A Community-Based, Focused-Deterrence Approach to Closing Overt Drug Markets

A Process and Fidelity Evaluation of Seven Sites

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Preface

Overt drug markets are not as prominent as they once were, but they still exist and are often associated with violence and property crime, as well as lower quality of life for nearby residents. Despite the considerable strain that these markets can place on communities, efforts to close them can disrupt the delicate relationship between those who live in these communities and the criminal justice agencies charged with protecting them. The Bureau of Justice Assistance funded Michigan State University (MSU) to train a cohort of seven jurisdictions in 2010 to implement a community-based strategy that uses focused deterrence, community engagement, and incapacitation to reduce the crime and disorder associated with these markets. The strategy was inspired by the High Point Drug Market Intervention and RAND was selected by the National Institute of Justice to evaluate these efforts. This process evaluation details how well the seven sites adhered to the model they were exposed to during the trainings, the barriers they encountered, and lessons learned from their experiences. It should be of interest to decisionmakers considering new approaches to addressing overt drug markets and those assessing whether this intervention affected crime and other outcomes in these jurisdictions.

The RAND Justice Policy Program

The research reported here was conducted in the RAND Justice Policy Program, which spans both criminal and civil justice systems issues, with topics including public safety, effective policing, police-community relations, drug policy and enforcement, corrections policy, use of technology in law enforcement, tort reform, catastrophe and mass injury compensation, court resourcing, and insurance regulation. Program research is supported by government agencies, foundations, and the private sector.

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Questions or comments about this report should be sent to the Allison Ober (aober@rand.org). For more information about the Justice Policy Program, see http://www.rand.org/jie or contact the director at justice@rand.org.

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Summary

Overt drug markets—which bring together buyers and sellers in geographically well-defined areas—not only facilitate the sale and use of drugs, but also can pose threats to public health and safety. Participants in these markets sometimes engage in violence, and the markets can have other negative effects on the quality of life for nearby residents, including noise, vandalism, burglary, prostitution, traffic congestion, begging, and disorderly conduct. Despite the considerable strain these markets can place on communities, efforts to close them with traditional law enforcement practices often challenge the delicate relationship between communities and criminal justice agencies, particularly when the involvement of law enforcement exacerbates long-standing mistrust between police and community members.

In 2010, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funded Michigan State University (MSU) to train a cohort of seven jurisidictions to implement a community-based strategy that uses focused deterrence, community engagement, and incapacitation to reduce the crime and disorder associated with overt markets. The strategy was inspired by the High Point Drug Market Intervention (DMI) (Kennedy, 2009) and RAND was selected by the National Institute of Justice to evaluate these efforts.

BJA originally had planned to support the training of 12 sites across two training cohorts of six sites each; however, there was much less demand for the training than anticipated. The training and technical assistance (TTA) providers engaged in supplemental recruitment activities, but still were only able to identify seven sites that were able to attend the training, so the original evaluation plans, which included randomization, were not possible. BJA provided sites with modest funding to travel to the training sessions; sites were not provided with any additional funding for implementation of the program. Teams from all seven sites that expressed interest participated in the training; these were Flint, Michigan; Guntersville, Alabama; Jacksonville, Florida; Lake County, Indiana; Montgomery County, Maryland; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Roanoke, Virginia.

The sites were trained using an implementation strategy created by the BJA training and technical assistance team and inspired by the High Point Drug Market Intervention (DMI). It is beyond the scope of this report to describe all of the differences between these approaches; interested readers are encouraged to consult the two program manuals (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009a; National Network for Safe Communities, 2013). In general, the models differ in their instruction on community involvement and engagement, the order of the steps, and the National Network Model always includes a racial reconciliation component, whereas the BJA training model only includes this if a particular site deems it necessary. Appendix A also demonstrates that the ratio of A-listers to B-listers was much smaller in the High Point DMIs than in most places that have attempted to adopt a similar strategy. It is impossible to say whether different

outcomes could have been secured had there been more of a focus on racial reconciliation or smaller A-lister to B-lister ratios in the sites that made it to the call-in.

RAND conducted a thorough assessment of the effort, examining program implementation; program impact on crime and disorder, drug market dynamics, and community police relations; and costs. The process evaluation was developed using a linear logic model similar to one presented by the W.K. Kellogg Foundation (2004) and modified by Donaldson (2007). Using this model, we examined *inputs* (implementation processes, context and environment, and costs) and their relationship with *short-term outputs*, such as fidelity to the training model, program implementation, and engagement and support of the community. We also examined the relationship of both inputs and short-term outputs to *long-term impact*, such as changes in crime over time (Donaldson, 2007; W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2004).

This report focuses on the process evaluation and details how each site implemented the different phases of the strategy, innovations they developed, barriers they encountered, and how well the sites adhered to the BJA model they were exposed to during the training (i.e., fidelity). Process evaluation data collection occurred primarily from March 2011 through April 2012 (some of the sites were followed through 2013, if they fully implemented the model). To conduct the process evaluation, the RAND team attended training sessions, conducted site visits, attended project team meetings and community events, recorded activities, and attended and conducted a process recording of the call-in (i.e., took detailed notes on procedures and observations). RAND also conducted semistructured interviews with most of each site's team members before and after the call-in, gathered input about fidelity to the BJA approach and barriers to implementation, and reviewed media accounts of the interventions.

Results

Figure S.1 shows the progress of the seven sites, by phase. Throughout implementation, sites encountered barriers, and some implemented various innovations to enhance the process. All seven sites were able to complete Phase I (Planning for the Intervention) and at least begin Phase II (Targeting Drug Markets), while five sites moved forward to Phase III (Working with the Community). Only four sites made it to Phase IV (Preparing for the Call-In), which is the point that most researchers and practitioners consider the date of implementation (i.e., intervention date) and thus were able to complete all five phases of the implementation (Phase V involves following up after the call-in).

Figure S.1. Implementation Progress of the Seven Sites, by Phase

Phase I: Planning for the Intervention

In the first phase, the team is formed. As conceived, the team consists of four core members who come from law enforcement, prosecution, social services, and the community (often a member of the religious community). Next, according to BJA's TTA model, the team is supposed to conduct a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis—identifying these various aspects of their team and location.

Sites varied in the way they initiated the strategy. Two teams were initiated by law enforcement, two by prosecutors, and others by a local organization or a city council member. At the outset of the planning process, all but two of the sites (Jacksonville and Lake County) had identified and recruited individuals to fill each of the recommended four core roles on the team. During the planning phase, teams varied in how regularly they met, ranging from weekly to monthly. Barriers in the planning phase included difficulty in translating program knowledge to suit the specific setting, high turnover within teams, and lack of buy-in from leadership from the participating criminal justice systems agencies. Teams did not specifically conduct a formal

SWOT analysis to determine whether they were ready to move forward, although this may have been done informally. It is not clear why this step was not formally undertaken by sites.

Phase II: Targeting the Drug Market

The second phase involves targeting a specific drug market. Using objective crime measures to select the market—and communicating this to the community—demonstrates that the program target is not based on subjective criteria or police bias. According to the training model, the target area should be narrowly defined, which will allow the team to concentrate its efforts and identify all street-level drug dealers.

Teams differed in their approaches to crime mapping and defining the target area. Four teams (Flint, Jacksonville, Lake County, and Roanoke) relied on a formal analysis of local crime data (as prescribed in the model). The team in Montgomery County, on the other hand, chose its target area because it was the *only* viable area within the city to implement the strategy (the city only had one overt drug market). To identify the candidates (i.e., drug dealers to be targeted by the intervention), most teams adhered to the model, using some combination of informants, tips from community members, and information from officers assigned to the target area and special narcotics divisions. Of the two teams that did not follow the model, one (Flint) used existing warrants to identify candidates and the other (New Orleans) identified candidates from a list of dealers from an ongoing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) investigation.

Three teams (Guntersville, Montgomery County, and Roanoke) followed the model to build cases against the candidates by using confidential informants to conduct undercover buys, and some used undercover police officers because of difficulty identifying informants. The remaining teams either never initiated or did not complete this step. Barriers to this phase included lack of manpower and budgetary issues, lack of clarity about how to conduct the undercover investigations so they could be used in the subsequent call-in, and changes in leadership.

Phase III: Working with the Community

In Phase III, which often occurs simultaneously with Phase II and Phase IV, the team engages key stakeholders and community members to obtain their buy-in. This phase also provides an opportunity for law enforcement and the community to engage in a dialogue and heal damaged relationships. Sites employed a combination of activities to engage community members in the intervention, including community meetings, meetings with community leaders, community events, developing and administering community surveys to obtain opinions about drug dealing in the neighborhood and about the community's relationship with the police, and door-to-door contact with residents. All but one of the sites that passed the targeting stage conducted at least one meeting to reach out to target area residents before the call-in. The only site that did not hold a formal meeting before the call-in was Montgomery County because the team worried that such a meeting would jeopardize ongoing undercover investigations. Barriers

to community involvement included lack of community interest, along with the perception that the process was invasive.

Three sites tried something different than the standard community engagement approaches. Guntersville organized separate meetings with church leaders, community stakeholders, and charitable organizations to explain the purpose of the strategy and request support. A formalized survey of residents' views of crime and disorder that the Lake County team developed and conducted was also a true innovation because the team was able to have the survey included in residents' utility bills. However, due to the lack of support and funding, the surveys were never analyzed. Roanoke also conducted an informal neighborhood survey, sending police officers door to door before the call-in. The survey was used to identify issues of concern in the community to address after the call-in.

Phase IV: Preparing for the Call-In

The call-in is a large community meeting, generally led by a high-level law enforcement representative, where the B-listers are confronted with their illegal and antisocial behavior. They are offered a second chance, with the understanding that if they do not take it, there will be certain, swift, and severe consequences. They are also offered a variety of social services, such as drug treatment, educational assistance, and job skills training, to meet needs that could otherwise impede efforts to stop dealing drugs. Four sites held call-ins (Flint, Guntersville, Montgomery County, and Roanoke). All these sites successfully apprehended and charged A-listers. All teams that held a call-in also successfully notified offenders and/or their families through invitation letters, and most attended the call-in meetings. Call-in venues and formats were similar across the sites and adherent to the model, with all sites presenting a strong deterrence message to offenders and their families.

Phase V: After the Call-In

The final phase consists of two main efforts. First, on the law enforcement side, the target area receives additional services, manpower, and prioritized calls for service; law enforcement also continues to communicate with the community personally or through newsletters, meetings, etc., and follow up with the B-listers to ensure that they are not reoffending. Second, on the community side, community members organize and exert their own informal social control, such as making the neighborhood inhospitable to drug dealers, or developing a neighborhood watch and cooperating with police by reporting drug dealing and other crimes to prevent both the B-listers and any would-be replacement dealers from reestablishing the overt drug market.

Following the call-in, most law enforcement agencies prioritized calls for service and stepped up patrol in the target areas, and one site added resources such as neighborhood video cameras, a dedicated telephone line for calls for service, and bike patrols. All sites engaged in community follow-up through such means as community engagement events and meetings, although some to a lesser degree. One site (Guntersville) formed several specific committees to address ongoing

community concerns. However, none of the sites except Roanoke assigned someone to follow up with the B-listers, making progress at the other sites difficult to track. (In Roanoke, a police officer served as a mentor to the B-listers and checked in with them regularly. Although assignment of a mentor is not explicitly stated in the model, some sort of ongoing follow-up with B-listers is.) Barriers to follow-up after the call-in include budgetary and manpower issues and difficulty in following up with B-listers. Innovations included partnerships with community businesses, organizations, and leaders; use of a database to track B-listers' use of social services; and trainings on the strategy for police dispatchers.

Implementation Lessons Learned

The report highlights five implementation lessons from this round of BJA trainings:

Lesson One: Without a strong commitment from leadership within the local law enforcement department and the prosecutor's office, it will be very hard—if not impossible—to successfully implement the intervention. Three sites did not make it to the call-in phase. While each site experienced its own difficulties, the common theme at these sites was the lack of support at the highest levels of police departments or prosecutor's offices or the loss of initial support from leaders at these key agencies over time. Although a commitment from all four entities—law enforcement, prosecutors, community representatives, and service providers—is important to the success of the program, a very strong and sustained commitment from the top leadership in police departments and prosecutor's offices seem to be vital to the success. An initial commitment that is not sustained, or lack of strong commitment from one of these entities, may impede full implementation.

For example, even though the New Orleans initiative began in the police department, there were challenges because it was initiated at the managerial level; as a result, team members were hesitant to act because they were unsure of support from police department leadership. The Lake County initiative ultimately failed because it was not strongly supported by the police chief. Guntersville was led by the county district attorney and had strong support from the local police leadership.

The need for prosecutorial support is also clear. In Flint, budget issues within the prosecutor's office prevented the assignment of a single prosecutor to handle all intervention cases, which made it difficult to follow up adequately with A-listers and B-listers who were caught violating the terms of their suspended cases. In the case of Jacksonville, the state's attorney did not lend strong support; in Lake County, the team prosecutor left the position.

Lesson Two: Team members should have a good understanding of the approach before beginning the process. A full understanding of the training model from the outset will prevent avoidable missteps and will likely improve fidelity to the model. In Flint, the team was anxious to roll out the program and began preparing for a scheduled call-in before the first BJA training session. However, once the team learned it had not completed all the steps, it retroactively

attempted to complete some of them. As a result, the original call-in date was delayed and some community members became distrustful about whether the team was going to follow through with its promises. Similarly, the team did not understand that the community engagement after the call-in was important until the training was complete; as a result, this phase was not as strong as it could have been if the team had had sufficient time to prepare.

Lesson Three: Team turnover should be expected and addressed in advance. Most of the teams experienced some turnover in the core membership, and in some cases, this put an end to the intervention. Several team members mentioned that it was important to have multiple people from each sector familiar with the project in case someone changes positions.

In both Jacksonville and Lake County, the programs ceased when those who spearheaded the effort to implement it left for other positions. While it is impossible to know what would have happened if the jurisdictions had received grant funds to implement the program, it is likely that the agencies receiving the funds would have felt an obligation to follow through on the work plan even with the departure of a key team member. This is a liability that should be discussed at the outset of the effort.

Lesson Four: Political situations can influence implementation and program support. Initially, Lake County received support from the police chief and the mayor. However, during the planning phase, they experienced a change in leadership within the mayor's office and the Gary Police Department. During and after the transition, the team stalled and was not able to move forward with completing the targeting phase. In New Orleans, scandals within the police department led to a change in leadership. During the change in leadership, team members did not know if new leadership was aware of the intervention or whether they had the authorization to move forward, which also led the initiative to stall. While political situations may not be easy to prepare for, teams should be aware of this issue, and if applicable, brief and gain support from new leadership on the intervention as soon as possible.

Lesson Five: If sites plan to track dealers, an action plan should be developed before the call-in. Some sites did not develop specific systems for tracking A-listers and B-listers, either from the outset or at all. This information is important for understanding the causal mechanisms underlying observed changes, keeping track of intervention costs, and successfully delivering on the deterrence message.

Some sites were not able to keep careful track of whether B-listers were complying with the terms of program, and some lacked specific requirements for B-lister participation. While follow-up with B-listers may not be the crux of the intervention, the success of B-listers in ceasing their drug dealing (and, in some cases, completing a social service program) and/or the success of police apprehending B-listers who do not comply with program requirements may reinforce the intervention's message within the community.

Conclusion

BJA had originally planned to support training of 12 sites across two training cohorts of six sites each; however, there was much less demand for the training than anticipated. It is unclear whether the seven sites that did end up participating would have been selected had other candidate jurisdictions been considered (i.e., other sites might have been more likely to successfully implement the strategy). The four sites that were able to hold a call-in attributed their success to a clear focus, strong leadership, and support from top leadership in the police department and prosecutor's office. These sites were also able to work relatively quickly, holding their call-ins approximately nine months after the first training. Our hope is that this process evaluation is useful for decisionmakers considering new approaches to addressing overt drug markets and those assessing whether this intervention affected crime and other outcomes in these jurisdictions.

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Abbreviations

BJA	Bureau of Justice Assistance
DMI	drug market intervention
FACT	Flint Area Congregation Together
FPD	Flint Police Department
GIS	geographic information system
HHS	Health and Human Services
HIDTA	High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
HMIS	Homeless Managing Information System
JSO	Jacksonville Sheriff's Office
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MSU	Michigan State University
NA	not applicable
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NNSC	National Network for Safe Communities
NOPD	New Orleans Police Department
POC	point of contact
RICO	Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
SWOT	strength, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
TAP	[Roanoke] Total Action against Poverty
TTA	training and technical assistance
YEP	[New Orleans] Youth Empowerment Program

1. Introduction

Statement of the Problem

Overt drug markets—which bring together buyers and sellers of drugs at set times in geographically well-defined areas—can pose threats to public health and safety. Buyers and sellers in these markets sometimes engage in violence to resolve conflicts (Harocopos and Haugh, 2005), and the markets can also have other deleterious effects on the quality of life for nearby residents, including noise, vandalism, robbery, prostitution, traffic congestion, begging, and disorderly conduct (Baumer et al., 1998; Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 1998; Weisburd and Mazerolle, 2000). Yet despite the considerable strain these markets can place on communities, efforts to close them can disrupt the delicate relationship between communities and the criminal justice system. Furthermore, with overt markets in many cities occurring primarily in African-American neighborhoods, the involvement of law enforcement can exacerbate long-standing mistrust between police and community members, some of whom may believe that police "are part of a conspiracy to destroy the community" (Kennedy and Wong, 2009).

Early law enforcement efforts to disrupt and close overt drug markets had mixed success, both in terms of reducing crime and violence and in achieving community satisfaction with police enforcement activities (Caulkins, 1993). In response to these challenges, another approach to addressing overt drug markets has been to implement a drug market intervention (DMI).

The goals of the DMI approach—borrowed from the "pulling levers" strategy that was developed to reduce youth gun violence in Boston (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996; Kennedy, 1997; Braga, 2008)—are to (1) eliminate overt drug markets, (2) return the neighborhood to the residents (i.e., by demonstrating that they do not tolerate drug dealers in their neighborhoods, forming a neighborhood watch, or by reporting drug dealing to the police to send a message to dealers that drug dealing will no longer be tolerated in the community), (3) reduce crime and disorder, and (4) improve the public's safety and quality of life (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b). A DMI attempts to disrupt and close down overt drug markets through the use of threat and sanction, as well as community-building. In a DMI, police officers identify sellers involved in the market, make undercover buys, and build credible cases to prosecute the offenders engaged in drug sales. Police and prosecutors arrest and prosecute dealers who are deemed to be violent and dangerous (these offenders are labeled "A-listers") and publicly announce the threat of arrest against the remaining dealers (called "B-listers"). Concurrently, the community is encouraged to "take back" its neighborhood and prevent new markets from forming.

Although there is some variation in the way a DMI is conducted (Kennedy and Wong, 2009; Hipple, Corsaro, and McGarrell, 2010a; Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b), it typically consists of five phases (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009a): (1) planning for the DMI, including developing the

DMI team; (2) targeting the drug market through crime analyses, incident review, and undercover operations; (3) working with the community to obtain buy-in by engaging community members, business leaders, and faith-based organizations; (4) planning for and conducting the "call-in," a public community meeting that brings together law enforcement, B-listers, their families, and community members; and (5) conducting enforcement and community follow-up after the call-in. The call-in, which occurs after violent dealers (A-listers) have been arrested, is the most public feature of the DMI and a critical point of interaction between the community and the police. During the meeting, documentation of B-listers drug-dealing behavior is shared publicly, and offenders are offered the chance to avoid arrest by agreeing to cease their drug dealing. They are also offered social services to help them change their behavior. The DMI also sometimes includes a discussion of the history between the police and community members to address long-standing and persistent conflict and to bring dialogue about racism to the forefront (Kennedy and Wong, 2009). After the call-in, the DMI team facilitates community mobilization and the formation of strong informal social control, such as formation of neighborhood watch groups and other activities that serve to lower tolerance for drug-dealing and reset community norms, to prevent replacement dealers from establishing themselves and the market from reemerging.

Focus of This Study

More-systematic and multimethod studies using strong methodological frameworks and evaluation models are needed to fully understand if, how, and how well the program works, (Braga and Weisburd, 2012a; Braga, 2012). The National Institute of Justice funded the RAND Corporation to study a cohort of new sites that signed up for a training and technical assistance (TTA) program funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). RAND's evaluation offers a thorough assessment of the training program inspired by the High Point DMI, examining program implementation; program impact on crime and disorder, drug market dynamics, and community police relations; and program cost-effectiveness. The comprehensive evaluation was developed used a linear logic model similar to one presented by the W.K. Kellogg Foundation (2004) and modified by Donaldson (2007). Using the model, we examined *inputs* (implementation processes, context and environment, and costs) and their relationship with *short-term outputs,* such as fidelity to the model, program implementation, and engagement and support of the community. We also examined the relationship of both inputs and short-term outputs to *long-term impact* (see Figure 1.1), such as changes in crime over time (Donaldson, 2007; W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2004). This report includes only the process evaluation, which describes how each site implemented the intervention along each of the program's five phases, as well as the fidelity of each site to the model.

Sites included in the overall evaluation are those that participated in a BJA-funded TTA program conducted by Michigan State University (MSU) and many of the original High Point

DMI team members—consisting of at least one member of local law enforcement, one prosecutor, one social service worker, and one influential community member. These sites were spread across the United States and expressed interested in implementing the program. They were invited to participate in the TTA, solicited through an announcement requesting applications. Seven sites applied for and participated in the training: Flint, Michigan; Guntersville, Alabama; Jacksonville, Florida; Lake County, Indiana; Montgomery County, Maryland; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Roanoke, Virginia. The sole requirement for acceptance was the formation of a team and the commitment to attend the trainings. The BJA training consisted of five sessions that covered all aspects of implementation and follow-up. BJA provided sites with modest funding to attend the training sessions; sites were not provided with any additional funding for implementation.

Figure 1.1. Evaluation Logic Model



Organization of This Report

The remainder of this report is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two describes the motivation and theoretical underpinnings for DMI. Chapter Three describes the approach used in this evaluation, including the study settings and the methods used. Chapters Four through Eight present the results of RAND's process evaluation for each of the five phases, and Chapter Nine presents a discussion of our findings and implementation lessons learned. The document also contains seven appendices. Appendix A contains a ratio of A-listers to B-listers, Appendix B lists the sentences for A-listers, Appendix C contains process evaluation forms, and Appendix D details the information sought from semistructured interviews. Appendices E and F include more information on the Roanoke program. A separate online Appendix G includes the site reports.

2. Motivation for and Theoretical Underpinnings of the DMI

As noted in Chapter One, the DMI is designed to close down overt drug markets permanently through a collaborative approach between law enforcement (i.e., police and prosecutors) and the community. The DMI was created in response to backlash against aggressive police tactics, which were often seen as unfair and racially motivated. The DMI is intended to work by incapacitating drug dealers deemed dangerous to the community (e.g., because of previous or current involvement in violence), deterring other drug dealers, and enhancing police legitimacy while increasing the community's capacity to exert informal social control. This is a departure from the traditional "police crackdowns" because the DMI is organized around the idea that police resources are most efficiently used when they target the right people while working with the community.

Traditional Approaches to Closing Drug Markets

Due to the harmful effects of the open-air drug markets, they have received a great deal of attention from public officials, criminal justice agencies, and public health workers in attempts to shut them down. Harocopos and Haugh (2005) identify five general types of strategies for open-air drug market suppression: (1) drug enforcement approaches, (2) community responses, (3) civil remedies, (4) modifying the physical environment, and (5) demand-reduction strategies. Here, we will discuss only the law-enforcement–driven market closure research literature that focuses on shutting down an entire overt drug market at once.

Police Crackdowns

Police crackdowns, which have been defined as "an intensive local enforcement effort directed at a particular geographic target," have been conducted for at least 50 years (Smith, 2001). The theory behind their use was that targeting enforcement resources in an area with a high concentration of drug market activity could essentially "break the back" of a local drug market in a way that a more-diffused application of resources could not. The closure of the market, in turn, would make drugs less accessible to users, and would make drug dealing less visible to community members.

Debates emerged over whether police crackdowns were effective at reducing drug crimes and eliminating drug markets, and, if these methods were effective, whether they were worth their cost in terms of community disruption and the damage to policy-community relations (Sherman, 1998; Aitken et al., 2002). Some arguments against crackdowns included the following:

- They simply displace drug activity to new geographic areas rather than eliminating the activity entirely.
- Any effects are short-lived, with drug markets bouncing back soon after the end of a crackdown.
- They strain relationships between police officers and the communities they serve
- They may exacerbate other related crime problems.

In addition, any benefits from crackdowns may come at the cost of impeding informal social control processes, such as neighborhood watch groups, by creating the impression that crime is solely the concern of the police or by alienating members of the community and causing hostility toward the police (Chermak, McGarrell, and Gruenewald, 2006).

The literature on crackdowns provides some examples of their lack of—and in some cases, negative—effects. In one case, a study of a police crackdown on a heroin market in Vancouver, Canada, concluded that the intervention did not change the price of drugs, the frequency of their use, or enrollment in treatment programs (Wood et al., 2004). In addition, the authors noticed displacement of injection drug use to other areas, along with an accompanying increase in discarded needles and a decrease in needles being returned to Vancouver's needle exchange program. In another case, a qualitative study of a crackdown on a heroin market in a suburb of Melbourne, Australia, found that while the intervention reduced the most visible aspects of the drug market, the effects were deemed "superficial and temporary"; furthermore, the intervention resulted in displacement of the drug problem to other areas and discouraged safe injection practices (Aitken et al., 2002). Similar findings emerged from another qualitative study on a heroin market in a suburb of Sydney, Australia (Maher and Dixon, 2001). The authors noted that the crackdown in this instance led to dispersion of users, displacement of the market and its attendant violence, displacement of heroin use with pharmaceuticals, and the possible straining of relationships between police and ethnic minorities in an area where "police legitimacy is insecure." Finally, Moeller (2009) reported on the effects of a crackdown on the cannabis market in Copenhagen, Denmark, that involved dozens of arrests and the imposition of a "zero tolerance zone." In the aftermath of the crackdown, the number of drug transactions declined drastically as the price increased moderately; however, maintenance proved costly and led to large confrontations between the police and the community, injuries suffered by officers, and formal complaints against police conduct. Furthermore, retailers innovated with new forms of distribution that made cannabis dealing more visible in other areas of the city while market participants engaged in violent struggles for market share.

Kennedy and Wong (2009) note that typically after police activities to close a market are undertaken, "drug dealers return, new dealers come into the neighborhood, and the drug markets are quickly back in business" (Kennedy and Wong, 2009, p. iii). Indeed, a police crackdown that results in a short-term crime reduction can actually undermine long-term control by diminishing informal community mechanisms. Evidence suggests that police enforcement efforts could be more effective if the efforts had greater community support and "legitimacy," enhanced the

certainty of punishment rather than the severity of punishment, were limited in duration, and rotated their focus from hot spot to hot spot.

Beyond the Traditional Crackdown

Cognizant of the limitations of traditional crackdowns, academic researchers have developed innovative ways of maximizing the benefits of this approach while reducing its costs. Theoretical work by Caulkins (1993) points out that while police in a given jurisdiction may have sufficient resources to collapse a drug market with a crackdown, maintenance of the effect requires additional resources that, if lacking, could preclude the elimination of subsequent markets—that is, unless significant community support is obtained. However, if the community is sufficiently engaged in maintaining the first market's elimination, enough police resources might be freed up to target additional markets. Insights such as this conform to modern theories of community policing (Chermak, McGarrell, and Gruenewald, 2006), and have led to the rise of new approaches toward crackdowns.

Analysts have emphasized that the *certainty* of punishment, rather than the *severity*, seems to be crucial to a would-be criminal's decisionmaking process. Observational evidence from multiple countries suggests a weak relationship between punishment severity and levels of crime (Farrington, Langan, and Wikstrom, 1994). However, a review of studies from the United States and Great Britain concluded that greater certainty of punishment was associated with lower crime rates, while the association between severity and crime rates was much weaker (Von Hirsch et al., 1999). According to Nagin and Pogarsky, "punishment certainty is far more consistently found to deter crime than punishment severity, and the extra-legal consequences of crime seem at least as great a deterrent as the legal consequences" (2001, p. 865). One relatively recent innovation used to communicate the risk of sanction involves face-to-face meetings between police and offenders. Observers of this strategy suggest that holding face-to-face meetings with offenders could be a useful way to communicate the risk of punishment and deter crime (McGarrell et al., 2006).

Another key insight in the development of new deterrence approaches is that a large portion of crime is committed by a small number of persistent offenders whose habits may be known and potentially controlled. This observation led Kennedy (1997) to suggest that crime control measures should focus on these persistent offenders, and he described a *focused deterrence approach* to control "selected dimensions of criminal behavior." This approach, which has come to be known as "pulling levers," holds that directly communicating a deterrence message to specific individuals who are at the greatest risk of involvement in crime but are still low-level offenders can increase perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment related to those crimes (Kennedy, 2009). One of the first applications of this approach occurred in Operation Ceasefire, an effort to reduce youth gang violence in Boston beginning in 1995; a review of focused deterrence programs and their effectiveness can be found in a recent meta-analysis (Braga and Weisburd, 2012b). Of the focused deterrence approach, Kennedy said: "It may be

that a key aspect of getting the deterrence equation right is simply communicating directly with the last group that is usually considered for inclusion in crime control strategies: offenders themselves."

Designing the Drug Market Intervention

The DMI program was developed in High Point, North Carolina, to supplement the crackdown approach with some of the new thinking on how to leverage deterrence and positively influence police-community relations (Kennedy, 2009). Specifically, the DMI relies on focused deterrence with respect to lower-level offenders while incapacitating dangerous offenders and empowering communities to set up norms—such as showing disdain for drug dealers, forming neighborhood watch groups, and reporting drug dealers to the police—that prevent the overt drug markets from reestablishing. The credible threat of sanctions to specific individuals at risk of becoming more-serious offenders is thought to deter further crime. Additionally, as noted by McGarrell, Corsaro, and Brunson (2010), delivering deterrence messages in a respectable but public way—such as having respected community members involved in the delivery of the message and offering social support to low-level offenders—builds on procedural justice (Tyler, 1990) and re-integrative shaming theory (Braithwaite, 1989; McGarrell, Corsaro, and Brunson, 2010). Within the DMI framework, this is achieved through the call-in, when B-list dealers are presented with the evidence against them, the sanctions they would face, and an ultimatum to discontinue dealing by midnight.

The DMI also relies on an improved relationship between law enforcement and community members and, ultimately, gives greater responsibility to community members (Kennedy, 2009) who are determined not to tolerate overt drug dealing and help prevent it from reoccurring (McGarrell, Corsaro, and Brunson, 2010). To improve the relationship between law enforcement and the community, the DMI involves an effort to examine and change the traditional "narrative" on both sides (Kennedy and Wong, 2009). This is in line with a procedural justice approach in which law enforcement is transparent in its operations so that the community can understand and endorse their policies, procedures, and operations. Ultimately, the DMI holds that, through improved collective efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997) and the reassertion of community social control (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b), community members take more responsibility for their neighborhood and hold drug dealers accountable for their behavior. As part of the DMI approach, police commit to responding promptly to calls for service, which is thought to improve perceptions of police legitimacy (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b; Kennedy and Wong, 2009) and thus more likely to make individuals more like to comply with the law (Tyler, 1990).

The BJA TTA program focuses on five phases of implementation (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b):

- In Phase I, representatives from four entities (law enforcement, prosecutor's office, community, social services) come together to form a team dedicated to closing the overt

drug market. Ideally, the law enforcement and prosecutorial representatives are people with decisionmaking abilities within their organizations; the influential community member is well-known and respected within the community; and the social service representative, while not necessarily a provider him or herself, should be someone who can bring service providers together to offer services to DMI candidates. The DMI team might also include a representative from the city or mayor's office, the U.S. Attorney's Office, faith-based organizations, probation and parole representatives, outreach workers, reentry services, research partners, and judges or public defenders. The timing of the DMI is site-specific and depends on many factors, but ideally the time from formation of the team to the call-in (Phase IV) is seven to 11 months.

- In Phase II, the team defines the target market and "maps" all the problems. Members of the team identify a discrete market, survey the drug problem, conduct incident reviews, identify all the active drug dealers, and conduct undercover operations to build cases against all the dealers in the target market. During this process, the team (or a small part of the team) divides local dealers into an "A-list" (dangerous and/or violent dealers) and a "B-list" (dealers not deemed to be dangerous or violent), as described earlier in this chapter. The names of A-listers are forwarded to the district attorney so they can be prosecuted and removed from the community, while the police and prosecution maintain the evidence against the B-listers and obtain unsigned arrest warrants to be used as leverage to encourage the B-listers to stop dealing drugs.
- Phase III, which is concurrent with Phase II, involves working with members of the community, whose support is essential to the program's success. This part of the program involves mobilizing the community to get buy-in and active participation. Community engagement activities often include a series of community meetings before the call-in that involve key criminal justice players, residents, neighborhood leaders, business owners, and faith-based leaders in the target area in order to achieve buy-in.
- Phase IV is the most public part of the program—the call-in. During the call-in, all the B-listers are invited to a community meeting and told that their drug dealing needs to stop immediately. They are shown the evidence against them, along with the unsigned warrants, and they are told that if they return to selling drugs, they will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. They are also told that the community cares about them and attempts are often made to connect them with the appropriate social services and other programs.
- Phase V involves community maintenance. In this phase, community members, who now see that law enforcement cares about their community and does not want to simply lock up all their members, effectively exert their informal social control by creating a community that does not tolerate drug dealing and by cooperating with the police to prevent the market from reemerging.

In the training model, police are encouraged to build relationships with prominent community members—including neighborhood association, business, and faith-based leaders—seeking their endorsements as well as their assistance in providing social services to B-listers. Kennedy (2009) argues that a crucial aspect of this involves racial reconciliation and "truth telling" in an effort to build mutual respect between community leaders and the police department, as programs are often conducted in predominantly African-American neighborhoods where there is a long history of racial tension between community members and the police.[1]

The impact of the DMI theoretically is related to several social and behavioral mechanisms. First, the market is decapitated, with all the dealers being removed almost simultaneously: The violent dealers are arrested and therefore incapacitated, and the other dealers (B-listers) are put under intense surveillance and given the assurance of swift, certain, and severe punishment if they continue to deal. Second, the DMI prevents replacement dealers from filling the newly unmet market demand by increasing police presence (i.e., formal social control) and increasing the likelihood that someone gets caught, thus enhancing the deterrence message to the B-listers and non-DMI–involved potential replacement dealers. During this time, the police develop a relationship with the community, demonstrating their commitment to improving the quality of life and preventing the overt market from re-establishing. The community can use this time to unify and take back its neighborhood. Third, the revitalized community is organized and able to effectively exert informal social control to prevent the return of overt drug selling. Community involvement is the key to the approach: In order for the focused deterrence message to be actualized, law enforcement and the criminal justice system must be able to successfully back up their threats, which they cannot do alone; DMI's success hinges on community cooperation and the establishment of strong community norms against overt drug selling. Community involvement after the call-in can be encouraged through fliers and posters, and through neighborhood watch groups, as well as community events such as barbecues and park clean-ups.

An effective deterrence message is established through increased social control, strong community norms, and improved police-citizen relations. This message forms the foundation for sustained change in the overt drug market and neighborhood quality of life. See Figure 2.1 for a model of sustained community change after a DMI.

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[1] The National Network Model always includes a racial reconciliation component, whereas the BJA training model only includes this if a particular site deems it necessary.

Figure 2.1. Theoretical Model: Mechanisms for Sustained Community Change After the DMI



The three complimentary mechanisms that really define the DMI and differentiate it from other programs—the mechanisms that are thought to be centrally responsible for its sustainability—are the building of police legitimacy through positive police-community relationships, increased community cooperation with law enforcement, and the establishment of neighborhood informal social control and collective efficacy. There is a robust literature on the importance of police legitimacy in influencing both cooperation with law enforcement and internal motivation to comply with the law (Hawdon, Ryan, and Griffin, 2003; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Meares, 2000; Meares, 2008; Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 2004). Police legitimacy has been found to be particularly important in the context where there are strained police/community relations and a high concentration of racial minorities and structural disadvantage (Meares, 2008; Tyler and Wakslak, 2004), conditions that characterize many overt drug markets (Fellner, 2009). The program's aim of strengthening police/community relations is particularly important because most DMIs have been implemented in African-American neighborhoods where misguided law enforcement approaches can exacerbate long-standing tensions between police and African-American community members, some of whom may believe that police "are part of a conspiracy to destroy the community" (Kennedy, 2009).

The DMI enhances police legitimacy and cooperation by engaging the community throughout the process and demonstrating that the police are committed to improving quality of life and not there simply to "arrest the problem away." By opening up a dialogue between the police and the community, and having law enforcement both clearly describe what it is doing (e.g., transparency) and withholding some of its powers (e.g., banking cases to demonstrate that they are not out to incarcerate low-level drug offenders, thus demonstrating their commitment to the community), they may effectively reduce the public's attribution of the police's behavior as biased, which in turn, has been shown to increases the acceptance of the police's authority (Tyler and Wakslak, 2004). Police legitimacy is an important predictor of both compliance with the law and cooperation with the police, which has been found to be vital for effective crime control and disorder management (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). In fact, police legitimacy has been found to be more important in influencing people's decisions to conform with the law than punishment (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). Legitimacy is influenced not only in the public's recognition of the police's authority, but also by the belief that the two groups share a moral purpose (Jackson et al., 2012). Community members who believe that the police are being transparent and considering their input are both more satisfied with police services and believe that the police are legitimate authorities (Hinds and Murphy, 2007). Through these mechanisms, the DMI should produce a better relationship between the community and police, resulting in sustainable reductions in both crime and disorder, as well as having the secondary benefit of increased positive perceptions of the police.

While building more-positive relationships with the community, the DMI also seeks to increase community capacity to begin to exert informal social control to prevent the market from reemerging. Programmatic elements that promote this include neighborhood activities, newsletters, services, and other activities mainly coordinated by the community and social service team members. Increased informal social control through collective efficacy has a long history of research support for controlling neighborhood crime (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1998). Collective efficacy, which is the neighborhood's ability to organize and control antisocial behavior through informal mechanisms, creates resilience to crime and disorder through community member's establishing strong community norms.

The High Point DMI, which took place in five neighborhoods, has received the most attention from researchers. The first formal evaluation, by Frabutt et al. (2009), found that the High Point DMI was a success—both law enforcement and the community reported positive perceptions of the program and noted how it reduced crime and disorder. Their analysis of simple crime statistics backed up these perceptions—crime was lower after the call-in than before in the target areas; however, the methods used to estimate the crime impact fall short of the methodological rigor required to make strong causal conclusions.

More recently, reanalysis of the High Point DMI crime data has included comparison groups and other methodological additions that have attempted to estimate the causal effect more

precisely. Corsaro et al. (2012) examined not only the High Point DMI target areas versus the rest of the city, but also added analyses of areas adjacent to the target areas and propensity score matching to create matches on blocks with similar crime trajectories. They found an 18-percent decline in violent crime in the traditional model and 14-percent decline in the matched model. Saunders et al. (2015) used a different approach that creates a counterfactual to the target market by identifying different locations in the same city that collectively have similar pretreatment characteristics in terms of sociodemographics and crime levels and trajectories. Using these methods, they estimated the effects on crime to be larger than previous evaluations with little evidence of displacement.

An initial expansion of the DMI in places such as Nashville, Tennessee; Providence, Rhode Island; Rockford, Illinois; and Winston-Salem, North Carolina, took place before the official evaluation of the High Point DMI was published. Shortly after, BJA established a formal training and technical assistance program and, to date, more than 30 sites have been formally trained and attempted to implement the DMI. The published evaluations of the efforts in Nashville Providence, Rockford, and Winston-Salem, suggest that the effort reduced crime (Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell, 2009; Corsaro and McGarrell, 2009; Frabutt et al., 2009; Kennedy and Wong, 2009; McGarrell, Corsaro, and Brunson, 2010), while evaluations of the efforts in Peoria yielded no statistically significant decreases in crime (Corsaro et al., 2011; Corsaro and Brunson, 2013). However, there is tremendous variation in the rigor of the analytic approaches used in these replications, which is further discussed in Saunders et al. (2015; see, also, Braga and Weisburd, 2012a).

3. Approach Used in this Process Evaluation

In this chapter, we describe the seven sites evaluated in this study and discuss the methods used in our process evaluation. For the discussion of settings, we first describe the geographic representation of the seven sites, and then describe each site and its targeted drug market.

Current Study Settings

Seven sites participated in the BJA-funded trainings in 2010. This was the third cohort of sites to go through the BJA-funded TTA program and the first to be formally evaluated. The original plan was for BJA to support the training of 12 sites across two training cohorts of six sites each; however, there was much less demand for the training than anticipated. The BJA TTA providers engaged in supplemental recruitment activities, but still could only identify seven sites that were able to attend the free training. Therefore, all the sites that applied to participate were provided with the training (including travel) free of charge, and they were all included in our evaluation. (BJA did not provide any funds to sites to implement the intervention.) The sites were trained using an implementation strategy outlined by the BJA TTA team (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009a). The sites were primarily concentrated east of the Mississippi River, and ranged from Michigan to Florida (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1. Geographic Representation of Seven Sites



The target drug markets in each of the sites were also diverse (see Table 3.1), according to the categories of drug markets described by Reuter and MacCoun (1992). Appendix G (available separately online) contains more information on the targeted drug markets.

Table 3.1. The Targeted Drug Markets

Site	2010 Population	Primary Drugs Sold in the Target Market	Drug Sale Methods in the Target Drug Market
Flint, Michigan	102,191	Cocaine and heroin	Export*/Local** Market: Heroin buyers predominately from outside the area; cocaine buyers both local to target area and outsiders; sold from abandoned properties
Guntersville, Alabama	8,214	Crack cocaine, some marijuana and methamphetamine	Export/Public*** Market: Most buyers and some sellers believed to come from outside target area; many buys occur in local park
Jacksonville, Florida	823,291	Crack cocaine and marijuana	Local Market: Dealers mostly only sell to known local customers; little evidence of drug transactions visible from the street
Lake County, Indiana	496,052	Cocaine, heroin, and marijuana	Local Market: Most buyers are local; most buys thought to occur indoors, but outdoors in warmer months
Montgomery County, Maryland	975,630	Crack, heroin, pharmaceutical pills, and marijuana	Export/Local Market: Buyers typically known to dealers; sold in apartments or cars
New Orleans, Louisiana	347,965	Heroin and crack cocaine; some powder cocaine, marijuana, and prescription pills	Export Market: Several drive-through overt drug markets
Roanoke, Virginia	96,790	Crack cocaine and marijuana	Export/Local Market: Both indoor and outdoor drug markets

* Export Market: Neighborhood residents sell to non-residents
** Local Market: Mostly resident dealers and customers
*** Public Market: Sellers and customers are mostly non-residents (MacCoun et al., 2003)

Next, we briefly describe each of the seven sites and the drug markets targeted within each site. We obtained information about the sites and the drug markets through police reports, interviews with the team members, observation of the sites, and by additional public documentation on the sites. Additional information about the sites is found in Appendices A–G.

Flint, Michigan

Flint, Michigan, is a medium-sized urban city in Genesee County, 66 miles northwest of Detroit. Before the trainings, Flint had experienced a rise in gun violence and a sharp increase in murders, and the city was ranked number one per capita for homicides in 2010. A preliminary

analysis conducted by the Flint Police Department (FPD) and MSU faculty indicated that drugs were connected to a high proportion of these homicides. The city is undergoing a significant population decline, going from a quarter-million residents at its peak in the late 1970s to just over 100,000 inhabitants now. The city's major industry was previously a General Motors plant, which now stands vacant; only a couple of auto part supplier companies remain of what was once the main source of jobs in Flint.

Like the city, the FPD has suffered serious declines in numbers, going from more than 300 sworn officers in 1996 to about 130 in 2010. Efforts to control the growing violent crime problem have been hampered by the significant decline in the city budget over the past decade and the corresponding reduction in the size of the police force. A Project Safe Neighborhood grant that the FPD counted on in its fight against crime is now gone, leaving the department without extra resources for special projects.

Targeted Drug Market: Area in Northwest Flint. The market initially targeted was a large area in northwest Flint, about one square mile, referred to as Flint's Second Ward. By and large, the area consists primarily of single-family homes populated by a mix of owners and renters, with a few gas stations and fast-food restaurants. Nine in ten residents are African-American, and most are poor, elderly, or both. There are many boarded-up homes, vacant lots, and whole vacant blocks where homes that were built to house auto workers have been torn down. According to the police, the main drugs sold in the area are cocaine and heroin. Heroin customers are thought to be mostly outsiders, while cocaine is sold to both locals and people from outside the neighborhood. The police believe that the majority of drug sales occur inside the many abandoned houses in the neighborhood. The Second Ward was the target zone for their first two intervention efforts.

Guntersville, Alabama

Guntersville, a small town in northern Alabama, has a population of 8,366 and is the county seat of Marshall County. Guntersville is about 45 miles southeast of Huntsville and 65 miles northeast of Birmingham, and it has a total area of 42.4 square miles, of which 25.4 square miles is land and 17.0 square miles, or 40 percent, is water. The city is largely residential and contains a concentrated area of quaint stores and restaurants on the two streets that constitute the center of the town. Poultry processing plants in and around Guntersville and bass fishing tourism fuel the local economy.

Targeted Drug Market: Lakeview Community. The target neighborhood of Lakeview Community" also has been referred to historically as "the Hill." This name this is perceived as derogatory—possibly because it has been used in a derogatory manner in the past when referring to this high-crime, predominantly African-American enclave—and the community is making efforts to change this. Although an A&E documentary labeled Marshall County as "meth mountain" for its prevalent methamphetamine problem, crack cocaine is reported to be the most commonly used/sold drug in the Lakeview Community. Other substances sold in the Lakeview

Community include marijuana, prescription pain pills, and some methamphetamine. Customers come mostly from outside the area. Three-quarters of the residents of the targeted area are African-American. Major thoroughfares separate the Lakeview Community from other sections of Guntersville. Historically, relationships between community residents and law enforcement have been highly strained and contentious. Residents express a high degree of distrust of law enforcement, and well-publicized lawsuits were filed against the police for excessive force and a range of police misconduct in the Lakeview Community between 2008 and 2011.[1]

Jacksonville, Florida

Jacksonville is the largest city in Florida by population and the largest city by area in the contiguous United States. Located on the St. Johns River, the city is a major military and civilian deep-water port. The local economy is based on services such as banking, insurance, health care, logistics and tourism. Of its more than 500 neighborhoods, those with ongoing poverty and high crime and violence include neighborhoods in and adjacent to the downtown core: Downtown, Historic Springfield, and the section called Eastside. Downtown Jacksonville is the historic core and central business district of Jacksonville. Springfield is an historic residential neighborhood north of Downtown—in the early 1900s, it was home to many of Jacksonville's wealthiest residents.

Targeted Drug Market: Weed and Seed Area in East Jacksonville. The Weed and Seed[2] area consists primarily of single-family homes with some apartment buildings and public housing complexes. Most residents are African-American, many of whom are elderly and have lived in the area their whole lives. A neighborhood of historic homes within the area is undergoing gentrification with help from the city, which is installing bike lanes and other amenities to attract redevelopment efforts. According to members of the team, the main drugs sold in this area are crack cocaine and marijuana. The team states (and a ride-along by RAND researchers confirmed) that the markets maintain low visibility, often selling only to known local

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[1] Carla Maurice Moore et al., vs. City of Guntersville, et al., 2011.

[2] The U.S. Department of Justice's Weed and Seed program was

> developed to demonstrate an innovative and comprehensive approach to law enforcement and community revitalization, and to prevent and control violent crime, drug abuse, and gang activity in target areas. The program, initiated in 1991, attempts to weed out violent crime, gang activity, and drug use and trafficking in target areas, and then seed the target area by restoring the neighborhood through social and economic revitalization. Weed and Seed has three objectives: (1) develop a comprehensive, multiagency strategy to control and prevent violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime in target neighborhoods; (2) coordinate and integrate existing and new initiatives to concentrate resources and maximize their impact on reducing and preventing violent crime, drug trafficking, and gang activity; and (3) mobilize community residents in the target areas to assist law enforcement in identifying and removing violent offenders and drug traffickers from the community and to assist other human service agencies in identifying and responding to service needs of the target area. To achieve these goals, Weed and Seed integrates law enforcement, community policing, prevention, intervention, treatment, and neighborhood restoration efforts (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).

customers with little evidence of drug transactions visible from the street. Early discussions among the team members began to delineate the boundaries of a target area for the project using data on drug and violent crime complaints, and began to identify areas where they could get cooperation from neighborhood residents.

Lake County, Indiana

Located in the northern part of Lake County, Gary is the seventh largest city in Indiana, with a population just over 78,000. Early in its history, Gary prospered, with high levels of employment in the steel mills. However, with the decline of the steel industry, many of the mills laid off their employees, resulting in mass unemployment and increases in crime. Gary's population is in decline, and much of the city's middle class has left since the 1970s. Property taxes in Gary are high, but taxes are collected on only 70 percent of properties, principally because almost one-third are abandoned. According to team members, 50–60 percent of applicants for positions at some major area employers fail initial drug tests. A recent High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) analysis reported that cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are abundant in Gary.

Targeted Drug Market: Glen Park. The team targeted the Glen Park neighborhood for the intervention. The area of about 20 square blocks is about five miles from Gary's central business district. It is made up of primarily of single-family homes with a few low-rise apartment buildings. In contrast to most of the other sites, it has some commercial activity, including liquor stores, a barber shop, restaurants, groceries, gas stations, and a flea market. The area contains a mix of ages and a mix of renters and homeowners, and even some displaced people from Hurricane Katrina. Most of the more-recent residents are African-American. There is widespread abandonment in the area; on some blocks, houses are well kept, while on others, nearly all houses stand vacant. According to team members, the area has a high rate of violent crime and drug activity, as well as a number of houses where drugs are sold and consumed. Most buyers are thought to be local, but there are also many who come in cars from other parts of the county. Markets are said to operate primarily indoors, but they do operate outdoors during the warmer months, especially at gas stations.

Montgomery County, Maryland

Montgomery County in Maryland selected an overt drug market in Damascus, a small, unincorporated town in the northern part of the county.[3]

Targeted Drug Market: Damascus Gardens Apartment Complex. The targeted drug market, a public housing project, is located at a densely populated and somewhat urban, insular arrangement of seven residential apartment buildings. The apartment buildings—all identical in

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[3] Though unincorporated, Damascus's boundaries are defined as a result of its status as a "Census-Designated Place" (or CDP), and the U.S. Geological Survey's designation of it as a populated place.

shape and size—and their residents stand in sharp contrast to the otherwise suburban, pastoral surroundings of Damascus, which consists of large, single-family dwellings along wide, tree-lined streets. Of the total 5,010 occupied housing units within Damascus's 9.6 square miles, Damascus Gardens contains approximately 90 units in an area less than 0.01 square miles.

The crime rate in Damascus is generally low; however, the Montgomery County Police reported a relatively robust drug market in the Damascus Gardens community. The main drug problems, according to county police, included crack, heroin, pharmaceutical pills, and marijuana. Most buyers were repeat customers known to the dealers and the transactions typically took place in apartments or in the buyers' cars. According to the police, most customers were from the county, although some reportedly came from farther points such as Baltimore and West Virginia. Damascus Gardens was well known to drug-using commuters who passed through the area. Police reported that the market appeared to operate largely on a referral basis, and unfamiliar customers were sometimes assaulted and robbed.

New Orleans, Louisiana

New Orleans is in southeast Louisiana, at the crescent bend in the Mississippi River, 105 miles upriver from the Gulf of Mexico. Following Katrina, weeks of flooding created massive devastation, which was the impetus for an instantaneous decrease in population and a major increase in blight and abandoned properties. New Orleans experienced a 29.1-percent decrease in population from 2000 to 2010, but it has been in a recovery mode since Katrina and was on the 2011 *Forbes*' list of Fastest-Growing Cities in America, coming in at number one with a 4.9-percent increase from April 2010–July 2011. Despite its recovery efforts, New Orleans is home to ongoing inner-city blight and high crime rates. Unlike some urban areas, New Orleans does not have blight and high crime concentrated in one or two areas; rather, significant crime occurs in small neighborhood areas or housing development projects, often encompassing only a few city blocks. Within these neighborhoods, loose associations of chronic offenders or gangs are formed, and battles between gangs from neighborhood to neighborhood have contributed to high violent crime rates.

Targeted Drug Market: Hoffman Triangle Neighborhood. The target area chosen by the team was the Hoffman Triangle Neighborhood, formerly known as "back of town" by locals. Members from the gang known as 3nG organize and operate drive-through overt drug markets in the area. The one-way configuration of roadways enables the drug dealers to evade detection by law enforcement. Allegedly, a communication system between the dealers also helps the dealers avoid detection by police. Streetlights in the area generally are shot out as soon as they are replaced, so the area is often in darkness, which also aids criminal activity; law-abiding citizens are fearful of walking in the area. In addition to the established drug market, the area is experiencing problems with illegal dumping of tires, copper theft, open and abandoned residences, disinvestment (open and abandoned buildings), and the recent relocation of blighted housing ("historical structures") to the area. The dominant drugs in the DMI target area are

heroin and crack cocaine, with marijuana, powder cocaine, and prescription pills being less common. Other crimes in the target area presenting a problem for the neighborhood and law enforcement include murder, prostitution, and burglary. There are strong community organizations and associations in the Hoffman Triangle Neighborhood working toward reducing blight, tearing down blighted properties, reducing crime, and revitalizing commercial business in the area.

Roanoke, Virginia

Roanoke, Virginia, population 98,465, is the tenth-largest city in the Commonwealth of Virginia and the largest municipality in southwest Virginia. It is west of the Blue Ridge Mountains and is a major transportation center between Tennessee and Maryland, with active railways and an airport. Originally known for its rail history, Roanoke is known today as a health care, manufacturing and retail hub. While thriving in some ways, Roanoke's rates of economic and population growth lag behind state and national averages, and has a violent crime rate more than twice that of the rest of the state.

Targeted Drug Market: Hurt Park. The Roanoke team selected Hurt Park as its target area, an area of 2,785 residents in the city's historic district near the commercial center of town. The area forms an elongated rectangle bounded on one side by a railroad right-of-way. Hurt Park is a mixed-use neighborhood, containing a concentration of industrial and residential properties. Residential properties are almost exclusively single-family homes, many now converted into multifamily apartments. Several blocks of public housing apartment buildings that were a haven for crime have been demolished and replaced by single-family attached homes. The limited retail in the area consists primarily of several convenience stores. There are a few abandoned buildings, primarily along one block owned by a single landowner. One reason for choosing Hurt Park was a tradition of community organizing started by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Over the past two years, Hurt Park has undergone attempts to improve the overall condition of the neighborhood.

BJA Training and Technical Assistance

As noted previously, BJA funded MSU's School of Criminal Justice, along with several of the original team members who helped develop the original High Point DMI, in 2010 to conduct TTA for teams across the United States—that is, jurisdictional teams consisting of at least one member of local law enforcement, one prosecutor, someone from the social service sector, and one influential community member—who were interested in implementing a program inspired by the High Point DMI. The BJA-funded training consisted of five sessions held between January 19, 2011, and October 17, 2012, that covered all aspects of implementation and follow-

up.[4] Jurisdictions in the seven sites discussed in this report put together teams that participated in the third round of the BJA-funded TTA program.

This implementation strategy differs from the model outlined by the National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC), led by David Kennedy (NNSC, 2013). It is beyond the scope of this report to describe all the differences between the BJA strategy and the NNSC model; interested readers are encouraged to consult the two manuals for further detail on these differences. In general, the models differ in their instruction on community involvement and engagement, with some differences in the order of the steps, and the National Network Model always includes a "racial reconciliation" component, whereas the BJA trainings only make this a priority if a particular site deems it necessary.

The first TTA session was for the points of contact (POCs), who would be the people responsible for coordinating the project. The POC meeting was held before the first comprehensive team training to introduce the intervention, explain the importance of selecting proper core team members, and prepare the team's designated communication liaison for what lay ahead. The one-day meeting was held in Alexandria, Virginia, on January 19, 2011, to introduce the intervention and help the POCs identify the right people to attend the TTA sessions.

Three core team training sessions were held approximately three months apart. The first training was held in Greensboro, North Carolina, on March 23–24, 2011, with the High Point DMI team (a past, but not current, TTA site) acting as the local host over the two-day training. The second training, a session lasting a day and a half, occurred on June 7–8, 2011, in Nashville, Tennessee. The Nashville DMI team (also a previous, but not current, TTA site) provided local support to the training. The third training, also one and a half days, took place on September 20–21, 2011, in New Orleans, Louisiana, where representatives from the neighboring Jefferson Parish offered their assistance.

Following the third training session, a fourth session was added to allow sites that had implemented DMI to highlight their efforts. The fourth training provided an exchange forum for successes, ideas for improvement or next steps, and continued support by experienced sites. This fourth training session was hosted by the Roanoke team in Roanoke, Virginia, on October 17, 2012.

In general, the four trainings were structured to allow time for the following:

- brief overview and update of current site activities
- spotlighting of local DMI efforts by the host site
- team meetings
- meetings of functional or like discipline groups

[4] The BJA TTA program did not provide funding to the jurisdictions to actually implement the intervention.

- TTA providers to cover other promising practices or strategies, a reminder about technical assistance and resources, and a summation of the entire training and "what's next"
- RAND to offer an evaluation description/update.

All five training sessions were very well received, as indicated on each session's training evaluations. The teams liked having group work time and time to interact with like disciplines. All training evaluation results were summarized and provided to BJA.

Through emails and telephone conversations, the TTA team contacted each site seven times from May 2011 to February 2013 to stay current on activities, efforts, changes, and challenges. A summary of each comprehensive contact was provided to the BJA after completion. In addition to the structured site contacts, the TTA providers periodically communicated with each site during the TTA initiative. The TTA team remains in contact with the sites, although contact has become more sporadic.

Beyond the POC meeting and the training sessions, the TTA team provided assistance to each site in the form of a one-day site visit. The TTA team provided more technical assistance to Flint on an ongoing and ad-hoc basis because Flint is located relatively close to MSU. The TTA team members made the following site visits:

- Flint: Numerous onsite visits, given the proximity to MSU
- Guntersville: December 6, 2011
- Jacksonville: August 30, 2011
- Lake County: November 9, 2011
- Montgomery County: September 14, 2011
- New Orleans: August 24, 2011
- Roanoke: September 27, 2011.

Peer-to-peer technical assistance was also facilitated by the TTA providers, who referred sites to experts or knowledgeable, experienced professionals who successfully implemented previous DMIs to fully and adequately address questions and/or to share ideas. Such peer-to-peer exchanges occurred during training sessions and throughout the entire TTA initiative, and they created and continue to maintain a DMI website as a means of information and assistance. The DMI website (MSU, undated) contains resources, links, a site map, and videos.

Methods for the Process Evaluation

Evaluations of criminal justice programs typically assess the impact of programs on outcomes, such as reduced criminal activity; however, evaluations that focus on implementation contribute much-needed information about how programs were put into action and about the fidelity to the original program model (Lipsey et al., 2006). There is growing emphasis on measuring program implementation through process evaluation because of frequent variability in implementation procedures across sites (Harachi et al., 1999; Dusenbury et al., 2003).

Process evaluation contributes to an understanding of the relationship between program elements and program outcomes (Bartholomew, Parcel and Kok, 1998; Steckler and Linnan, 2002; Saunders, Evans, and Joshi, 2005). If programs are implemented poorly, significant outcome effects may not be as likely (Lipsey et al., 2006). Often the greatest program effects are found when programs are implemented with greater integrity and fidelity (Hansen et al., 1991; Battistich et al., 1996).

Given the importance of process evaluation on its own and in relationship to the crime impact analysis, we tracked and measured the implementation of each of the program components: context, including initiation of the program and implementation processes; fidelity; and innovations and barriers (Baranowski and Stables, 2000; Steckler and Linnan, 2002; Saunders et al., 2005). Accordingly, goals of the process evaluation are as follows:

1. **Describe context and implementation processes.** The intervention we evaluated was a set of nine prescribed steps across five distinct phases. The program is typically implemented in a slightly different way each time it is undertaken because it is a "recipe" that will differ depending on local conditions; however, according to the BJA TTA model, the program steps should remain the same. Differences in implementation could occur depending on the people involved in implementation and the political and local climate, along with differences in the conditions of the specific overt drug market and the resources available to the team. Therefore, understanding the context is essential for understanding how each intervention is implemented.
2. **Measure fidelity to the training model.** Fidelity is a difficult concept to measure in the case of this intervention because it is a process and a set of steps customized to each site. Therefore, the RAND research team assigned fidelity scores to the different steps based on the extent to which the steps were completed. *It is very important to note: A lower fidelity rating is not necessarily indicative of poor performance or outcomes, rather, it is used to note whether the program was implemented according to the training model.* These fidelity ratings are based on classification schemes that are consistent with the training model.
3. **Assess implementation challenges and innovations.** To better understand which factors contribute to the successful implementation of the intervention, the following steps were taken: (a) identifying barriers and challenges to implementation and documenting how they were addressed by the different sites; (b) identifying major reasons that sites receiving the BJA training failed to implement the program; and (c) documenting innovative ways that sites implemented aspects of the program and/or overcame implementation barriers.

The RAND team collected data from a number of sources using a variety of methods (e.g., site visits, interviews with all of the team members, and observation of BJA trainings). The team also hired on-site coordinators, typically graduate students, at each of the seven sites. These coordinators spent approximately one day a week observing implementation at each site (which ranged from six to 15 months, depending on the site). Each on-site coordinator was local to the area and chosen with input from each local team to increase acceptance. On-site coordinators collected objective fidelity measures of implementation processes and systematically elicited

subjective feedback from team members on treatment integrity and implementation problems. These forms were developed by the RAND evaluation team with guidance from our expert panel and MSU's trainers (See Appendix C for data collection forms.)

Process evaluation data collection included the following actions, which occurred primarily from March 2011 through April 2012 (some of the sites were followed through 2013):

- **Attend BJA training sessions.** Researchers attended all the BJA training sessions, where researchers spoke with team members and the trainers to learn about their progress and to discuss implementation difficulties.
- **Conduct site visits.** RAND researchers conducted in-person site visits throughout the implementation period (up to two years after training began for some sites) to speak to core team members about their roles in the project and about plans for conducting the program.
- **Complete weekly progress reports of team activities and challenges.** On-site coordinators completed reports that outlined team activities for the week, as well as any difficulties the teams were facing.
- **Attend project team meetings.** On-site coordinators attended team project meetings and took comprehensive meeting notes on prescribed data collection forms.
- **Record activities.** On-site coordinators recorded all project activities related to the intervention (e.g., project team meetings, community events, technical assistance site visits).
- **Community events.** On-site coordinators attended intervention-related communitywide meetings and events.
- **Attend and conduct a process recordings of the call-in.** On-site coordinators attended the call-in (if a call-in occurred) and recorded procedures and team member interactions using data collection sheets.
- **Conduct semistructured interviews with all team members before and after the call-in.** On-site coordinators conducted semistructured interviews with team members before and after the call-in to obtain an understanding of changes in perceptions of the intervention both before and after the call-in (see Appendix D for interview protocol).
- **Gather input from BJA TTA providers on implementation fidelity and barriers to implementation.** RAND also maintained regular communications with BJA TTA provider staff from MSU on site progress. Because multiple TTA sessions were held over a period of years, RAND also received input from the trainers on implementation barriers the sites encountered in the field.
- **Collect media accounts.** On-site coordinators monitored local publications and collected any stories that reported on the project to enable the RAND team to follow how the programs were being portrayed in the media.

The RAND team analyzed data collected across the various sources within the context of each of the five major phases of the process: (1) planning; (2) targeting the drug market; (3) working with the community; (4) preparing for the call-in (including the call-in); and (5) after the call-in. Consistent with the process evaluation goals, we describe implementation activities within each phase at each site and examine each site's fidelity to the training model described by the TTA providers (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b). Throughout the intervention phases, sites encountered barriers to implementation, and some implemented various innovations that enhanced the process. Where appropriate, the various implementation barriers and notable innovations were recorded.

In the next several chapters, we follow each site along its implementation, though it should be noted that not all the sites completed all the phases (see Figure 3.2). All seven sites were able to complete the first phase and at least begin the second phase, and five sites moved forward to phase three. But only four of the seven sites made it to the call-in phase of the program, which is the point that most researchers and practitioners consider as the date of implementation (i.e., intervention date). Summaries of each site are provided in the appendices.

Figure 3.2. Implementation Progress of the Seven Sites, by Phase

4. Process Evaluation, Phase I: Planning for the Intervention

In the first phase, the team is formed. As conceived, a team consists of four core members, who come from law enforcement, prosecution, social services, and the community (often someone from the faith-based community). Next, the team identifies the SWOT for itself and its location.

In this chapter, we first discuss how sites formed teams and assessed their readiness to participate. We then provide our assessment of planning phase fidelity at each site, and describe planning barriers and innovations.

Forming Teams, Assessing Readiness

> DMI teams should consist of at least one member of law enforcement, one prosecutor, one member of a social service agency, and one influential community member (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b).

On the whole, RAND found that sites varied in the way they initiated the intervention. Two teams were initiated by law enforcement, two by prosecutors, and others by a local organization or council member. A few common themes were noted by all seven sites when asked about their decision to participate in the intervention:

- failure of traditional law enforcement methods (e.g., raids and arrests) to shut down drug market activity
- need for increased community participation in anticrime efforts
- significant tension and distrust between members of targeted communities and law enforcement.

Although interest in the intervention originated from different sources or organizations within each site, the impetus behind the intervention originated from (1) law enforcement, specifically the police, (2) the prosecutor's office, or (3) a community agency. In New Orleans and Roanoke, for example, members of law enforcement were the impetus for interest in the DMI. In New Orleans, interest in the DMI program originated from the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) and the opportunity for BJA's free training. In Roanoke, the police chief had read stories about success with the DMI in High Point, North Carolina, and was a strong supporter of Roanoke's participation in the program.

In Guntersville and Lake County, interest in the intervention stemmed from the prosecutor's offices. In Guntersville, a prosecutor who became a core member of Guntersville's team had become frustrated with the ongoing drug sales in the Lakeview community and the criminal justice system's inability to put a stop to it. In Lake County, a deputy prosecutor initiated interest

in the program after she found information about the DMI online and thought it would be a good fit for addressing problems within the community.

At the other sites, interest began when local organizations or leaders brought information about the DMI to local leaders. In Flint, members of a local organization, the Flint Area Congregation Together (FACT), went to the mayor and city council to suggest they try the DMI program; the decision to initiate a DMI program in Flint subsequently occurred with the support of the Flint Police Department chief of police. In Jacksonville, the local Weed and Seed coordinator received an email about a federal grant opportunity to receive DMI training. She subsequently brought this information to a colleague within the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office (JSO). Upon receiving support to participate in the DMI, the two worked together to apply for the training program and to recruit other team members. In Montgomery County, a city council member suggested the DMI program to the county chief of police. After researching the possibility of adopting the program, the Montgomery County Police Department became enthusiastic supporters of the DMI.

Planning Phase Fidelity

Program fidelity during the planning phase was assessed by considering whether the team had initial and ongoing support from each required membership category (law enforcement, prosecutor's office, social service provider(s), and community member(s). Fidelity ratings were determined as follows:

- high fidelity: initial and ongoing support from at least one member of each group
- medium fidelity: at least initial support from each group, even if support waned over time
- low fidelity: missing one or more representatives from a group at the outset.

We found that sites generally adhered to the training model during the planning phase of the process, as shown in the shaded final column of Table 4.1. At the outset of the planning process, most sites had identified and recruited individuals to fill each of the recommended four core areas—law enforcement, prosecutor, social service, and influential community member. During the planning phase, teams varied somewhat in how regularly they held team meetings, ranging from weekly to monthly. Flint, which held weekly meetings, had the largest team. Of note, teams did not specifically conduct a formal SWOT analysis to determine whether they were ready to move forward, and thus we did not assess fidelity on this particular task. This does not mean that the sites did not informally conduct these analyses or assess their readiness in another way; it only means that we did not observe any formalized or structured process, as outlined in the program steps. Roanoke and Guntersville had "high" fidelity for the planning phase, with support from members of each requisite group at the outset and throughout the program. Flint, Montgomery County, and New Orleans each had "medium" fidelity for planning, with a member of each group at the outset of the program but waning support from one or more groups as the program continued. In Flint, involvement from the local prosecutor declined over time; and in

New Orleans, support from the community service representative declined over time. Jacksonville and Lake County received a rating of “low” because they did not have support from all of the groups when they initiated the program—Jacksonville did not have the support of the prosecutor’s office, and Lake County did not have an influential community member of the team.

Table 4.1. Planning Phase Fidelity

Site	Local Law Enforcement		Prosecutor's Office		Social Service Providers		Influential Community Members		Frequency of Regular Team Meetings	Adhered to Training Model for Team Composition
	On Original Team	Ongoing and Full Support	On Original Team	Ongoing and Full Support	On Original Team	Ongoing and Full Support	On Original Team	Ongoing and Full Support		
Flint, Mich.	FPD	✓	Local prosecutor	Support declined over time	United Way representative	✓	Reverend from local church	✓	Weekly	Medium
Guntersville, Ala.	Guntersville Police Department	✓	District attorney	✓	United Way representative	✓	Pastor of a church in the target area	✓	Biweekly	High
Jacksonville, Fla.	Jacksonville Sheriff's Office and Weed and Seed coordinator	Support declined over time	State attorney grants manager	X	Weed and Seed coordinator	✓	Respected longtime teacher	✓	Monthly initially; dropped off	Low
Lake County, Ind.	Gary Police Department	Support declined over time	Deputy prosecutor	✓	Workforce innovations; community service officer	✓	X	X	Biweekly initially; dropped off	Low
Montgomery County, Md.	County police	✓	State attorney office	✓	County Health and Human Services (HHS) provider	✓	Church leaders	Attended a few meetings	Monthly	Medium
New Orleans, La.	New Orleans Police Department	Very slow to support	Prosecutor	✓	Youth Empowerment Program (YEP) community service provider	Support declined over time	Neighborhood development representative	✓	Monthly	Medium
Roanoke, Va.	Roanoke Police Department	✓	Commonwealth attorney	✓	Total Action against Poverty (TAP) president	✓	Neighborhood association president, school teacher	✓	Biweekly	High

Planning Barriers and Innovations

Getting the right team together had been a difficulty for sites implementing the DMI in the past, so the BJA TTA team held an additional pre-training meeting with each of the POCs, emphasizing the importance of having the correct people on the team.

Barriers. While most teams were able to assemble the necessary members in a timely manner and garner social services to at least verbally commit support to the program, a few teams confronted some obstacles during the planning phase. Although representatives from each site attended training sessions and BJA provided technical assistance, sites encountered some barriers to holding teams together and sustaining interest in the program due to a variety of factors, including:

- the time and resources each site had to devote to the project
- whether there was strong leadership within the group
- the perceived importance of the intervention to each member of the group and their organization
- lack of resources or organizational support.

Another barrier to sustaining interest in and momentum on the project was the high turnover experienced by most teams; in some cases, the team that implemented the call-in was different than the team that attended the initial BJA training sessions.

In New Orleans, participation was primarily driven initially by law enforcement, and it was several months into the process before members of the other three groups (prosecutor, community service organization, community member) were identified and recruited. As a result, progress in planning for areas outside law enforcement was delayed and the team had difficulty gaining the full support of a social service agency. After the BJA TTA team paid a technical assistance visit and suggested that the intervention team use a service provider coordinator or case manager to set up resources for the B-listers (i.e., the call-in candidates), the team began identifying resources and attempting to secure commitments from social service agencies. The team also experienced a challenge regarding the inconsistent involvement of YEP, a target-area provider. YEP representatives initially attended several team meetings and expressed enthusiasm about participating in the program. However, their involvement did not continue, despite reportedly being offered funds by another program to provide services to B-listers.

In addition, planning for the intervention in New Orleans was delayed for several reasons. Early on, there seemed to be a lack of communication about the intervention among NOPD ranks, which delayed progress of the program. Specifically, the district sergeants were unsure about their mission and whether they had authority to move forward with the program. Additionally, there was a change in NOPD leadership, and it was unclear for a period of time whether the program would move forward. The new NOPD administration had many important issues to address, including high rates of murder and violent crime, as well as the need to

overhaul the department's infrastructure. These priorities took precedence over intervention-related activities for a period of time.

In Flint, the implementation team was eager to proceed and, early in the planning phase, the team set a call-in date, even before the implementation team had attended any of the BJA training sessions. Several issues, however, impeded the team's ability to conduct the call-in according to the original timeline, including difficulty getting service providers on board with the program and securing memoranda of understanding (MOUs) from interested service providers. The team also realized that the other steps in the process needed to be completed before a call-in could occur. According to one team member, there was confusion among the team members about what they were supposed to be doing before they attended the first BJA training session. After attending the session, the team agreed about how to proceed and began studying the BJA-funded step-by-step guide (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b). Although the call-in was rescheduled, the delay created skepticism within the community about whether the team was going to follow through with its promises. Subsequent call-ins in Flint were all held after the team had attended all the training sessions.

Innovations. The primary innovation during the planning phase was the procurement of MOUs with the social service providers. Both Flint and Lake County decided to formalize these relationships and formally outline the responsibilities of the community service providers.

Key Points on Planning for the Intervention

- Sites varied in the way they initiated the intervention. Two teams were initiated by law enforcement, two by prosecutors, and others by a local organization or a council member.
- All but two teams had all recommended members of the core team (law enforcement, prosecutor, community member, social service provider) at the outset.
- Barriers in the planning phase included difficulty in translating program knowledge, high turnover on teams, and lack of buy-in from leadership.
- The primary innovation during this phase was some sites' procurement of MOUs with the social service providers.

5. Process Evaluation, Phase II: Targeting the Drug Market

The second phase is “Targeting the Drug Market.” This phase includes crime mapping, surveys of informants, incident review and analysis, and undercover operations to gather evidence against active dealers.

In this chapter, we first discuss how sites completed these steps, then provide our assessment of targeting phase fidelity at each site, and finally describe planning barriers and innovations.

Implementation of Targeting Steps

We discuss sites’ implementation of this phase in three sections:

- Step 1 discusses crime mapping and defining a narrow target area
- Steps 2–3b discusses the steps leading to candidate identification, including surveying informants and conducting an incident review
- Step 4 discusses undercover operations to gather evidence against all the active dealers in the target zone.

Step 1: Crime Mapping and Defining a Narrow Target Area

> The traditional DMI model approach to Step 1 is to conduct a systematic crime analysis to better understand drug markets and to select a market associated with high crime and violence (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b).

According to the training model, the target area should be narrowly defined, which will allow the team to concentrate efforts and identify all drug dealers in the area. For the most part, the target areas chosen by the sites were focused on a specific neighborhood/area—ranging from one square block (Montgomery County) to one square mile (Flint). Within the target area, some sites honed in on a specific area they felt the drug activity was most commonly occurring.

However, teams differed in their adherence to the model for crime mapping and defining the target area (as shown in the shaded third column in Table 5.1). Flint, Jacksonville, Lake County, and Roanoke conducted crime analyses, but some also had other strategic reasons for selecting the target area, such as the presence of strong neighborhood groups that the groups felt would embrace the intervention, and not all relied on crime analyses to select a narrowly defined target area. In Flint, for example, the team examined crime data and chose the area within the city that contained the highest number of serious crimes, but did not identify a discrete drug market. In Roanoke, the team first examined areas that contained the highest numbers of calls for service, drug arrests, and violent crimes. Subsequently, the team strategically chose one of these crime-afflicted areas, the Hurt Park neighborhood, because of the history of community organizing in the neighborhood and previous support from Hurt Park organizations for projects aimed at

developing a better quality of life for community residents. Because participation in Jacksonville grew out the city's existing Weed and Seed program, analysis efforts were focused on identifying defined boundaries for the intervention within the Weed and Seed program area. Initially, police crime analysts identified two drug and violent crime hot spots within the Weed and Seed area that could serve as potential intervention targets. The final decision for a defined area within one of the two hot spot areas was made in order to comply with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office's requirement that the selected area could not be a target of any current federal investigations.

Lake County compiled statistical data from a variety of sources, including drug hotline calls, calls for service, detective reports, and geographic information system (GIS) maps, to identify a geographic location that would lead to the best possible return from implementing the program. Once the city identified a general geographic location, the team consulted with officers who frequently patrolled the area to identify a manageable area to target, the Glen Park neighborhood. The team said it chose Glen Park because it felt the area, which is home to a university, medical center, and Urban League headquarters, was ripe for development. The team felt that if it were able to mitigate the drug problem, the university would attract more students and businesses.

Other sites chose their target areas because there were the only viable areas within their cities to implement the intervention. In Guntersville, the team reported that the Lakeview Community, or "the Hill," was the only area within the city that contained a significant overt drug market. In Montgomery County, the team chose to target a low-income housing complex known as Damascus Gardens, which was home to a relatively robust drug market that traditional law enforcement so far had been unable to shut down. This was reported by the lieutenant in charge of narcotics investigations to be the only overt drug market in the district.

Finally, the New Orleans' team originally planned to conduct the intervention within two districts (the 5th and 6th districts), but ultimately decided to leverage information gained from an ongoing narcotics racketeering investigation in the Hoffman Triangle area of the 6th district. From the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) investigation, officers had been working to document drug dealers in the Hoffman Triangle, and it was known there was a blatant overt drug market operating in the area. The plan was to use arrestees from this investigation to compile the A- and B-listers. According to the team, the Hoffman Triangle also was chosen because there was a solid and active neighborhood development association in the area.

Steps 2–3b: Steps Leading to Candidate Identification

> In Step 2, Survey, the DMI approach is to identify and assess drug dealers in the area by surveying street-level enforcement officers, probation officers, vice/narcotics officers, and community members. This step generally involves talking with and collecting all relevant information from these individuals. Step 3 involves conducting a modified incident review by reviewing information gathered in Step 2 along with additional police reports; convening vice and

> narcotics officers who work in the identified target area; examining and organizing information and performing a link analysis (i.e., an analysis to determine if crimes or offenders are connected). Step 3a consists of refining the list to drug dealers still active in the area, and Step 3b involves narrowing down the list to call-in candidates by convening law enforcement and prosecutors (local and federal); deciding who (if anyone) should be prosecuted immediately based on review criteria; proceeding with cases not eligible for the call-in; and targeting remaining individuals for the call-in (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b).

In the BJA training model, sites must identify candidates for participation in the intervention. Two types of candidates must be identified: A-listers are those with chronic and violent offenses, while B-listers should be those with less severe and fewer offenses. The training model requires key stakeholders from each site to agree upon specific criteria (e.g., what is "violent") and, in some cases, to go over each case and decide on which list the offenders belong.

Sites were fairly uniform in methods they used to identify candidates—most sites initially relied on some combination of informants, tips from community members, and information from officers assigned to the target area and special narcotics divisions. In Flint, the team also used existing warrants to identify potential program candidates. In Montgomery County, the team also relied on information gleaned from calls for service and traffic offenses to identify candidates. There were, however, a few deviations from the model. In New Orleans, the team did not conduct a survey of drug dealers in the target area because it was relying on a list of dealers provided by the ongoing RICO investigation.

Criteria for inclusion on the A-list or the B-list were fairly similar across the sites. Most sites agreed that, to be on the B-list, individuals must not have a violent criminal history and no felony or gun charges on their criminal record. There were small discrepancies among the sites, which are outlined below.

For the sites that completed the targeting phase, the number of A-listers and B-listers was fairly similar across sites (see Table 5.1). Flint, Guntersville, and Roanoke identified approximately twice as many A-listers as B-listers. In Montgomery County, the numbers of A-listers and B-listers were approximately equal. Across all sites, the teams were able to arrest all identified A-listers. As noted, Jacksonville and Lake County did not complete the targeting phase. Note that none of the materials produced by NNSC or BJA make recommendations about what share of the identified dealers should be placed on the A-list or B-list.

Teams developed their own principles for deciding whom to include on the A-list or B-list, which is acceptable in the TTA model. In Flint, the team was initially undecided about whether to allow individuals who had a previous weapons charge to be included as B-listers; eventually the team decided who would be included on the B-list on a case-by-case basis. In Guntersville, the team included several "less objective" criteria for inclusion on the A-list or the B-list. Individuals who had a history of cooperating with the police and who seemed likely to benefit from the program were included on the B-list. Conversely, individuals who had expressed extremely negative attitudes toward law enforcement and the team subjectively felt would not

likely be helped by the program were included on the A-list. In New Orleans, inclusion on the A-list could also occur if the candidate had multiple drug charges. While the A-list criteria in Montgomery County were fairly similar to other sites, one exception was made for an individual who, although previously charged with only a relatively minor offense, had allowed her apartment to be utilized for drug use and sales for ten years.

Step 4: Undercover Operations

> In Step 4, law enforcement builds cases on call-in candidates by having undercover officers make buys; sending confidential informants to make buys (and using audio, video, and photographs); and documenting all drug dealer activities (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b).

In keeping with the training model to gather evidence, sites relied on different combinations of undercover buys and videotaped, audio-recorded, and photographed evidence of the buys. Local laws dictated how each site approached the undercover operations, and thus, the methods the police used during the undercover buy varied slightly across sites:

- The Guntersville, Montgomery County, and Roanoke teams all relied on confidential informants to conduct the undercover buys. The Roanoke police reported difficulty in finding informants to participate in drug purchases; the team ended up developing special operations to catch drug buyers and turning them into informants.
- Police forces played varying roles in building the case against the candidates. The Flint Police Department felt it could not rely on undercover informants in the area for such a large operation, and thus members of the FPD conducted the undercover buys with candidates. Guntersville used its narcotics division to build cases against the candidates. In Lake County, members of the Gary Police Department began gathering evidence on candidates through undercover operations, although difficulties (discussed further below) prevented the department from completing the work.
- In New Orleans, the NOPD did not conduct undercover operations specifically for the intervention. Instead, because the New Orleans team was leveraging information gained from the ongoing RICO investigation, it relied on more than 3,000 photos collected during RICO investigations to document drug-dealing activity for the candidates.

Targeting Phase Fidelity

Table 5.1 summarizes our evaluation of fidelity to the model during the targeting phase. It should be noted that none of the sites followed the steps outlined in the training for the targeting phase in order—in fact, most of the sites did not determine who would be on the A-list and B-list until after the undercover investigations.

Table 5.1. Fidelity Ratings for Targeting Phase

Site	Method for Defining the Target Area	Number of A-listers Identified	Number of B-listers Identified	Adherence: Defining the Target Area
Flint, Mich.	• Examined crime data • Chose area in city with highest number of serious crimes	15	6	Low
Guntersville, Ala.	• Chose only area in city that contained overt drug market	12	6	Medium
Jacksonville, Fla.	• Used crime analysts to identify two drug and violent crime hot spots • Ensured selected area was not a target of any current federal investigations	NA	NA	NA**
Lake County, Ind.	• Compiled statistical data from drug hotline calls, calls for service, detective reports of investigation locations, GIS maps	Not applicable (NA)	NA	NA**
Montgomery County, Md.	• Chose low-income housing project • According to police, relatively robust drug market operating in complex	10	9	Medium
New Orleans, La.	• Leveraged information from ongoing narcotics racketeering investigation to identify A-listers and B-listers	14	1*	Low
Roanoke, Va.	• Examined areas that contained highest numbers of calls for service, drug arrest rates, and violent crime rates. • Selected a specific drug market in a neighborhood with strong community.	10	5	High

* The New Orleans team originally identified ten A-listers and five B-listers. But after the B-list was created, four of the B-listers had gone on to commit more serious offenses and were not eligible for the B-list within a year of the start of the targeting phase.
** Did not complete the targeting phase.

Fidelity ratings were determined as follows:

- high fidelity: used crime analysis to identify target market, followed steps for identifying and dividing program candidates into lists
- medium fidelity: did not use crime analysis to identify target market, did follow steps for identifying and dividing program candidates into two lists
- low fidelity: did not use crime analysis to identify target market, did not follow steps for identifying and dividing program candidates into two lists.

Guntersville and Montgomery County received “medium” ratings because they did not use crime analysis to identify the target drug market, although they did follow the steps for identifying dealers, conducting undercover operations, and dividing dealers into A- and B-lists. It should be noted that both sites reported that they did not need to conduct traditional crime analyses because they selected the only overt drug markets in their jurisdictions. Flint and New Orleans both received “low” ratings. Flint used statistical analysis to identify a location, but used outstanding warrants to create their list of dealers instead of following the training model, which would require them to conduct a survey of dealers operating in the area and compiling evidence. They also selected a very large area, which is contrary to the model’s guidance and specifically advised against by the TTA providers. New Orleans received a “low” rating because they did not conduct a statistical analysis to identify a location and decided to use an ongoing RICO investigation to populate their list of dealers—both of these decisions are incongruent with the training model. Roanoke received a “high” fidelity rating for the targeting phase. Jacksonville and Lake County did not receive ratings because they never completed the phase.

Targeting Phase Barriers and Innovations

Barriers. Although each site that engaged in the targeting phase was able to identify and gather sufficient information on potential candidates, some sites reported difficulties during the process. Barriers included lack of manpower and budgetary issues, lack of clarity about how to conduct the undercover investigations, and changes in leadership.

Significant barriers to identifying candidates were reported in Jacksonville and Lake County, the two sites that did not complete the targeting phase during the observation period. In Jacksonville, roughly 40 hours of undercover work resulted in identification of potential gangs and individuals the program could target. However, the team was unable to move forward with the intervention due to budget cuts, layoffs, and reorganization. No targets were definitively identified.

In Lake County, the team initially was undecided about how to conduct the investigations. The prosecutor’s office wanted to use undercover officers, rather than confidential informants, but the police department argued that its manpower resources were stretched too thin to devote officers to undercover operations. The prosecutor’s office also wanted to use audio equipment during the buys to build stronger cases against the candidates, but a lack of resources prevented the team from being able to use audio equipment.

In addition, political changes in the mayor’s office and the police department in Lake County stalled the team’s progress with targeting. During the election process, the mayor and police chief were reluctant to allocate resources needed to conduct the investigation, which prevented the investigation process from occurring for the better part of six months. While both the new mayor and police chief provided verbal support for the intervention, there did not appear to be any resource or fiscal support for the program. A few candidates were eventually identified by

police officers, but because of the lack of support within the higher ranks of government, the team was unable to move forward to gather evidence against them.

Several sites reported difficulties during the undercover operations, mostly stemming from a lack of resources. The site that was best able to successfully negotiate a difficult resource situation was Flint. Because of a lack of manpower and significant violent crime issues in the area, the FPD had a difficult time devoting enough officers to the undercover operations. In addition, because the team was anxious to proceed with the call-in, undercover investigations began during the winter, which was challenging because fewer people were making deals on the streets during the winter months. However, other options, such as a community hotline and police officer recommendations, were not successful in identifying potential candidates. Undercover operations ultimately offered the best approach for identifying candidates, although drug market operations presented challenges to this approach. According to the FPD, dealers in the targeted area often moved around to other markets in the city. They reported that Detroit gang members were mainly responsible for the narcotics operations in Flint, setting up the supply chain and then hiring locals to handle the street-level transactions. When the police would turn up in one area, dealers would relocate to other places to continue the deals. This combination of issues made it difficult to gather evidence, and although the FPD was able to gather enough evidence against a number of individuals eventually, it reported doubts that they had identified and gathered evidence against all major players within the target area.

Key Points on Targeting the Drug Market

- Teams differed in their approaches to crime mapping and defining the target area, with four teams relying on a formal analysis of local crime data (as prescribed in the training model), one using calls for service, and others taking a more strategic approach, such as targeting the only areas with high crime, or those undergoing other drug-related investigations.
- To identify candidates for the intervention, most teams adhered to the model, using some combination of informants, tips from community members, and information from officers assigned to the target area and special narcotics divisions. Of teams that did not follow the model, one used existing warrants to identify candidates and the other identified candidates from a list of dealers from an ongoing RICO investigation.
- Three teams followed the model to build cases against the candidates by using confidential informants to conduct undercover buys, and one used undercover police officers due to difficulty identifying confidential informants. The remaining teams either never initiated or did not complete this step.
- This phase appears to be vital to overall implementation—if a site was able to conduct this phase with at least medium fidelity, they were able to implement the intervention.

Barriers to this phase included budgetary issues and lack of manpower, lack of clarity about how to conduct the undercover investigations, and changes in leadership.

6. Process Evaluation, Phase III: Working with the Community

Phase III, which often occurs simultaneously with Phases II and IV, involves the community component of the intervention, which continues in Phase V. In this phase, the team works with the community by engaging key stakeholders and community members to obtain buy-in. In addition to educating the community about the intervention, this phase provides an opportunity for law enforcement and the community to engage in a dialogue and heal damaged relationships.

In this chapter, we first discuss the implementation of two community steps: mobilization and setting the call-in time and place. We then provide our assessment of phase fidelity at each site, and describe planning barriers and innovations.

Implementation of Community Steps

Step 5: Community Mobilization

> In Step 5, the DMI approach is to obtain community buy-in by involving key criminal justice players; engaging the community; engaging residents in the target area; engaging neighborhood leaders in the target area; engaging business owners in the target area; engaging faith-based members; holding a series of community meetings in the target area; briefing the mayor and city council on the strategy; and briefing other key stakeholders like judges or public defenders (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b).

Of the sites that moved toward a call-in, most conducted activities to mobilize the community and engage them in the process. Sites employed a combination of activities to engage community members in the intervention, including community meetings, meetings with community leaders, community events, community surveys, and door-to-door contact with residents (see Table 6.1). All but one of the sites that passed the targeting stage conducted at least one meeting to reach out to residents of the target area before the call-in. At each of these meetings, the format was fairly similar. Leaders of the team explained the process and/or showed an explanatory video. Speakers then made a point to call the community to action and state that local leaders, including law enforcement, wanted to work with the residents to improve their community. Residents were reminded that they needed to take an active role in keeping their community safe and that the program's success relied on residents' participation. Following the call-to action, team members often engaged the community, for example, allowing a question-and-answer session or passing out cards on which community members could write their concerns. The only site that did not hold a formal meeting before the call-in was Montgomery County because the team worried it would jeopardize ongoing undercover investigations. However, the HHS representative on the Montgomery County team did make efforts to reach out to the community in other ways—for example, by holding meetings with select community

members, establishing a youth boxing program and life-skills workshops, and organizing pizza parties within the complex.

Table 6.1. Community Mobilization Activities Before the Call-In

Sites	Number of Community Meetings Before Call-In	Description of Community Meetings	Community Events Before Call-In	One-on-One Engagement with Community	Engaging Community via Media	Adherence to Training Model for Community Mobilization Before Call-In
Flint, Mich.	2	Target-area meeting; citywide meeting	0	Door-to-door contact with officers	Yes	High
Guntersville, Ala.	4	Target-area meeting; church leader meeting; community stakeholder meeting; charitable organization meeting	Park cleanup	None	Yes	High
Jacksonville, Fla.	0		0			NA
Lake County, Ind.	1	Breakfast	0	Survey with utility bills	No	NA
Montgomery County, Md.	0		0	None	No*	Low
New Orleans, La.	0		0	Door-to-door contact with officers		NA
Roanoke, Va.	2	Target-area meeting; church leader meeting	0	Door-to-door survey by officers	Yes	High

* We conducted an Internet search for media in Montgomery County. Our search did not produce any results.

In addition to meeting with area residents, several sites also held meetings with community leaders in an effort to garner support and get trusted leaders in the community to spread the word about the program. In Flint, the team organized several widespread community meetings that included residents both inside and outside of the target area. The first of these formally announced the roll-out of the program approximately one year before the call-in. The team held a second community meeting in the month before the call-in. The official Flint website also contained information about the program—which changed names several times over the course

of a few years—to keep the community updated on their progress. In Guntersville, several meetings were held with local leaders, including a meeting with area pastors, a meeting with community stakeholders, and a meeting with charitable organizations. Roanoke held meetings with church leaders, neighborhood watch groups, and the target area neighborhood alliance. The team also held meetings with homeowners and landlords to encourage these individuals to exert greater control over possible illegal activities occurring on their premises. Because these meetings were held before a formal public announcement of the target area, local leaders were instructed not to reveal the location of the target area to others to avoid compromising ongoing undercover operations.

Most sites also used methods other than community meetings to reach out to residents of target areas. Several sites—Guntersville, Lake County, New Orleans, and Roanoke—engaged with residents of target areas through door-to-door contacts and informal and formal surveys. In Flint, six community members and police officers conducted door-to-door contacts with residents. During these visits, the team informed residents about intervention, encouraged participation, and encouraged residents to call the police if they noticed any drug or other criminal activity. Guntersville held a session with homeowners within the targeted area to inform owners about requirements for upkeep of property and began demolishing abandoned properties. Lake County sent out a survey enclosed with a few thousand residents' utility bills and received more than 400 responses. Roanoke began distributing a newsletter, the first informing the community about the steps and purpose of the intervention.

Guntersville appears to be the only site that conducted a formal community event before the call-in—a neighborhood clean-up. About 22 individuals participated, including community organizations, churches, the Marshall County District Attorney's Office, and the Guntersville Police Department. However, the team was disappointed that very few members of the target area participated in the event. To further improve the appearance of the community, the team also targeted homes in the area that were noncompliant with code enforcement, and scheduled demotion of condemned houses.

It should be noted that even the sites that have yet to complete a call-in engaged in some limited forms of community engagement. In Lake County, the team held an initial community breakfast to explain the intervention and allow residents to ask questions. Most of the approximately 30 people who attended were social service providers and leaders of community organizations. Several smaller meetings with community leaders were subsequently held to garner support for the program, but no further community meetings with residents have been held. Many sites also gave media interviews either before or after the call-in. The research team found more than a dozen newspaper stories about its initiative in Flint and a few in Roanoke before the first call-in, many of which invited the community to get involved. Importantly, the stories did not identify the target market—this was done to ensure officer safety during the undercover operations. Each site decided to handle media relationships differently, as some believed stories coming out before the call-in could jeopardize the intervention. There were

newspaper articles about three of the four sites after the call-ins, with most being quite positive. According to the TTA providers, having a media strategy, whatever it is, is the most important component of media relations. However, we have no specific measures of how the media might have enabled community mobilization because it is not directly part of the implementation guide.

Step 5a: Setting the Call-in Time and Place

> Step 5a involves identifying an appropriate location within the target area in which to hold the call-in (such as police stations, schools, and churches) (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b).

Each of the sites found a place to hold the call-in with relative ease and all call-ins were well attended, averaging about 100 community members. There was little variation in where the call-ins were held, and each site reported being pleased with their chosen venue, overall.

Working with the Community Phase Fidelity

It is difficult to give a rating of fidelity to the model for the "Working with the Community" phase before the call-in because there is not a specific set of activities that are supposed to happen. However, we have summarized the activities that did occur in Table 6.1. The RAND team assesses the overall fidelity for working with the community in the section that describes activities occurring after the call-in (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2. Community Mobilization and Follow-Up Activities; Fidelity to the Model

Site	Assigned a Mentor/Resource Coordinator to B-Listers	Community Meetings with Law Enforcement and Newsletter	Follow-Up with Promised Community Resources (e.g., replace lights, clean up, etc.)	Description of Community Follow-Up	Overall Community Mobilization Fidelity (includes both before and after call-in)
Flint, Mich.	No	Yes	Yes	Target area cleanup; Halloween party	Low
Guntersville, Ala.	No	Yes	Yes	DMI follow-up meeting; block party; basketball camp; neighborhood cleanup	High
Montgomery County, Md.	No	Yes	Yes	Four community meetings; life skills courses and employment planning for adults; boxing program for youth	Medium
Roanoke, Va.	Yes	Yes	Yes	DMI newsletter both online and in print; KOPS-Kids program for law enforcement and children; program to clean and repair community	High

Working with the Community Phase Barriers and Innovations

Barriers. Some sites had difficulty garnering community support for the intervention. While target-area announcement meetings were well attended, most sites did not hold additional events before the call-in to engage the community. One site, Guntersville, organized a park clean-up evening. However, the team reported that very few residents attended the event; rather, most attendees were members of teams and community organizations. In addition, the event was perceived by some community representatives as invasive, so it might have had a negative impact on the community's view of the program and subsequent support for the intervention.

Innovations. Some sites engaged in various types of community outreach with community leaders to gain support, but three sites that tried something different than the standard community engagement avenues.

Believing that support from local leaders was essential to buy-in from residents of the target area, Guntersville organized three separate meetings with church leaders, community stakeholders, and charitable organizations to explain the purpose of the intervention and request

support. Following the stakeholder meeting, the Guntersville team decided to form three subcommittees from the 25 stakeholders who attended the meeting: (1) *police community relations*, which was charged with developing a formal process to begin a dialogue about community relations, assess the concerns of the community and law enforcement, and seek implementation; (2) *community assessment*, which was charged with assessing the needs of the community and developing a plan for community development (including property development, maintenance, renovations, and resources to assist with development projects); and (3) *community education*, which was charged with looking at ties between the community and educational organization and with working to determine and improve the educational needs of the community. Following stakeholder meeting and the establishment of the subcommittees, the three subcommittees were to hold regular meetings individually to discuss their assigned tasks after the call-in.

The formalized survey conducted by the Lake County team was also a true innovation because the team was able to have the survey included in residents' utility bills. Team members reported receiving 400 returned surveys; however, they were never able to enter or analyze the data due to a lack of resources. Roanoke also conducted a neighborhood survey using the police officers going door to door before the call-in. This engagement was intended to describe the program, garner good will, and collect baseline measures to see how the communities' perceptions of drugs, crime, and the police changed after the intervention.

Key Points on Working with the Community

- Of the sites that moved toward a call-in, most conducted activities to mobilize the community and engage them in the process.
- Common activities included community meetings, door-to-door contact, and interviews with media.
- Barriers included lack of community interest and engagement, along with the perception that the process was invasive.
- Innovative options for working with the community included engagement with local and church leaders and a survey.

7. Process Evaluation, Phase IV: Preparing for the Call-In

Phase IV focuses on the call-in, which is the culmination of the first three phases and is generally considered the "starting point" of the intervention when measuring its effectiveness. The call-in is a large community meeting, generally led by a high-level law enforcement representative, where offenders are confronted with their illegal and antisocial behavior. They are offered a second chance, with the understanding that if they do not take it, there will be certain, swift, and severe consequences. They are also offered social services to meet their needs (e.g., education, drug treatment, job skills) so that there are no other excuses to stop engaging in criminal behavior.

In the training model, the call-in should include: (1) a display of law enforcement's undercover work, including pictures of drug dealers, pictures of drug dealers in action, pictures of drug houses and street corners where transactions take place, and a three-ring notebook about each offender, including all the information law enforcement has about that offender and their drug-dealing habits; (2) the unsigned arrest warrant for that offender; and (3) a strong, two-pronged message delivered by law enforcement and the community stating that (a) drug dealing and violence will no longer be tolerated in the target area and each of the offenders is on "official notice" that evidence has been collected, and (b) the candidate is being given a second chance. The meeting should convey the message that the community finds the offender's behavior unacceptable and should offer help in the form of community resources to those who want it. There should also be a deadline for offenders to cease and desist their drug dealing activities (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b).

The first step in preparing for the call-in is to contact the call-in candidates and the influential people in their lives. All receive a letter inviting them to the call-in, explaining the goals of the program, and promising that the offender will not be arrested at the call-in. The team may also conduct an assessment of the candidates' social service needs, such as employment, drug or alcohol treatment, transportation, etc., and then the team ensures that the services are available.

In this chapter, we discuss site preparation for the call-in, including A-lister arrests and prosecutions, notification of candidates, and conducting the call-in. We then provide our assessment of call-in phase fidelity and describe barriers and innovations.

Implementation of Preparation for Call-In Steps

A-Lister Arrests and Prosecutions for Implementing Sites

Although it is not an official step in the model outlined in BJA's TTA materials, the successful arrest of A-listers before the call-in is essential to the deterrence message of the

intervention and to the legitimacy of police efforts in the eyes of the community. Shortly before the notification phases, all sites that implemented the intervention successfully apprehended and charged A-listers. For the three sites from which we have data, each arrested between eight and 12 A-listers. In Guntersville, eight A-listers were prosecuted at the state level and four at the federal level; six months following the call-in, one prosecuted at the state level had pled guilty and received a 15-year sentence and seven others' trials were still pending. The team was unable to provide the status of the four A-listers being charged at the federal level. In Montgomery County, a raid was conducted and ten A-listers and their families were evicted from the Damascus Gardens complex; six months following the notification, nine of the ten were successfully prosecuted while the tenth was not prosecuted on the condition that he move out of the apartment complex. In Roanoke, eight A-listers faced state charges and two faced federal charges; six months following the notification, all ten had been successfully prosecuted and are serving their sentences. See Appendix B for a summary of all the A-lister sentences.

Steps 6 and 7: Contacting and Notifying Candidates About the Call-In

> The goals of DMI's Step 6 are to identify 'influential' people in each targeted offender's life, such as family, friends, spiritual advisors, non-family members, and to conduct small group visits to influentials to explain the goals of the initiative and to invite them to participate in asking the offender to quit what they are doing and to encourage them to attend the call-in. Step 7 involves law enforcement sending a letter to the call-in candidates that indicates to candidates that law enforcement is aware of their street-level drug dealing and that this behavior has to stop. The letter should include an invitation for the offender to come to a meeting, a statement that says that the offender will not be arrested at the call-in; and a suggestion that the offender bring someone important to them (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b).

The four sites that reached this phase conducted the notification in person and delivered a letter either to the B-lister him or herself, or to a close family member. Although some teams experienced difficulties, all were able to notify all offenders and/or their families eventually, and when it came time to hold the call-in, most B-listers at each of the sites attended.

Sites used varying approaches for notifying family members (see Appendices E and F for Roanoke's redacted offender notification letter). In Guntersville, a team consisting of invested community members did the notification, with the idea that community members would have the best opportunity to reach out to the B-listers and their families and would be able to encourage them to attend the call-in. The original notification team consisted of two pastors within the community. This team initially experienced difficulty in making contact; for example, one house was vacant and another resident did not allow the team inside. An expanded team, this time with a police officer, a community member, and an added city council member attempted to make contact again. The team's goal was to speak to the B-lister and hand-deliver a letter/invitation to the call-in. Because the A-listers had been rounded up several days before, some B-listers

fearfully ran and/or ignored the knock at the door. However, after several attempts, the new team was able to make contact with each of the candidates or a close family member.

In Flint, invitation letters were delivered by hand to the candidates or their families days before the call-in. As in Guntersville, very few letters were actually delivered to the candidates; most often the letters were delivered to family members. The team reported that family members seemed very responsive to the invitations, and most said they would be at the call-in and would make sure the candidates attended as well.

Steps 7a and 7b: Preparing for and Conducting the Call-In

> Step 7a involves determining what services should be available at the call-in and arranging for these services and 7b consists of conducting the call-in, a face to face meeting between the offenders, the community, and law enforcement (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b).

Call-in venues and formats were similar across the sites and adherent to the training model.

Format. Across the four sites that conducted at least one call-in during the study period, the general format has been fairly uniform. The call-ins were all held at community centers or public venues (i.e., a library) and were attended by team members, community leaders (i.e., chief or police, U.S. district attorney, city mayor) and a fairly large number of community members, ranging from 75 to 100 individuals. The event usually began with an introduction to the intervention, followed by words from leaders of the team and other community leaders. Two of the four sites—Guntersville and Montgomery County—prominently displayed pictures of the A-listers who had recently been arrested. During the meeting, the team described the long sentences the A-listers were facing, and emphasized that the B-listers had an opportunity to avoid the same fate.

Message. The message presented was also generally the same: B-listers were informed that the criminal justice system was aware of their drug-dealing activities and had sufficient evidence to prosecute them. The B-listers were then informed that they were being given a second chance, that the community cared about them, and that if they chose to get help and cease drug dealing, they would not be prosecuted. Select members of the community were then allowed to speak; selected individuals included former drug dealers/users who had turned their lives around and members of the community who had personally been harmed by drug dealing/using. At the end of the meetings, B-listers were given the opportunity to meet with social service providers.

Presentation of evidence. Sites varied in whether and how they presented evidence gathered against the B-listers. In Flint, following the communitywide meeting, B-listers and their family members were shown into a private room. At that time, prosecutors referred to a stack of files at the front of the room and informed the B-listers that the folders contained the evidence gathered against them. It is interesting to note that only one B-lister subsequently asked to see the evidence contained in his folder. Once the prosecutor presented the evidence against this B-lister

and described the amount of time he was potentially facing, the B-lister immediately signed the agreement and met with the social service provider. The others signed the agreements as well.

In Guntersville, the team originally planned to show the B-listers the videotaped evidence against them. At the call-in, however, the team felt that showing the evidence in public might be too embarrassing, so they opted not show the videos. In hindsight, several of the team members wished they had publicly shared the video evidence because they believed the deterrence message would have been stronger. In Montgomery County, the prosecutor publicly presented the evidence against the B-listers, along with unsigned arrest warrants, while in Roanoke, each B-lister was shown into a private meeting room to look at the evidence against him or her.

Requirements for avoiding arrest. Sites also varied as to whether the B-listers were given specific requirements to avoid being arrested and/or whether they were required to sign an agreement at the call-in, which is not a required element of the program. In Flint, the B-listers were required to sign an agreement to participate in the intervention, but it was only after the call-in that the team decided upon the requirements for staying in the program. These requirements were to (1) have no new drug or violent offenses during the review period; (2) check in with a member of the review board every Monday to give an update on how they were doing; and (3) complete drug and alcohol screenings. The screenings were never enforced, but the team included this requirement in the hope that the threat of potential testing would deter the B-listers from using.

In Guntersville and Montgomery County, the B-listers were informed at the call-in that they were to cease drug-dealing activities to avoid future arrest, but they were not required to sign a written agreement, nor were they required to participate in a program or any social services. In Roanoke, B-listers were verbally informed of the requirements to avoid arrest, but were not required to sign a formal agreement. In addition to ceasing drug-dealing activities, B-listers in Roanoke were required to participate in a nine-day program held in a location outside of Roanoke. Referred to as a "Life College," the program included aptitude testing; job or education placement; sessions with community elders, faith leaders, and ex-offenders; parent and relationship training; and pairing with a mentor from churches in the community (see Life College curriculum agenda in Appendix F). Following Life College, the B-listers were required to participate in regular peer group meetings

Social services. Finally, sites varied in the social service portion of the call-in. In Flint and Guntersville, a primary social service provider was present at the call-in to conduct an initial intake. Following the call-in, the teams planned on conducting follow-up visits with each of the B-listers and provide referrals to other social service agencies capable of meeting each B-lister's specific needs. In Montgomery County, a number of service providers were present at the call-in, and B-listers could choose to speak to the service providers based upon their own perceived needs.

Call-In Phase Fidelity

The call-ins tended to be the most consistent part of the intervention across the sites. Perhaps because the call-in is a major event and the most public portion of the entire program, sites placed a lot of emphasis on the call-in and put in a great deal of preparation. There was some variation in details (Table 7.1), such as whether B-listers were required to sign a pledge or contract and how the A-listers were featured, but, given that these components are not specified in the training model, they are not factors when determining model fidelity. Of the four sites that held call-ins, all were rated as having high fidelity to the training model. A high-fidelity rating was determined as including presentation of evidence; community involvement; a clear deterrence message to the B-listers; and a social service component matching B-listers' needs.

These sites are rated as having high fidelity because they had all of the recommended elements of the call-in.

Table 7.1. Fidelity to the Training Model for the Call-In

Sites	Number of Community Members in Attendance	Presentation of Evidence	Number of B-Listers Attending	Service Providers	Adherence to the Training Model for the Call-In
Flint, Mich.	~95	Separate from community; a stack of B-lister files at front of room; were not shown evidence unless requested	6/6	Primary service provider to conduct initial needs intake	High
Guntersville, Ala.	~75	Planned to show videotaped evidence but during call-in decided not to	6/6	Primary service provider to conduct initial needs intake	High
Montgomery County, Md.	~85	Evidence against each B-lister publicly presented	8/9	Several service providers present for B-listers to speak with on their own initiative	High
Roanoke, Va.	~100	Each B-lister shown to private room to view evidence	4/5	Several service providers present for B-listers to speak with on their own initiative	High

Call-In Barriers and Innovations

Barriers and innovations. There did not appear to be many barriers or innovations during the call-in phase, perhaps because the sites had "scripts" from previous interventions from which to create their agendas. All sites perceived the call-ins to be successes, and there was fairly high uniformity in the format of the call-in across all sites that implemented it. This could be because the call-in is considered the crux of the intervention, and all sites were working toward the goal of holding a call-in. As a result, sites could be most familiar with and stick to the prescribed "recipe" for the call-in.

However, Flint decided to require signed agreements by B-listers, which is not a part of the training model. The agreement B-listers signed stated that they would not commit a new drug or violent offense, would check in with a team member once a week, and would complete an alcohol and drug screening. The other sites had various program requirements, but these were not put into writing and signed by the B-listers.

Key Points on Preparing for and Conducting the Call-In

- All sites that held call-ins successfully apprehended and charged A-listers. Each site arrested between eight and 12 A-listers. Note that none of the materials produced by NNSC or BJA make recommendations about what share of the identified dealers should be placed on the A-list or B-list
- All teams that held a call-in successfully notified offenders and/or their families through invitation letters, and most invitees attended the call-in meetings.
- Call-in venues and formats were similar across the sites and adherent to the training model, with all sites presenting a strong deterrence message to offenders and their families.
- There did not appear to be many barriers or innovations during the call-in phase, perhaps because the sites had "scripts" from previous sites from which to create their agendas.

8. Process Evaluation, Phase V: After the Call-In

The final phase of the intervention distinguishes it from many other programs and, if successful, keeps the market from re-emerging. It consists of two main efforts: one from law enforcement and one from the community. On the law enforcement side, the target area receives additional services, manpower, and prioritized calls for service. Law enforcement presence is important to signal to the community that they care and are committed to suppressing the overt drug market. Law enforcement should also continue to communicate with community members personally or through newsletters, meetings, etc., and follow up with the B-listers to ensure that they are not reoffending. On the community side, there is a need for community members to organize and exert their own informal social control and start to cooperate with police, to prevent both the B-listers and any would-be replacement dealers from reestablishing the overt drug market.

Implementation of Steps After the Call-In

Step 8: Increasing Enforcement in the Community

> In Step 8, law enforcement enforces the cease and desist order and no tolerance message by conducting the following activities: watching for any signs of continued street-level drug dealing in the target area; continuing to make buys in the area; continuing to send confidential informants into confirmed drug locations; encouraging residents to call law enforcement; giving calls from residents high priority by law enforcement; immediately investigating reports of dealing; asking judges to issue an arrest warrant for notified offenders about whom there are complaints and arresting those offenders. Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b.

Following the call-in, most sites prioritized calls for service in the target area and increased patrolling in the area. The one exception was Flint; according to the FPD, severe budgetary restrictions and manpower issues prevented them from devoting resources specifically to the target area. In Guntersville, the team set up a call-in line for residents to report issues in the community; the team has also continued to aid in the process of condemning and demolishing properties. In Montgomery County, the police force increased patrols in the area, and a community police officer inspected the condition of the property every two weeks and reported physical disorder problems to the resident manager. In Roanoke, the team also used license plate readers in the target area to identify the owners of vehicles and send each owner a letter during the follow-up period informing them that their cars were parked in an area where narcotics are known to be sold. The team hoped the letters would increase community members' perceptions that police officers are monitoring the area and that it would be possible to identify any outsiders.

Roanoke also increased bike patrols and posted visible video cameras in the area for six months after the call-in.

Three of the four sites were able to step up their law enforcement activities in the target neighborhoods, generally for a period of at least three months, which included both additional personnel and attempts to buy drugs. Only Flint was unable to dedicate any additional enforcement efforts in the targeted area, because of budgetary issues. The sites were also fairly uniform in their enforcement follow-up with the B-listers, following the prescribed model. Three of the four sites ended up arresting at least one B-lister who violated their agreement in the first six months: Flint police arrested four of the six B-listers, Guntersville police arrested one of the six B-listers, and Montgomery County police arrested one of the nine B-listers. Both Guntersville and Montgomery County levied enhanced charges against the B-listers who violated their agreements, and considered enhanced sentencing. Flint police, however, reported that they were unable to follow through with the focused deterrence threat of "special" prosecution because of limited resources and an inability to secure enhanced punishment (e.g., prison time).

Step 9: Following up with Candidates [and the Community] on Promised Resources

> Step 9, the final step in the DMI process, involves following up with the candidates and with the community. In the traditional model, this step involves the following activities: following up with call-in candidates on promised resources; having a resource coordinator/designated team member contact the notified offenders to determine if offenders are getting the help they need; assigning mentors to notified offenders; encouraging the community to keep in touch with the call-in candidates through phone calls and visits; law enforcement putting out newsletters and flyers containing information about the targeted drug dealers that have been arrested as well as those that chose a different path; law enforcement continuing to attend community meetings in the area to maintain the lines of communication; the DMI team providing the community with anything that was promised (e.g., replace lights, clean up trash); and close monitoring of the crime data with continual feedback from the research partners (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009b).

Follow-up with community. Most sites held a number of community events in the months following the call-in, though some did so to a lesser degree. In Flint, a park clean-up event was held in the target area and attended by approximately 20 community members along with members of the team and one FPD sergeant. The second event—a Halloween party for children—was held in the same park. The team reported approximately 50 to 60 young people participating in the event.

In Guntersville, several community events were held, including a second park clean-up event (although few community members participated in the event, with mostly the police department working on clean-up efforts), an after-school block party attended by approximately 30 children, a basketball camp sponsored by the Guntersville Police Department, and a follow-up resident meeting to update the community on intervention-related information. Finally, the Guntersville Public Library, located at the edge of the target area, organized a book club open to community

residents. The police-community relations committee continued to meet periodically and organized a unique neighborhood watch program that elected block captains who were in charge of contacting the police if there were any problems or if drug dealing returned to the neighborhood.

In Montgomery County, the precinct district commander and resident manager held four meetings with apartment residents after the call-in, and the community service provider team member has continued to hold community events and life skills courses. In addition, officers assigned to patrol the complex have contacted new families moving into the property, both to welcome them and inform them of the antidrug initiative. A local church group also donated sports attire and refurbished recreational equipment to the complex. As of this writing, the team continues to send an update in the weekly complex newsletter, informing the community about progress made on abating noise and other social disorder issues.

Roanoke has engaged in less community outreach, and has instead focused more on enforcement within the community and providing services to the B-listers.

Follow-up with B-listers. Not all B-listers who attended the call-in and initially expressed interest continued to follow the program. In Flint, four of the six eligible B-listers who attended the call-in ultimately chose not to participate. To apprehend nonparticipants, law enforcement in Flint conducted one search initiative per week, and the fugitive and road patrol sections were alerted of the search. Nonparticipants were also featured on a television program that identifies local fugitives and in the Crime Stoppers section of the newspaper. In both outlets, the offenders' charges were listed, along with the fact that the program was offered to them but that they refused to participate. Ultimately, all four offenders who did not enter the program were arrested. However, according to the team, they were not subject to enhanced prosecution, which was part of the threat during the call-in, which led to frustration within the remaining team.

In Guntersville, one of the six B-listers was reported to have continued selling drugs and was subsequently arrested. He was not allowed back in the target area. He has since pled guilty and is awaiting sentencing. Several residents and the B-lister's family members expressed displeasure with the B-lister's arrest, but the team felt it was important to follow up on promises. In Roanoke, all five B-listers attended the program, and, although there are concerns that one B-lister is continuing to deal, no arrests were made in the yearlong follow-up period. In Montgomery County, there was a complaint made against one of the B-listers, but this individual had not been arrested in the year after the program.

Three of the four sites did not assign a mentor or resource coordinator for the B-listers, and, thus, their progress was difficult to track. However, according to the program records, no B-lister participated in any of the social services that were offered at the call-in, and only two of the seven B-listers in Flint showed up for the intake appointment with social service providers. All five of the B-listers in Roanoke completed the Life College program.

Post–Call-In Phase Fidelity

Fidelity in the post–call-in phase was broken up into two components: enforcement and overall community mobilization and follow-up (Table 8.1, as well as Table 6.2 in Chapter Six). According to the training model, enforcement after the call-in is essential to sending the message that the police care about the neighborhood and will not allow it to be an overt drug market. However, as important as enforcement may be immediately after the call-in, the mechanism that keeps the drug market closed over time comes from the community, through increased informal social control, and through ongoing cooperation with the police.

Fidelity ratings for enforcement were determined as follows:

- high fidelity: significant additional enforcement activities
- medium fidelity: some additional enforcement
- low fidelity: no supplemental enforcement.

Fidelity ratings for community mobilization and follow-up were determined as follows:

- high fidelity: comprehensive B-lister follow-up and community mobilization
- medium fidelity: some B-lister follow-up and some community organization
- low fidelity: no B-lister follow-up and little community organization.

Guntersville, Montgomery County, and Roanoke received "high" fidelity ratings for post–call-in enforcement, while Flint received a "low" rating. Guntersville and Roanoke both received "high" fidelity ratings for community mobilization and follow-up, Montgomery County received a "medium" fidelity rating, and Flint received a "low" rating. Both Guntersville and Roanoke added enforcement activities and call prioritization in the target area, conducted follow-up with B-listers, and mobilized the community through a wide variety of activities, including a community newsletter, clean-ups, organized interest groups, and community improvement projects. Montgomery County received a "medium" rating for community mobilization and follow-up because, while law enforcement prioritized activity in the Damascus Gardens Complex, they provided limited B-lister follow-up and there was no evidence of the community mobilizing (e.g., all community follow-up originated from the team and community members did not become actively involved in organizing). While Flint's team conducted several community follow-up events, it was unable to secure funding for additional law enforcement or prosecutorial resources in the target area.

Table 8.1. Increased Enforcement Activities After Call-In; Fidelity to the Model

Site	Additional Patrol Officers, Special Squad Officers Assigned to Target Zone	Change in Call Priority for Targeted Area	Law Enforcement/ Confidential Information Continue to Try to Make Buys in Area (more than normal)	Special Handling of B-Lister Arrests/ Prosecutions	Post Call-In Enforcement Fidelity
Flint, Mich.	No	No	No	No	Low
Guntersville, Ala.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Montgomery County, Md.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Roanoke, Va.	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	High

Post–Call-In Phase Barriers and Innovations

Barriers. While most sites were able to prioritize calls for service and/or increase patrol in target areas following the call-in, extreme budgetary and manpower issues prevented Flint from being able to devote any extra resources to the target area. A lack of police presence in the community could make enforcement of the intervention and communication of a no-tolerance policy difficult.

In addition, Flint experienced some difficulty in following up with B-listers. The team felt it was not able to act fast enough to arrest individuals who chose not to participate in the program. However, law enforcement believed that, in the future, reducing the lag time between call-in and arrest would be difficult because most of the individuals they would be targeting were "underground." Many did not have permanent addresses and, according to law enforcement, most of the time they hopped between three or four residences. According to law enforcement, current call-in individuals were already underground before the call-in.

Flint also had difficulty following up in the courts with nonparticipating B-listers. The team originally had a prosecutor on board who was supposed to handle all intervention cases. However, by the time of the call-in, the District Attorney's Office did not assign all cases to the designated prosecutor. The first offender to go through adjudication was able to plead down her case. She received 30 days of incarceration, and the felony firearms charge against her was dropped. Two others also have been able to plead down their charges. Although each offender's folder was flagged as an intervention case, the prosecutor handling the case either was not aware of the program or not able to prosecute the case the way the original team had intended.

Innovations. Several notable activities were observed during sites' implementation of the maintenance phase after the call-in. First, Guntersville has been particularly active in its outreach with the community. By partnering with community businesses, organizations, and community leaders, it has been able to organize numerous community events (e.g., a basketball camp, a book

club, an after-school party, and a second park clean-up evening). A neighborhood watch that the police community relations group developed is also in the works.

In Flint, the team came up with an innovative method for monitoring B-listers' use of social services by adding the program as a service provider within the Homeless Managing Information System (HMIS), a database that allows for the tracking of services by provider or by individual across the entire state. The team felt that using the HMIS would allow it to manage outcomes down the road, meaning the team would be able to look at how participants are doing in the different categories and make adjustments and improvements as the program moves along.

Roanoke employed several unique techniques to ensure a police presence in the neighborhood. The team had several meetings with police dispatchers in which the dispatchers were instructed to give priority to calls from the whole target area neighborhood of Hurt Park. In the meetings, dispatchers noted that for the target area to receive a swift response time by the police, all dispatchers must know the area very well and learn about the intervention. The coordinator set up multiple one-hour training days with the dispatch teams to teach them about the intervention and get them familiar with the target area. The dispatchers cited concerns over the availability of officers to respond, specifying that a shortage of officers during shift changes would lead to slower response times in the area. As a result of these concerns, the police chief decided to hand-pick a cadre of officers who had shown the greatest enthusiasm about the intervention to beef up response time in Hurt Park.

The department also received community development funds to pay officers for additional overtime that might result from the program. A subsequent meeting was held by the coordinator with the Emergency Management 911 team to go over how to handle community calls originating from the target area. In addition, a database was created that lists the addresses where most of the calls for service originated. Using this tool, the team planned to assign each officer in the maintenance team to a particular hot spot to make constant patrols of the area and create a relationship with community residents. In addition, a maintenance team of seven officers in Roanoke was created, with each officer assigned a particular B-lister. The officers were to act, in essence, as "Big Brothers" to help the B-listers succeed in the program. The plan was for the team to get together monthly to discuss all the issues that each B-lister was having in the hopes of developing solutions to any problems discovered.

Team members in Montgomery County had a very different overt drug market and thus, their maintenance plan was unique. The team worked with a much smaller community of fewer than 100 Section 8 apartments. Team members held several meetings, and many of them focused on problems within the apartment complex, mainly its disrepair. They were able to get the management company to make a large number of physical changes to the complex, and a church group also came to donate goods and improve the recreational equipment. Additionally, independent of the team, the apartment complex's management company decided to evict anyone who shared a lease with an A-lister, which meant that quite a few family members were removed from the complex along with the A-listers.

Key Points on Follow-Up After the Call-In

- Following the call-in, most sites prioritized calls for service and stepped up patrol in the target areas, as prescribed in the training model, and added some innovations, such as neighborhood video cameras, a dedicated telephone line for calls for service, and bike patrols.
- All sites engaged in community follow-up through such means as community engagement events and meetings, although some to a lesser degree. One site formed several committees specifically to address ongoing community concerns.
- Three of the four sites did not assign a mentor to the B-listers to follow up with them, making progress difficult to track.
- Barriers to follow-up after the call-in include budgetary and manpower issues and difficulty in following up with B-listers.

Innovations included partnerships with community businesses, organizations, and leaders; use of a database to track B-listers' use of social services, and trainings on the intervention for police dispatchers.

9. Discussion of Process Evaluation Findings and Implementation Lessons Learned

In this chapter, we discuss the findings of the process evaluation for all five phases of the intervention and provide some lessons for future implementations. We begin with a summary of fidelity ratings for all sites across the intervention phases and then highlight key points about the implementation process for the sites that fully implemented and for those that did not. We then provide some broad implementation lessons. Again, it should be noted that we measured implementation fidelity on the training that the sites received, which was based on materials developed for the BJA TTA program (Hipple and McGarrell, 2009a), and not the implementation guide developed by the NNSC (2013), which differs across a few domains that fall outside the purview of this report.

Summary of Fidelity Ratings Across the Five Phases

Of the four sites that implemented the intervention (e.g., followed the steps and held a call-in), there was a significant amount of variation in fidelity to the training model. Roanoke adhered most closely to the model across all five phases, and Flint's implementation was the most divergent. It should be reiterated that these ratings of fidelity only represent *how closely their programs followed training model* and should not be taken as judgments how well the teams performed or how effective the intervention and its components were across the sites. Below, we provide a brief summary of site-by-site implementation.

Table 9.1. Summary of Fidelity to the Training Model by Phase

Site	Phase I Planning	Phase II Targeting the Drug Market	Phase III Working with the Community	Phase IV Preparing for the Call-in	Phase V After the Call-In
Flint, Mich.	Medium	Low	Low	High	Low
Guntersville, Ala.	High	Medium	High	High	High
Jacksonville, Fla.	Low				
Lake County, Ind.	Low				
Montgomery County, Md.	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
New Orleans, La.	Medium	Low			
Roanoke, Va.	High	High	High	High	High

Implementation Lessons from Sites That Did Not Implement the Intervention

At the time of this report, three sites have yet to implement the intervention (i.e., make it to the call-in). It appears as if Jacksonville, Lake County, and New Orleans will not implement the intervention. While each site experienced its own difficulties, the common theme at the three sites was a lack of support at the highest levels of local government/key agencies or the loss of initial support from leaders at key organizations over time.

Jacksonville, Florida

In Jacksonville, interest in the intervention came from a local Weed and Seed coordinator, who recruited a sheriff's office district commander, a local bishop, and a respected community leader to participate on the team. The state's attorney's office loaned a grants manger to the team, but never sanctioned participation of a prosecutor. The sheriff's leadership of the target area underwent several changes during the effort, and the last commander indicated that investigative resources were limited and the intervention was not a priority, especially given the apparent lack of interest on the part of the state's attorney's office. Team meetings ceased and the initiative ended when the Weed and Seed coordinator took another position.

Lake County, Indiana

The Lake County initiative got off to a good start, initiated based on the efforts of a senior staff member in the county prosecutor's office who was interested in getting the community more engaged in the fight against drugs. At first, a core team, including police and social service representatives, met regularly and selected a defined target area based on crime analysis. The team began to prepare by conducting a neighborhood survey and developing a social service plan. However, reluctance on the part of the police chief to commit limited resources slowed the targeting process, and a change in administrations that ushered in a new mayor and police chief further reduced the initiative's priority. With a lack of administrative support, meetings ceased and the project stalled for lack of interest, ending when the prosecutor who initially organized the effort left for a new job.

New Orleans, Louisiana

Many of the obstacles New Orleans encountered focused on not getting enough support and involvement from higher-ranking NOPD officials. Although the initiative began in the police department, it began at a managerial level and team members did not know whether higher-ranking officials in the department supported the program. As a result, NOPD team members did not feel confident moving forward, nor did they feel they could devote significant time to the effort. Such activities as putting together cases for submission to the district attorney took much longer than expected. In addition, significant reorganizations within NOPD created even more uncertainty about support for the intervention and detracted from related activities. Finally, resources that could have been devoted to the intervention were often diverted because of the

significant time and manpower that NOPD provides to festivals and events in New Orleans throughout the year.

In New Orleans, the program relied on an ongoing RICO investigation to identify potential candidates, and the team has not really involved the larger community or informed them of the program. Because of the loss of all but one B-lister to A-lister status, the team either will not conduct a true call-in or will include probationers as part of the call-in.

Implementation Highlights for Sites that Fully Implemented the Intervention

Four of the sites fully implemented the intervention, including the call-in. We summarize highlights from these sites here.

Flint, Michigan

In Flint, the intervention program had the support of the highest levels of local government (i.e., mayor, the chief of police, and city council) from the outset. However, the Flint team faced multiple challenges throughout the first implementation and did not follow the training model closely.

Instead of completing all the steps in sequential order, the team retroactively completed some of the steps after learning more about the intervention at the BJA trainings. The team also chose an unusually large area to target, approximately one square mile. Other steps were skipped. For example, the team was unable to survey the target area to identify A-listers, but instead pulled them from existing warrants. In addition, only two of the six B-listers who attended the call-in agreed to renounce drug selling and enter the program. The four who refused to participate ultimately were arrested, but then received light sentences, which failed to communicate the message to the community that officials were serious about their threats of sanctions against individuals who did not accept the program. Furthermore, resources did not permit an organized and strong maintenance program. The team did sponsor a couple of community events, but only after attending a BJA training session that emphasized the importance of connecting with the community. Moving forward, team members say they hope to continue to build on their community engagement and collaboration efforts with other community groups. Since the original implementation of the intervention, the Flint team has conducted two other rounds; the second implementation of the intervention was within the same target area as the first implementation, but the third round was implemented in a new target area.

Since the conclusion of the formal process evaluation period, the FPD and the Flint Lifelines program (the alternate name that the DMI team ultimately chose for their DMI program) have experienced a significant amount of change. Nonetheless, the Flint Lifelines team continues to meet every week to try to push the program forward. (See the separate online Appendix G for more details.)

Guntersville, Alabama

The Guntersville team appeared to follow the training model fairly closely. Like Flint, Guntersville also appeared to have support at the highest levels of local government, and participants at regular team meetings included the mayor, district attorney, and chief of police. However, support from police waned over time. The Guntersville team chose the only local area that it claimed contained an overt drug market. The area was defined geographically, and the team followed the model for identifying and categorizing candidates. While the team had rounded up A-listers for six months following the call-in, many of them had yet to go to trial. The team made extensive efforts to involve the community through meetings and sponsorship of special events both before and after the call-in. However, law enforcement maintenance efforts were minimal, and no requirements other than staying out of trouble were established for B-listers. After the call-in, there was little effort to track B-listers, except to note that only one had been arrested. None of the six B-listers contacted the team for social service assistance, although several had expressed need at the call-in for help in obtaining a GED, finding a job, or getting financial aid to attend college.

Montgomery County, Maryland

In general, Montgomery County appeared to adhere to the training model. The team consisted of a police captain, a crime analyst, an assistant state's attorney, and a staff member of county HHS. The target area selected was unique among the sites: a low-income apartment complex in the midst of an affluent community. According to the team, the apartment complex was the only viable site for the intervention in Montgomery County, similar to the case in Guntersville. While a single apartment complex does not appear to be a common choice among sites, the target area was a well-defined, geographically small area upon which the team could focus its efforts.

Montgomery County relied on traditional methods for identifying and categorizing A-lister and B-listers, and all but two A-listers received tough prison sentences. However, except for meetings held with management of the apartment complex, efforts to engage the community with formal meetings or events did not occur until after the call-in.

During the call-in, which was perceived by team members to be a success, the eight B-listers who attended were not asked to sign pledges or to participate in social services. However, the team did exert a significant amount of effort following the call-in. In the three months afterward, a team of four officers was relieved of responsibility for responding to calls for service and focused on proactive work in the area surrounding the targeted apartment complex, including regularly contacting the B-listers and making contact with new residents. Furthermore, the social service representative became a strong presence in the complex and regularly provided services to adults and youth. All A-listers were evicted from the complex, including any family members who shared a lease, which also might have contributed to changes in the complex after the intervention.

Roanoke, Virginia

Roanoke appeared to closely adhere to the training model and had high fidelity ratings in all areas. The Roanoke police chief was the impetus behind the local project and strongly supported the team's efforts, providing additional resources to make the project a success. The team was led by a police lieutenant, who held regular team meetings and made sure the project stayed on track. Using crime analysis, the team chose a defined target area and focused its efforts on a one-block area that had the most overt drug market issues. The team relied on traditional methods for identifying and classifying candidates and reached out to the community with a target-area meeting and surveys before the call-in. The team also devoted a significant amount of effort to following up with B-listers. One highly innovative feature of the Roanoke effort was the creation of a "Life College" that included aptitude testing; job or educational placement; sessions with community elders, faith leaders, and ex-offenders; parent and relationship training; and pairing with a mentor from churches in the community (see the program schedule in Appendix F). Ultimately, all five B-listers completed the 19-day course, and all but one were thought to be doing well.

Roanoke also conducted an extensive maintenance effort: Police dispatchers were taught about the intervention and the target area, then instructed to give priority to calls from that area. Community development funds were used to finance a hand-picked cadre of officers to beef up response time in Hurt Park. A maintenance team of seven officers was created, with each assigned to act as a "Big Brother" and help B-listers succeed in the program. In addition, each officer in the maintenance team was assigned a particular community hot spot where they made constant patrols and created a relationship with residents. Finally, the Roanoke police began using license plate readers to identify the owners of outside vehicles in the neighborhood; police would then send the owners a letter informing them that their cars had been parked in a known high narcotics area. The one maintenance area the team did not appear to focus on was organizing team meetings or community events. Overall, the intervention was deemed to be so successful that Roanoke decided to replicate it in another target area.

Implementation Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from the process evaluation can help ensure that future efforts to implement the model are well informed and undertaken in a way that ensures full implementation.

Lesson One: Without a strong commitment from key leadership within the police department and the prosecutor's office in the jurisdiction, it will be very hard—if not impossible—to successfully implement the intervention. Fidelity to the BJA model in the planning stage and getting key players on board is vital to program implementation success. While each of the three sites that did not make it to the call-in phase experienced unique difficulties, the common theme was a lack of support at the highest levels of local

government/key agencies or the loss of initial support from leaders at key organizations over time. Although a commitment from all four entities—law enforcement, prosecutor, community representative, and service provider—is important to the success of the intervention, a very strong and sustained commitment from the top leadership in the police department and at least one committed team member from the prosecutor's office seem is vital. An initial commitment that is not sustained or lack of strong commitment from one of these entities may impede full implementation of the intervention.

The Lake County initiative ultimately failed because it lacked strong support from the new mayor and police chief. Even though the New Orleans initiative began in the police department, the site ran into problems because it began at a managerial level; as a result, team members were hesitant to act because they were unsure of support from leadership in the police department. On the other hand, sites that had support from police department and prosecutorial leadership had greater success with implementation.

The need for prosecutorial support is clear in the case of Jacksonville, where the state's attorney failed to lend strong support, and in Lake County, where the team's prosecutor left the position; in each case, this lack of prosecution support was partially responsible for the demise of intervention. In Flint, budget issues within the prosecutor's office prevented the assignment of a single prosecutor to handle all intervention cases. As a result, not all prosecutors were aware that a case was related to the intervention, and the A-listers and B-listers who were caught violating the terms of their suspended cases were not sanctioned to the fullest extent, thus eroding program credibility.

Lesson Two: Participants should have a good understanding of the intervention before beginning the process. A full understanding of the intervention from the outset will prevent avoidable missteps throughout the process and likely improve fidelity to the training model. In Flint, the team was anxious to roll out the program and began preparing for a scheduled call-in before the first BJA training session. However, once the team learned it had not completed all the steps, it was forced to retroactively attempt to complete some of the steps. As a result, the original call-in date was delayed several times, and community members became distrustful about whether the team was going to follow through with its promises. Similarly, the team did not learn that community engagement after the call-in was important until after it attended the third training; as a result, this phase was not as strong as it could have been if the team had had sufficient time to prepare.

Lesson Three: Team turnover should be expected and addressed in advance. Most of the teams experienced some turnover in the core team, and in some cases, this put an end to the effort. Several team members mentioned that it was important to have multiple people who are familiar with the project from each sector in case someone changes positions. They also reported that it was essential that replacement team members buy in to the program's philosophy and were well trained on the intervention.

In Jacksonville and Lake County, programs ceased when program advocates left for other positions. Of course, it is impossible to say for certain what would have happened if the jurisdictions had received grant funds to implement the program, but it is likely that the agencies receiving the funds would have felt an obligation to follow through on the work plan even with the departure of a key team member. This is a liability that should be discussed at the outset of the effort.

Lesson Four: Political situations can influence implementation and support for the intervention. Initially, Lake County received support from the police chief and the mayor. However, during the planning phase, they experienced a change in leadership within the mayor's office and the Gary Police Department. During and after the transition, only verbal support was provided as opposed to manpower or resources; as a result, the team stalled and was not able to move forward with completing the targeting phase. In New Orleans, scandals within the police department led to a change in leadership in the NOPD. During the change in leadership, team members did not know if new leadership was aware of the intervention or whether they had the authorization to move forward. As a result, the process of putting together candidate cases stalled. While political situations may not be easy to prepare for, teams should be aware of this issue, and if applicable, bring new leadership on board with the program as soon as possible.

Lesson Five: If sites plan to track dealers, an action plan should be developed before the call-in. Some sites did not develop specific systems for tracking A-listers and B-listers, either from the outset or at all. This information is important for understanding the causal mechanisms underlying observed changes, keeping track of program costs, and successfully delivering the deterrence message.

Some sites were not able to track carefully whether B-listers were complying with the terms of program. Furthermore, some sites did not have specific requirements for B-lister participation. Thus, B-listers who might have originally expressed interest in the program did not follow up with social services, which could have increased the chances that they did not cease drug-dealing activities. While follow-up with B-listers may not be a crux of the program, it is possible that the success of B-listers in completing the program—and/or conversely the success of police apprehending B-listers who do not comply with the program requirements—could show a commitment to helping the community. Finally, Flint did not have a system for tracking A-listers, which meant that there was no way to make the community aware of any severe sentences A-listers received and, thus, reinforce a no-tolerance policy.

Conclusion

A variety of obstacles prevented some sites from fully implementing the intervention, including a lack of support from local politicians and or criminal justice system actors; insufficient funds and competing priorities within the police department and among the other collaborators; high team turnover; and a lack of understanding of each piece of the program

throughout the team. Interestingly, while some team members, particularly those from the community, anticipated that their competing interests (e.g., enforcement versus treatment focus) would be a problem, there was little to no evidence that this happened. In fact, the teams generally demonstrated a collaborative spirit and a willingness to solve problems in ways that were mutually advantageous.

Of note, sites that were able to implement attributed their success to a clear focus, strong leadership, and upper-level support, elements consistent with those considered key to facilitating implementation of new programs. Indeed, research on implementing new practices and programs suggests that buy-in from influential leadership is critical to implementation (Fixsen et al., 2005); that the participation of leadership in adapting the practices and programs to the local setting is particularly important to successful implementation (Rogers, 2002; Sales et al., 2006); and that cultivating "champions" (i.e., well-respected individuals within an organization or community) who can serve as peer consultants and role models also can facilitate implementation and, ultimately, adoption and sustainability of new practices and programs (Fixsen et al., 2005).

The sites that fully implemented were also able to work relatively quickly, holding their call-ins just a few months after the final training. If a site did not hold a call-in by this date, they never held one. Although a specific time frame is not provided in the training model, that momentum is essential in program implementation. However, it should be noted that we cannot draw any causal attribution about which steps and phases were essential for program implementation because this is an observational study.

Appendix A. Ratio of A-Listers to B-Listers

A notable difference between what happened in High Point, North Carolina and BJA sites—the ratio of A-listers to B-listers—is not reflected in the manuals or trainings, thus it could be more a reflection of site-specific characteristics than of philosophic differences. For example, there may have been more dealers in the BJA sites who were relatively more dangerous and less appropriate for the call-in than those in the first four High Point target areas. Nevertheless, the differences could affect the impact and sustainability of a DMI.

The focused-deterrence aspect of DMI involves identifying the retail sellers in the market, making undercover buys, arresting and prosecuting those who are most violent and dangerous (the A-listers), and banking the cases for the other dealers (the B-listers). Incarcerating the A-listers not only gets the violent and repeat offenders off the streets, it also makes the expected punishment salient for the B-listers who are given a second chance. Indeed, at many of the call-ins, there are empty seats with pictures of the A-listers who have been incarcerated.

The idea of banking cases has another role: It demonstrates to the community that law enforcement officials and other actors in the criminal justice system realize that traditional retail drug enforcement has been largely ineffective and detrimental, and that they are trying something different.[1] It is one thing to have these difficult discussions in the process of truth telling and reconciliation; it's another to convert it into practice.

In the first DMI in High Point (West End), four dealers were put on the A-list and 12 others were invited to the call-in, putting the B-list share at 75 percent. The B-list share for the second intervention was 69 percent (nine of 13), once again sending a signal to the community that law enforcement was choosing this new focused-deterrence strategy instead of the traditional approach. The third and fourth DMIs in High Point involved twice as many dealers, but there was still a commitment to putting most of the dealers on the B-list; for Southside the B-list share was 79 percent (22 of 28) and in East Side was 81 percent (26 of 32). The fifth DMI in Washington was an anomaly in High Point, with the B-listers only accounting for 36 percent (nine of 25). However, at this point many High Point residents were familiar with the DMI and how it had worked in other parts of town. They knew that law enforcement was dedicated to doing something different in their community.[2]

[1] Banking the cases "also greatly changed the underlying moral calculus: It was a graphic and concrete way to show the community, dealers, and their families that the views they had of law enforcement as conspiring to harm the community and control young black men is wrong" (Kennedy, 2009, p. 154).

[2] "In addition, the fact that the city had previously been so successful with its approach in other neighborhoods helped convince people. Despite the historical baggage that had to be laid to rest, 'residents now know and understand that the police in High Point are doing business differently,' Fealy said" (Von Ulmenstein, 2010).

While only a handful of targeted dealers were arrested in High Point and most were the subject of the focused deterrence, the opposite held true in the four BJA sites; most targeted dealers were incarcerated. Figure A.1 plots A-listers on the X-axis and B-listers on the Y-axis, for nine call-ins. In all the BJA sites, the B-list share is less than 50 percent: Flint, 29 percent (six of 21); Guntersville, 33 percent (six of 18); Montgomery County, 47 percent (nine of 19); and Roanoke, 33 percent (five of 15).

Figure A.1. Number of A-Listers and B-Listers in High Point DMIs and the Four Jurisdictions Participating in the BJA TTA



RAND *RR1001-A.1*

The most recent BJA TTA sites were not the only sites that had B-lister shares of less than 50 percent. In fact, except for the DMI implemented in Seattle, all attempts to replicate DMI have had more A-listers than B-listers (see Figure A.2).

Figure A.2. Number of A-Listers and B-Listers for Multiple DMIs



None of the materials produced by NNSC or BJA make recommendations about what share of the identified dealers should be placed on the A-list or B-list. Those on the A-list are believed to be too dangerous to stay in the community and the distribution of A-listers in overt drug markets varies by location and time. In the original iteration of the BJA model, the community worked together with the police and prosecutors to develop these lists (Frabutt et al., 2009); this is not the case for all DMI replications.[3]

With four of the five High Point DMI's having B-lister rates hovering around 75 percent and three of the four BJA sites with rates closer to 33 percent, variations could affect outcomes. The high rate of A-listers (and arrests) at BJA sites could have mixed messages to the community about providing dealers with an alternative to incarceration; also, as the B-lister rate gets lower, the enforcement aspect of the intervention becomes less about deterrence and more about incapacitation.

Discussion

DMI implementation in High Point was different from implementation at the BJA sites in a few significant ways, most notably in its focus on racial reconciliation and the number of dealers who were incapacitated. Emphasis on racial reconciliation and truth telling is greater in the

[3] One of the law enforcement officers interviewed by Frabutt et al. (2009) "detailed the whole process, noting the convergence of law enforcement and community input to make decision about the final list."

National Network manual than in the BJA manual and TTA. Neither model addresses the ratio of A-listers to B-listers, leaving interpretation to the sites.

Replication of innovative programs can be difficult, especially when the program requires multiple stakeholders and significant levels of collaboration—and, in the case of DMI, when there are two models that might emphasize different components. In some cases, community-specific variations are acceptable and can facilitate implementation and sustainability by making the programs more locally relevant. However, the differences noted above could affect outcomes.

Appendix B. A-Lister Sentences

In this appendix, we list the sentences given to A-listers in Guntersville, Montgomery County, and Roanoke.[1]

Guntersville A-Lister Sentences (six months following call-in)

Eight A-listers were prosecuted at the state level.

1. Trial pending; has been released from jail
2. Trial pending; currently in jail
3. Trial pending; has been released from jail
4. Trial pending; currently in prison
5. Trial pending; has been released from jail
6. Trial pending; released from jail due to medical issues
7. Trial pending; currently in jail
8. Plead guilty; sentenced to 15 years

Four A-listers were prosecuted at the federal level. Their status is currently unknown.

Montgomery County A-Lister Sentences (six months following call-in)

1. Conviction: two counts distribution of crack cocaine
   - Sentence: 20 years; suspend all but eight years, three years' supervised probation
2. Conviction: Distribution of crack cocaine
   - Sentence: ten years; suspend all but 18 months, four years' supervised probation, stay away order
3. Conviction: conspiracy for distribution of crack cocaine
   - Sentence: four years; suspend all but nine months, two years' supervised probation, stay away order; drug assessment
4. Conviction: Conspiracy for distribution of crack cocaine
   - Sentence: two years; suspend all but nine months, 18 months' supervised probation, stay away order
5. Conviction: conspiracy for distribution of crack cocaine
   - Sentence: five years; suspend all but nine months, three years' supervised probation, stay away order

[1] A-lister sentences for Flint were not available because the team was not able to track them through the system.

6. Conviction: distribution of crack cocaine
   - Sentence: 14 years; suspend all but three days time served, three years' probation (half supervised), stay away order
7. Conviction: conspiracy to distribute fake compact discs
   - Sentence: two years; suspend all but four days time served, 18 months' supervised probation, stay away order
8. Conviction: distribution of crack cocaine
   - Sentence: five years suspended, two years' supervised probation, stay order, enroll in drug program
9. Conviction: possession with intent to distribute
   - Sentence: five years; suspend all but four days time served, three years' unsupervised probation, (now lives in Washington, D.C.)
10. Stet on condition that defendant moves[2]
    - Result: moved.

Roanoke A-Lister Sentences (six months following call-in)

Eight A-listers were sentenced on state charges. The sentences were as follows:

1. Ten years suspended after serving one year, four months, and three years' probation.
2. Ten years suspended after serving one year, two months, and three years' probation.
3. Ten years suspended after serving two years, and three years' probation.
4. Ten years suspended after serving one year, seven months, and three years' probation.
5. 15 years suspended after serving six years, and three years' probation.
6. 20 years suspended after serving ten years, and three years' probation.
7. Ten years suspended after serving one year, seven months, and three years' probation.
8. Ten years suspended after serving two years, and three years' probation

Two A-listers were sentenced in the federal system:

1. Three years, six months to serve and three years' probation.
2. One year, four months to serve and three years' probation

[2] *Stet* is defined as "an indefinite postponement. No guilty verdict is entered, but the defendant may be asked to accept condition set down by the court. The defendant must waive his/her right to a speedy trial. A case on the stet docket may be re-opened at any time within one year if the conditions of the stet are violated" (Baltimore County Government, undated).

Appendix C. Process Evaluation Forms

This appendix contains the following forms, which were used in the process evaluation:

- Planning Phase Data Collection form
- Targeting Phase Data Collection form
- Community Organizing Data Collection Form
- Call-In Data Collection Form
- Post–Call-In Data Collection Form
- DMI Meeting Notes Form

Planning Phase Data Collection

Number and proportion of relevant local organizations eligible to participate in DMI. Note: Complete information even if an organization is not involved in DMI. For example, complete information for any local churches located within the target area whether or not they participate in the DMI project. Fill in names of relevant social services, community organizations, and churches.

	Team member (attends meetings)	Participant (but does not attend meetings)	Not involved
Police			
Local prosecutor			
U.S. Attorney			
Probation/parole			
Public or private housing manager			
Schools:			
Social services1:			
Social services2:			
Social services3:			
Social services4:			
Social services5:			
Church1:			
Church2:			
Church3:			
Community org1:			
Community org2:			
Community org3:			
Other 1:			
Other 2:			
Other 3:			

How many of the participating organizations have signed MOUs? ____________________

Has the team conducted a resident survey?

No

Yes ➔ How many respondents?

Describe survey methodology:____

____

Is there a written implementation plan? Y N

Does the team hold regular meetings?

No

Yes ➔ How often? ____________________________________

Since when? ____________________________________

Is there a written social service plan for B-listers? Y N

Describe the social service plan (Be specific about which agency is responsible for coordinating services, which agencies will deliver each service, and whether follow-up is planned for B-listers after call-in):

Has the team run into any significant impediments (examples: insufficient police manpower to boost strength in target area)? How has the team coped with the problem?

Targeting Phase Data Collection

Describe how the target area was chosen. Note the types of data that were used and the basis for the team choosing that area over others. Include number of square miles in target area and area boundaries.

Were there objective criteria for defining A-list dealers?

No
Yes ➔ What were they?____

Were the decisions on individuals vetted by the team at meetings? Y N

Was there consensus on the criteria used and individuals chosen?

No ➔ Elaborate: ____

____

____

How many of the A-listers identified were arrested? ____________________________

Indicate the charges brought, their criminal histories, and ultimate case dispositions:

	Charge	Felony convictions	Case outcome	Sentence
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				

Did the team make an effort to get community members to attend sentencing dates of the A-listers? Y N

Were there objective criteria for defining B-list dealers?

No
Yes ➔ What were they?____

Were the decisions on individuals vetted by the team at meetings? Y N

Was there consensus on the criteria used and individuals chosen?

No ➔ Elaborate: ____

____

____

Indicate the potential charges in cases built against B-listers, their criminal histories, and the type of evidence collected in the event that they were prosecuted:

	Charge	**Felony convictions**	**Type of evidence**
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			

Community Organizing Data Collection Form

Did the DMI team organize community events to publicize the project?

No
Yes ➔ How many events? __________
Describe (eg., picnic, ice cream social):______________________________

____

____

Did the team hold community meetings to describe/plan project?

No
Yes ➔ How many meetings (if regular, describe frequency, e.g., monthly): _________

____

How many people on average attended project community meetings (not events): ___________

Did anyone go door to door in targeted area to describe project to residents?

No
Yes ➔ Who: ____

What other means were used to publicize the project and gain community support? _________

____

____

____

Were neighborhood leaders identified and recruited to play a role in promoting project?

No
Yes ➔ How many? ___________________

What did they do?____

____

____

Did the project invite the whole community to the call-in?

No
Yes ➔ What means were used to invite the community? ___________________________

____

____

Call-in Data Collection Form

How many community leaders attended the call-in? ______________________________

How many members of the community at large attended the call-in? _____________

Which social service providers were present at the call-in?

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Who spoke at the call-in?

Prosecutor
Police
Social service providers
Community leaders
Members of the community at large
Others (list): ____

____

____

How many B-listers attended the call-in? ____________________________________

How many B-listers renounced drug dealing at the call-in? ___________________

Post–Call-In Data Collection Form

How many of the B-listers attending the call-in attended their first social service appointment?

____

Were there additional patrol officers or special squad officers assigned to the target zone?

No
Yes ➔ How many? ____

For how long after the call-in? _______________________________________

Did the police make up a list of prohibited behaviors in the targeted area?

No
Yes ➔ How was it publicized? ____

____

Did the police issue stay-away orders for arrestees not residing in the area?

No
Yes ➔ How many of these were issued? ___________________________

Did the police give priority to calls for service from the targeted area?

No
Yes ➔ For how long after the call-in? _______________________________________

Did the police increase pay for informants for info on low-level dealers in the targeted area?

No
Yes

Did the police conduct knock-and-talks with subjects of complaints from targeted areas?

No
Yes ➔ For how long? ____

Did the police conduct follow-ups with B-list dealers?

No
Yes ➔ With how many dealers? ___________________________________

How many times was each visited? ____________________________

Did the police conduct follow-ups with other offenders on probation or parole living in the area?

No
Yes ➔ With how many offenders? ___________________________________

How many times was each visited? ____________________________

Did the police establish a peer-to-peer information-sharing platform for officers to share information on incidents in the targeted area?

No
Yes ➔ Describe: ____

____

____

Did the team hold monthly community meetings after the call-in?

No
Yes ➔ For how many months after the call-in? ________________________________

Did the team establish contact with new residents in the targeted area?

No
Yes ➔ For how long after the call-in was this done? _____________________________

Was there a procedure established for regular reporting of broken street lights, trash, unkept yards, graffiti to appropriate city agencies?

No
Yes ➔ For how long after the call-in was this procedure in place? _________________

Did the team publish a newsletter?

No
Yes ➔ For how long after the call-in? ____________________________________

Did the team establish a youth education program?

No
Yes ➔ For how long after the call-in was this program in place?
____

DMI Meeting Notes

City ___________ Date __________

Attendees:

Police:________________________ Prosecutor:___________________________

U.S. Attorney:___________________ Probation/parole:______________________

Public/private housing manager:_______ Schools:________________________________

Social service 1:_________________ Social service 2:_________________________

Social service 3:_________________ Church group:__________________________

Community org 1:________________ Community org 2:________________________

Other 1:________________________ Other 2:_______________________________

Note topics discussed from 12 steps in the TTA implementation guide and specific commitments made by participants (Example: Step 1 Crime Mapping: Police department committed to producing hot-spot map of violent crimes by next meeting)

What has been accomplished since the last DMI meeting?

Note any significant impediments that were discussed and describe any solutions that were carried out or discussed during the meeting:

Other observations:

Appendix D. Semistructured Interview with Team Members

In this appendix, we include the questions used during the semistructured interviews with, respectively, police, prosecutors, and other partners (social services, community representatives). Questions are provided for both the first interview and the interview held after the call-in.

Police and Prosecutor Semistructured Interview Protocol

First set of interview questions

1. Why did your department decide to pursue this particular drug market intervention strategy?
2. Describe the target geographic area.
3. What criteria were used to choose this area?
4. What criteria were used to select the dealers who were called in versus those who were arrested?
5. Describe available community resources, supports, and networks to support the intervention.
6. How did the community/community members become involved or engaged?
7. How well were the law enforcement efforts coordinated with the community?
8. Describe the level of coordination among law enforcement agencies.
9. What was your role in implementing the strategy?
10. Where did your role fit within the whole chain of command responsible for implementing the strategy?

Second set of interview questions (after the call-in)

1. Here is a list of the steps involved in DMI. For each step, describe what went well, what you would do differently, and the barriers to implementation:

    a. Identify target area using crime mapping.
    b. Engage the community.
    c. Survey police officers.
    d. Identify street drug dealers.
    e. Review street drug incidents.
    f. Conduct the undercover investigation.

g. Establish contact with those who can influence offenders.
h. Conduct the call-in.
i. Practice strict enforcement.
j. Follow up.

2. Describe any maintenance efforts by law enforcement in the targeted area following the call-in.
3. Which elements were most important?
4. How would you summarize the impacts of this initiative?
5. What should your department do differently in the future?
6. How will you know if you are successful?
7. Are there any other thoughts you'd like to share?

Section 2. Other Partners (Social Services, Community Representatives)

First set of interview questions

1. How did you initially become involved with the Task Force in your community?
2. What was your original role on the task force?
3. How has that role changed over time?
4. What was your role in implementing the overt street drug strategy?
5. Describe the available community resources, supports, and networks to support the intervention.
6. How did the community members become involved?

Second set of interview questions (after the call-in)

1. Did you attend the call-in? What was your role?
2. Have you been involved with community maintenance? How?
3. Describe any processes to track the progress of B-listers who agree to participate in the program.
4. In what ways, if any, has your participation with the task force impacted you?
5. How do you think the community perceived the strategy?
6. How well-coordinated were the efforts of the community and the police department?
7. What have been some of the challenges in implementing the strategy?

8. How would you define “success?”
9. Are there any changes you would make to improve the strategy? What are they?
10. How would you summarize the impact of this strategy?
11. What barriers existed in the delivery of services to the call-ins?
12. Looking back, are there any particular experiences or stories that you think are important to help illustrate the impact of the initiative on:
    a. Participants
    b. Families
    c. Community Residents
    d. Partner Agencies
    e. Other Systems
13. Are there are thoughts you would like to add about this strategy or your experiences that I haven’t covered?

Appendix E. Roanoke Redacted Offender Notification Letter

This appendix contains a redacted copy of the letter sent by the Roanoke Police Department to invite B-listers to the call-in.

Dear

As Chief of Police with the Roanoke Police Department, I am writing to let you know that your activities have come to my attention. Specifically, I know that you are involved in selling drugs on the street. You have been identified as a street-level drug dealer after an extensive undercover campaign in the neighborhoods.

I want to invite you to a meeting on at the located at . You will **not** be arrested. This is **not** a trick. You may bring someone with you who is important to you, like a friend or relative. I want you to see the evidence I have of your involvement in criminal activity, and I want to give you an option to stop before my officers are forced to take action. Let me say again, **you will not be arrested at this meeting.**

If you choose not to attend this meeting, we will be in contact with you along with members of the community. Street level drug sales and violence have to stop in the . We are giving you one chance to hear our message before we are forced to take action against you.

Sincerely,

Chris Perkins

Chief of Police

Appendix F. Roanoke Life College Agenda

This appendix includes the agenda of Roanoke's Life College.

TAP's Design For the "Life College" (Draft 1/21/13)

Day 1–Tuesday, January 29, 2013

6:00 p.m. After call-in, we will meet with clients to introduce what will happen next.

Day 2–Wednesday, January 30, 2013 (intake and SA assessment)

8:00–8:30 a.m. Check-in and breakfast
8:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m. Assessment and orientation to Life College—at TAP/VA CARES (Clients sign contract agreeing to participate and be drug-free during program)
12:00 p.m. Check-out

Day 3—Thursday, January 31, 2013

Preparation for Life College at home: Pack warm clothes/coat and stocking hat, hiking/tennis shoes, and personal hygiene items. ABSOLUTELY NO CELL PHONES ALLOWED! A phone will be available for emergency phone calls.

Day 4—Friday, February 1, 2013

8:00–8:30 a.m. Check-in and breakfast (wand participants before leaving Roanoke)
8:30–10:30 a.m. Travel to site and lodge room assignments
10:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m. Tour of site
12:00–12:30 p.m. Lunch
12:30–4:30 p.m. "Lifeline" exercise
5:00–5:45 p.m. Dinner
6:00–8:00 p.m. "What is Important to Me" exercise
8:00–10:00 p.m. Personal hygiene and leisure time/subject-appropriate movie
10:00 p.m. Lights out

Day 5—Saturday, February 2, 2013

7:00–7:30 a.m. Wake-up
7:30–8:00 a.m. Breakfast
8:00 a.m.–12:00 p.m. "One Year Plan: Circle of Life" and "Strengthening Bombardment" exercises

12:00–12:30 p.m. Lunch
12:30–5:00 p.m. Team challenge
6:00–8:00 p.m. “Speed Bumps and Road Blocks to Success”
8:00–10:00 p.m. Personal hygiene and leisure time/subject-appropriate movie
10:00 p.m. Lights out

Day 6—Sunday, February 3, 2013

7:00–7:30 a.m. Wake-up
7:30–8:00 a.m. Breakfast
8:00 a.m.–12:00 p.m. Education workshop with Peter Lewis
12:00–12:30 p.m. Lunch
12:30–5:00 p.m. Team challenge/high ropes/zip line
5:00 p.m.–5:45 p.m. Dinner
6:00–8:00 p.m. Discussion on healthy relationships/mindfulness
8:00–10:00 p.m. Personal hygiene and leisure time/super bowl
Lights out after Super Bowl

Day 7—Monday, February 4, 2013

7:00–7:30 a.m. Wake-up
7:30– 8:00 a.m. Breakfast
8:00–12:00 p.m. Dealing with stress/relaxation techniques
12:00–12:30 p.m. Lunch
12:30–5:00 p.m. Hiking/outdoor activities (Frisbee, basketball, croquet, horseshoes)
5:00–5:45 p.m. Dinner
6:00–8:00 p.m. Conflict resolution/effective communication
8:00–8:45 p.m. Mindfulness/journaling
8:45–10:00 p.m. Personal hygiene and leisure time/subject-appropriate movie
10:00 p.m. Lights out

Day 8—Tuesday, February 5, 2013

7:00–7:30 a.m. Wake-up
7:30–8:00 a.m. Breakfast
8:00–10:00 a.m. Change activity
10:00–12:00 Substance abuse
12:00–12:30 p.m. Lunch
12:30–1:30 p.m. Discuss “Concerns of Returning Home” and next three days of activities
1:30–2:00 p.m. Pack up and travel back to Roanoke
3:00 p.m. Check out
Homework assignment: mindfulness and journaling

Day 9—Wednesday, February 6, 2013

8:00–8:30 a.m. Check-in at TAP classroom/breakfast
8:30–9:30 a.m. Budget/finance discussion
9:30–12:00 p.m. Job readiness/employment training
12:00–12:30 p.m. Lunch
12:30–4:00 p.m. Continuation of job readiness/employment training
4:00 p.m. Check-out
Homework assignment: mindfulness and journaling

Day 10—Thursday, February 7, 2013

8:00–8:30 a.m. Check-in at TAP classroom/breakfast
8:30 a.m.–12:00 p.m. Employment assessment
  Master application and résumé
  Job search/registration with online employment services
12:00–12:30 p.m. Lunch
12:30–4:00 p.m. Continuation of:
  Employment assessment
  Master application and résumé
  Job search/registration with online employment services
4:00 p.m. Check-out
Homework assignment: mindfulness and journaling

Day 11—Friday, February 8, 2013

8:00–8:30 a.m. Check-in at TAP classroom/breakfast
8:30 a.m.–10:15 p.m. Discussions with religious community (Christian, Unitarian, Buddhist, Muslim)
10:30–12:30 p.m. Discussions with community leaders
12:00–2:30 p.m. Graduation from Life College (lunch)

The current plan is to take groceries to provide for breakfast and lunch with staff, and participants fixing for themselves. Dinner to be provided by caterer with assistance from Apple Ridge Coordination.

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