



REPORT

THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL STUDIES OF THE POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

GOODGOV:

WORK TOGETHER, GOVERN BETTER

POLISH AND NORWEGIAN COOPERATION
TOWARDS MORE EFFICIENT SECURITY,
ENERGY AND MIGRATION POLICIES

WARSAW
MAY 2016



EDITORS: JAKUB GODZIMIRSKI, ZUZANNA NOWAK

THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL STUDIES OF THE POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

GoodGov: Work Together, Govern Better

Polish and Norwegian Cooperation towards More Efficient Security, Energy and Migration Policies

Editors:

Jakub Godzimirski, Zuzanna Nowak

Authors:

Jakub Godzimirski, Krzysztof Kasianiuk, Zuzanna Nowak,
Lidia Puka, Marcin Terlikowski

Warsaw, May 2016

© Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2016

Copy editor
Brien Barnett

Technical editor and cover designer
Dorota Dołęgowska

978-83-64895-75-3 pb
978-83-64895-76-0 pdf

Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych
ul. Warecka 1a, 00-950 Warszawa
phone (+48) 22 556 80 00, fax (+48) 22 556 80 99
pism@pism.pl, www.pism.pl

Contents

1. Executive Summary	5
2. Introduction	7
2.1. GoodGov Project	7
2.1.1. Why Poland and Norway?	7
2.1.2. Why Experimentalist Governance?	8
2.1.3. Why the Three Fields?	9
2.2. The GoodGov Method	10
3. GoodGov Main Findings	11
3.1. Comparing the Comparable?	11
3.1.1. Structural Problems	11
3.1.2. Changing Environment	12
3.2. Security Governance: Learning from Each Other, but Where's the European Union?	13
3.2.1. Polish and Norwegian Security Governance: Lessons Learned	14
3.2.2. The EU as a Non-Actor in Security Governance?	16
3.3. Energy: A Winding Path towards Improvement	18
3.3.1. Potential Complementarity	18
3.3.2. Governance Vulnerabilities and the Energy Union	19
3.3.3. Importer's and Supplier's Governance	20
3.4. Migration: Does It Pose a Threat to the EU?	22
3.4.1. EU Migration Policy	22
3.4.2. Securitisation of Migration	23
3.4.3. Poland, Norway and the East	24
3.5. Workshop Findings	26
4. Challenges Ahead	29
4.1. Poland	29
4.2. Norway	31
5. Afterword	33
6. Appendices	35
6.1. GoodGov Researchers	35
6.2. GoodGov Publications	36
6.3. GoodGov Events	37

1. Executive Summary

This report presents the main findings of the research project conducted between 2013 and 2016 by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), with support from the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (ISP PAN). It also maps the project's achievements, examines its policy relevance and identifies various knowledge gaps revealed during the study that should be addressed by new research.

The GoodGov project has revealed important governance-related differences between Poland and Norway. These result from the interaction of various internal and external factors, including historical experience and path dependence, geographical location and the challenges it poses, various types of resources and access to them, institutional solutions and membership in various international organisations and frameworks. The latter, such as the EU and the EEA, are of special note as they set their own governance-related priorities, rules and solutions that have both a direct and indirect bearing on national governance in Poland and Norway.

Based on the analysis of available data, this research project found that the governance system in Norway is perceived as more efficient than in Poland. In addition to the factors mentioned above, this may also be linked to the application of domestic learning mechanisms in Norway, where review of governance and learning play an important role and the apparent lack of such mechanisms in Poland. Since Norway ranks systematically higher than Poland in all six key categories assessed within the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)¹ project, one could expect the transfer of governance-related knowledge between Norway and Poland to be a possible means of improving governance in Poland, including in the three fields in focus in this study—security, energy and migration.

However, the potential for governance learning seems to be hampered by structural differences between Norway and Poland, by the fact that Poland and Norway are in different categories in at least two of the examined fields (energy and migration), and because Norway has decided to remain outside of the EU while Poland is a fully-fledged member. What complicates the picture even more is that the experimentalist approach to governance learning works better in some fields, such as energy and migration, and is much less present and efficient in other governance fields, such as security. Another factor limiting governance transfer is a visible preference for the application of hierarchical, international means of learning instead of non-hierarchical transnational learning practices among professional equals, which is considered to be far more efficient. All the governance-related challenges and differences notwithstanding, Poland and Norway should seek to closely work together for the sake of governance-related improvements.

¹ See: World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators," <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>.

2. Introduction

2.1. GoodGov Project

The GoodGov Project—“National and European Governance: Polish and Norwegian Cooperation Towards More Efficient Security, Energy and Migration Policies”—was a Polish-Norwegian research project conducted by the **Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)** in cooperation with the **Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)** and the **Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (ISP PAN)**, and financed by the **Polish-Norwegian Research Fund**, a part of the **Norway EEA Grants Scheme**. The goal of the GoodGov project was to map governance-related challenges at the national and European levels and to improve the efficiency of governance through the application of an innovative, multi-disciplinary approach. For this reason, the researchers operationalised the governance concept and used it to map the respective national and EU governance frameworks, and then assessed their efficiency in meeting policy-relevant problems in three specific fields: **security, energy and migration**. The main idea behind the GoodGov project was the conviction that middle-sized European countries, such as Poland and Norway, can only improve their governance (as well as EU governance) through enhanced cooperation.

Inspired by an **experimentalist approach to governance**, the GoodGov project aimed at answering four main questions:

- To what extent is Polish and Norwegian governance in three key policy areas (security, energy, migration) proactive or reactive?
- How could governance experimentalism, learning and revision improve the situation?
- What can the two countries learn from each other?
- How can they coordinate their policies on the European level in the three fields?

All of the project’s activities have enhanced not only relations between the two countries in the areas of security, migration and energy but also have resulted in strengthening people-to-people ties and the creation of a professional international network of experts working in those three fields. More than 20 researchers took part in the project (see Appendix 1), contributing to the exchange of information, views and good practices between Poland and Norway and laying the groundwork for further cooperation between the institutions involved as well as the broader research community. In addition to this, the Advisory Board, which included high-level experts, supervised the implementation of the project. Several expert seminars were organised in Warsaw and Oslo and additional governance workshops were held for the Polish administration in Warsaw. The entire project started in September 2013 and ends with the publication of this report and concluding conference in Brussels in mid-2016.

2.1.1. Why Poland and Norway?

Poland and Norway can be classified as middle-size countries “doomed to cooperate” in order to increase their say in supranational forums such as the EU and NATO. Although limitations in economic, social or military potential do not enable them to play a leading role in such institutions, their political role has been enhanced recently. Although the Polish-Norwegian political tandem is far from obvious, cooperation between the major analytical institutions in both countries, namely PISM and NUPI, has created an opportunity for both to gain a better understanding of their countries’ bilateral relations and supranational mechanisms. However, this

cooperation was aimed not only at examining the state of national and supranational governance but also was meant to help improve it.

2.1.2. *Why Experimentalist Governance?*

The concept of governance is key to understanding how power is managed at both the national and international level and how it impacts the lives of citizens, various stakeholders, and solution to various policy-related problems.

Governance can be approached from various angles. For the purpose of this study, the GoodGov researchers have adopted the understanding of national governance proposed by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project. According to it, "governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them."² In order to understand how governance works and what the effects of governance practices are in a given historical and geographical context, it is crucial to identify the key governance institutions, understood here as formalised policy- and decision-making bodies through which power is exercised, the key actors, meaning those who actively participate in governance practices, and the rules and norms regulating relations among actors and institutions, understood as socially accepted or non-accepted ways of dealing with governance-related issues. Governance can be thus understood as both a static framework consisting of various institutions, actors and relations among them and as a dynamic process in which those actors and institutions interact according to some established rules in order to provide various public goods and services.

Since the idea was to examine and compare not only the state of governance at the national level in Poland and Norway but also how those two states can achieve their governance-related goals within the broader European framework, the researchers also had to examine the question of European governance. According to the study, in various understandings of EU governance this can be seen as the process of making decisions by aggregating interests, as the process of making decisions by transforming interests, and as an open method of coordination (OMC), known also as experimentalist governance.³

The experimentalist approach to governance is especially well-suited to heterogeneous but highly interdependent decision-making settings such as the EU, and the practice of experimentalist governance is based on the presumption that a full decision-making cycle involves four elements that together form the whole process of defining and redefining policy goals and means.⁴ These four stages are:

1. Setting broad framework goals and metrics that will be used for gauging their achievement in a process that involves "central" and "local" units, in consultation with relevant civil society stakeholders.

2. Giving local units broad discretion to pursue these goals in their own way.

² *Ibidem*.

³ B. Eberlein, D. Kerwer, "New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical Perspective," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 42, no. 11, 2004, pp. 21–141.

⁴ For more on this approach to governance, see: Ch. Sabel, J. Zeitlin, "Experimentalist Governance," in: D. Levi-Faur (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Governance*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; C. Sabel, J. Zeitlin (eds.), *Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.

3. Making the local units report regularly on their performance and participate in a peer review in which their results are compared with those of others employing different means to the same ends.

4. Revising the goals, metrics, and decision-making procedures themselves on a regular basis by a widening circle of actors in response to the problems and possibilities revealed by the review process.⁵

Experimentalist governance works best under certain conditions. One of those conditions is a relatively high level of strategic uncertainty, which allows local units that face similar problems to learn from each other's solutions. Another prerequisite for experimentalist governance to work is a polyarchic distribution of power in which no single actor has the capacity to impose its own preferred solution without taking into account the views of the others, which provides strong incentives for common goal setting. Finally, experimentalist governance can replace more classic modes of governance, such as the process of making decisions by aggregating interests or transforming interests only when political actors agree to set up a system that makes the cycle of goal-setting, implementation and revision run relatively smoothly.

2.1.3. *Why the Three Fields?*

For Poland and Norway, governance in **national security** is of crucial importance as they are members of the same military alliance and are interested in improving security cooperation between NATO and the EU and in strengthening the trans-Atlantic security connection. The interests of the two countries in security are mostly overlapping, but there is also a certain need and possibility for learning how to improve governance in this specific field at the national level and how to make the two better coordinate their policies at the regional, European and trans-Atlantic levels.

When it comes to governance in the **energy** field, the project proposal was prepared in 2012, at a time of high expectations for exploration of shale gas in Poland. There was a general political consensus that the development of those resources could be a panacea to the country's reliance on imports, thus decreasing the traditional energy security risks coming from the East. The extent to which Poland could repeat the Norwegian recipe for success with a sustainable resource and revenue management became the focus of the GoodGov research. Additionally, the project aimed at a better understanding of the relationship between the EU and the two key gas and oil suppliers to the EU—Norway and Russia—with the former being part of the EU regulatory system and the latter a source of grave concern.

As far as **migration governance** is concerned, the reason for analysis of this question was the rapidly changing national, bilateral and European migration landscape. Norway has become one of the main receiving countries in Europe and its governance structures have had to learn how to operate in the new realities as its foreign-born population recently reached the significant level of almost 15%, with Poles at 2% of the whole population. Although Poland is still a sending country, there is a need to have a more active and efficient immigration policy. Hence, the Norwegian experience in that field could be highly relevant to Poles. Also, it was important to settle both countries' migration policies within the broader, European context of the Schengen regulations.

⁵ See: C. Sabel, J. Zeitlin (eds.), *op. cit.*

2.2. The GoodGov Method

The project was divided into five connected work packages (each engaging both Polish and Norwegian researchers). The work packages (WP) resulted in several publications addressing the key questions and presenting findings. All of these materials are available in the form of publications on both the PISM and GoodGov websites, and the full list of GoodGov publications can also be found in Appendix 2 of this report.

The project's team based its analysis on available official documents and statements, mapping the state of the academic debate on the issues addressed by the project, and interviews with key stakeholders in the fields reviewed by the project. In addition, within the course of the project, the team held several seminars, workshops and conferences (see Appendix 3) to discuss relevant issues with various groups of stakeholders and present the project's findings to a broader audience.

The first work package (WP1) focused on the state of governance in Poland and Norway (in both the national and European contexts) and on governance in three crucial national policy areas: security, energy, and migration. The dynamic theory of European integration was used as a tool to understand and measure how Poland and Norway interpret these major issues and examine how effective they are in shaping their national governance vis-à-vis the European governance regimes. All in all, this work package provided a theory-based foundation for the research within the subsequent work packages and was a central element framing the project and its conclusions.

In the second phase, the project was split into three additional Work Packages that were to address a set of more specific thematic questions related to the practice of governance in the three fields in focus (security, energy and migration). A schematic overview of those central questions is provided in the table below. In the following chapter, the main conclusions and policy recommendations to be drawn from the thematic studies are presented.

Table 1. Topics addressed within the 3 thematic work packages

WP2 National security	WP3 Energy	WP4 Migration
Best Practices in Security Sector Reform	How to Avoid the "Resource Curse" in the Changing European Environment: Internal, and External Governance Channels	EU Common Migration Policy: Frameworks and Practices; Completing the Free Movement Regime
A Need for a Regional Level of Security Governance	Russia as an External Factor for Creating European, Polish, and Norwegian Energy Policies	How to Manage EU/EEA Migration with its Neighbours—Completing the Free Movement Regime in an Open Way
Bridging EU and NATO Governance	The Paradox of Norway as a Stable Supplier to the EU (supplemental text)	New EU /EEA Diasporas: Receiving and Sending Countries' Perspectives

The fifth and last work package (WP5) had as its objective creating a summary of the whole project, drawing general conclusions on the governance systems, identifying lessons to be learnt, and putting the project's final output into the enhancement of future Polish-Norwegian cooperation. Hence, this final report constitutes a summary of all the activities undertaken during the past three years.

3. GoodGov Main Findings

3.1. Comparing the Comparable?

Poland and Norway have had to cope with various governance vulnerabilities and still face different governance-related challenges. Both countries were therefore compelled to adopt some country-specific and joint measures to reduce their governance systems' exposure to the negative impact of unfolding domestic and international situations. The WGI assessment revealed that Norwegian governance was perceived as much more effective than the Polish one in addressing policy-relevant challenges, which meant that at least in theory there was a possibility to transfer governance-related knowledge and best governance practices between Norway and Poland. The study called also for closer Polish-Norwegian cooperation in addressing security, energy and migration-related questions of mutual interest in both bilateral relations and at the EU level.

3.1.1. Structural Problems

However, the study found that the two countries were also expected to face some structural problems when trying to address some of those questions. There were at least three important reasons for that.

1. The incompatibility of national governance structures and cultures. The key question examined in the GoodGov study was whether and how it was possible to improve Polish governance to make it more compatible with Norwegian and international governance standards.⁶

As demonstrated during the research, in order to be successful any transfer of relevant governance knowledge and know-how has to take into account the local political, historical and social context, which is also valid for potential transfer of governance knowledge between Norway and Poland, and between the EU and its Member States. According to the experimentalist approach to governance, when dealing with governance challenges it is important to encourage learning from a *diversity* of settings by ensuring that all participants in the search for best practices are equal and to adopt a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach to learning, the identification and the implementation of best governance practices in order to address the EU legitimacy gap.

Another important finding—and recommendation—is that the transfer of relevant governance-related knowledge seems to be best ensured not through formalised cooperation of representatives of sectoral interests or of their respective governments, but rather in a less formalised setting, where professional networks of groups meet as professionals, when the participants of those processes learn from diverse experiences and are not “taught” by others how to improve governance. What is also found to be important in this context is the question of commitment from political leadership, which can serve to put knowledge-exchange between countries on the agenda, ensuring that civil servants and relevant institutions prioritise and allocate time and resources to take part in those processes.

2. The two countries had partly overlapping and partly contradictory interests in the three fields analysed in the GoodGov project. In the security field, Polish and Norwegian interests are both overlapping and compatible because they both are members of the same alliance, rely in their security calculations on NATO support in time of crisis and promote the idea of the alliance

⁶ O.J. Sending, “Governance in Norway and Poland: Can Unequal Partners Learn Anything from Each Other?,” *PISM Strategic File*, no. 12 (48), June 2014, http://GoodGov.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=17703.

returning to its traditional core tasks, especially with Russia increasingly challenging the basic principles of security cooperation in post-Cold War Europe.

In the energy sphere, Poland's and Norway's interests are partly complementary and partly divergent. These interests are complementary because Norway is an important supplier of energy to the EU and Poland is becoming increasingly dependent on energy imports. Supplies from Norway (e.g., through the Baltic Pipe) could help Poland address some of the energy security challenges it faces due to its dependence on energy supplies from Russia. But they are also partly divergent because Poland is interested in the security of energy supplies and in affordability of those supplies while Norway is mostly preoccupied with security of demand and in higher rather than lower prices for its energy commodities.

In the migration field, their interests are also partly complementary and partly conflicting. In terms of migration, Poland is the main sending country in Europe while Norway is one of the most important—at least per capita—European receiving countries. However, the fact that Poles living in Norway represent today almost 2% of the country's population has pushed questions related to migration in general and to the migration of Polish citizens to Norway to a relatively high position on the bilateral and European political agenda.

3. Poland and Norway are connected to the EU in different ways. Poland is a full-fledged member of the European Union and has direct access to all policymaking and decision-making bodies and can thus influence the bloc's policies directly from inside while Norway is connected to the EU through a special EEA agreement that gives it access to the Union's market but only very limited influence on its processes of policy design and implementation, and this has some consequences on how the two can cooperate.

Thus, the EU is not a shared arena in which they can participate as equal partners and work together on addressing common problems. It is, however, the main "provider" of the governance framework for both of them.

The project found that although in all three thematic areas of governance the requisites for experimentalist governance, such as strategic uncertainty and a polyarchic distribution of powers, are indeed in place, this type of governance at best coexists with other forms and is by no means dominant. Experimentalist practice seems to struggle when policies are conducted in a hierarchical manner, issues are too heavily politicised, or when not all stakeholders are included in the process. This type of governance seems also to be less likely to make its way to areas in which tighter regulations are required to ensure proper implementation and legal certainty. In addition, although uncertainty is indeed a factor that can trigger the experimentalist approach, with its learning cycle, it seems that this may be more problematic when an acute crisis arises and quick decisions and decisive action are needed.⁷

3.1.2. *Changing Environment*

The GoodGov project was conducted between 2013 and early 2016. This was a period of crises, major changes and emerging new challenges in international relations, all of which had a direct impact on all three of the examined policy areas.

In Ukraine, the very fundamentals of the existing European security system were shattered and it took time for the Member States and the EU itself to respond properly to the emerging security challenge, with little room for experimentalism in a situation that pushed Europe into

⁷ For more on that specific aspect of experimentalist governance, see: J. Zeitlin, "EU Experimentalist Governance in Times of Crisis," in: B. Laffan (ed.), *Europe's Union in Crisis: Tested and Contested* (the special issue of the *West European Politics*, 2016).

the morass of a new war at its borders. It was not the EU as such, rather two of its most powerful members—Germany and France—that took the lead in negotiating the Minsk solution, although not all the other members of the bloc seem to cherish it.

The Ukraine crisis and the instability in the Middle East, notably the civil war in Syria and the emergence of the so-called Islamic State, have also pushed the issue of energy governance high on the national and EU agendas. The Energy Union was coined and the concept at least partly implemented in response to those crises, which can be viewed as an exercise in experimentalist governance in which some Member States—in this case, mainly Poland—have proposed some governance-related solutions that were then meticulously studied and transformed into a common EU approach. However, when addressing some more pressing questions, such as the question of the supply of Russian gas to and through Ukraine, there was no room for setting in motion the experimentalist learning cycle but rather other more ad hoc forms of governance. And less than two years after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis it seems that the Union again faces a structural energy governance-related problem of some European energy stakeholders that challenges the very basic principles of solidarity and diversity that are supposed to guide EU energy governance, which is, for instance, the proposed Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

Finally, it seems that the experimentalist approach to governance has produced rather poor results when faced with the deepest migration crisis the Union has faced in its history. The EU and its Member States have been through several rounds of talks and deliberations but have not been able to devise, much less implement a proper policy to protect and manage the bloc's external borders at a time when hundreds of thousands of refugees and other migrants have stormed their way successfully into "fortress" Europe. This crisis, like many others, has shown clearly the limitations of the experimentalist approach.

However, the visible governance failures, such as those noted above, require closer attention because learning from them may help the countries cope with similar problems in the future. An experimentalist type of governance that is *per se* based on mutual learning and the redefinition of goals and means may help address at least some of the emerging challenges, but this approach has clear limitations when dealing with crisis situations that require an ad hoc and swift revision of goals and means.

At the European Union level, there are also several other structural issues that can hamper development of more efficient governance, such as the lack of an intra-EU agreement on how to interpret some of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that set the division of labour between EU institutions and national governments, and the lack of political consensus on the future direction of European integration, with some countries pushing for a more centralised approach and others trying to stop, or even reverse the pace and path of this "ever closer union." In addition to several exogenous challenges, the Union has to address several endogenous issues such as Brexit, which if it occurs may have a devastating impact on integration, and the increase in EU scepticism and xenophobia across broader layers of the bloc's electorate.

3.2. Security Governance: Learning from Each Other, but Where's the European Union?

WP2 focused on Polish and Norwegian governance in security. The research was structured around three case studies: (1) Norway's and Poland's engagement in security sector reform (SSR) in Afghanistan after 2001; (2) the countries' approaches towards regional defence cooperation mechanisms, NORDEFECO and the Visegrad Group (V4), respectively; and (3) EU-NATO cooperation shortcomings and their limiting effects on Polish and Norwegian security policy. Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in early 2014, the project broadened

its scope of analysis to include the responses of Poland and Norway to the increasingly hostile Russian defence posture.⁸

3.2.1. Polish and Norwegian Security Governance: Lessons Learned

There are numerous lessons Poland and Norway can learn from each other with regards to security governance in Europe. First is the issue of the balance between deterrence and engagement in relations with Russia. Both countries share a similar “flank” position (directly bordering Russia) and both have developed policies aimed at addressing the strategic uncertainty stemming from the asymmetry in military potentials between them and their prevalent eastern neighbour. Both consider membership in NATO and close military cooperation with the U.S., including the stationing of troops, materiel and defence industrial cooperation, as means of deterring Russia from military actions against them. Both have engaged it in practical cooperation, particularly in the people-to-people dimension. For instance, Norway and Poland established regimes for visa-free small border traffic with Russian Oblasts that are next to them (Murmansk and Kaliningrad, respectively). Further, Norway has a rich record of collaboration with Russia with regard to search and rescue on the high seas, environmental issues, and the decommissioning of Cold War-era navy vessels, while Poland had launched a number of initiatives to promote understanding and dialogue between the societies.⁹

There is another layer to the Polish and Norwegian approach to Russia. Norway has a longstanding record of “self-imposed restrictions” regarding defence policy and has considered them to be instrumental in mitigating the risk of conflict with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, whether by accident or misunderstanding. What followed from that were limitations on the stationing of forces and conduct of exercises, including on troops from other NATO member states, close to the Norwegian-Russian border.¹⁰ At the same time, Norway was host to U.S. and Allied military materiel and infrastructure in clandestine locations but aimed at a rapid reaction of NATO in case of Soviet aggression. Those experiences—a balance between deterrence and military transparency—can provide valuable input into the current discussions on the scale and character of the adaptation of NATO’s force posture on the Eastern Flank in response to the growing Russian threat.

Going down the governance ladder to the regional level, the examples of NORDEFECO and the V4 also provide valuable lessons. Both cooperation vehicles share a similar record of failure with their most ambitious initiatives, namely involving common development/procurement of weapon systems or creation of joint military units. The most discussed failures are the “Archer” artillery system, a NORDEFECO project, and the V4’s joint development of Mobile Air Defence Radar. In attempts to form joint military units, the Nordic European Union Battle Group, on standby in 2008 and 2011, finally turned out to be unsustainable in its original shape in the long run. A new joint force of Nordic countries—Nordic-Baltic Battalion Task Force (BTF), which as of 2016 is only in the planning stage—will be half of the size of the previous force.¹¹ The V4, in turn, struggled for years to establish a battlegroup before it finally took shape and went on standby only in 2016; its future as a framework for this kind of cooperation is uncertain.

⁸ Due to the structure of the project, this issue was discussed in the report summarising WP II. See: M. Terlikowski (ed.), *The Security Policy of Poland and Norway in the National, Regional and European Dimensions*, PISM Report, September 2015, www.pism.pl/publications/PISM_Reports_The-Security-Policy-of-Poland-and-Norway-in-the-National-Regional-and-European-Dimensions.

⁹ In this regard, an instrumental role was played by the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding, a state agency established for the purpose of promoting various initiatives and engaging Russian civil society and academia. For more, see: www.cprdip.org.pl.

¹⁰ For more, see: M. Terlikowski (ed.) *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8.

¹¹ G. O’Dwyer, “Nordic-Baltic Collaboration Boosts Logistics Demands,” *Defense News*, 31 January 2016.

In this sense, NORDEFECO and the V4 illustrate the limitations of defence cooperation as such: even when considering it is an age of austerity, pressing towards the cooperative development of capabilities still hits multiple barriers in collaboration that cannot be easily overcome. In this, the ultimate issue of state sovereignty, widely believed to be the biggest hurdle to establishing common capabilities, does not play a key role. Instead, technical factors have come into play as states consider military cooperation. They include different national legislation regarding such things as the process through which the requirements for military material are set, diverse multi-year financing frameworks related to defence matters, administrative limitations concerning the exchange of sensitive or classified information beyond borders and even between Allies, and national defence industry interests. All these hurdles have turned out to be high enough to force all regional defence and military cooperation vehicles, mushrooming in Europe over the last six years in response to austerity, downgrade their ambitions.

However, NORDEFECO and the V4 also offer another lesson. Cooperation among the Nordic countries is developing fairly well in areas such as training, military education, exchange of best practices, cybersecurity and logistics while in the V4 it is still lagging. NORDEFECO's flagship projects are its cross-border air training programme, which does not require aircraft to be re-deployed from one country to another for a planned exercise but for them to meet in the airspace of one of the cooperating countries, and its pooled air transport capability (NORTAT), allowing a country to "lease" flight-hours from cooperating partners depending on its needs.¹² It is widely admitted by Nordic countries that what enables this cooperation at the technical, military-to-military level is arguably the long-standing record of Nordic collaborative endeavours in defence-related issues and a permissive administrative environment (both civilian and military). Despite the different security status of the Nordic countries (meaning NATO and non-NATO members), they share a long record of various cooperative initiatives: NORDEFECO itself was established on the merging of three other, more specialised, cooperation vehicles.¹³ Consequently, a culture of cooperation was being slowly established, paving the way for effective collaborative endeavours, which, interestingly enough, are not blocked by whether the Nordic countries are NATO or non-NATO members.

Against this backdrop, the V4 still has visible gaps even though it moved to cover practical defence cooperation only a few years ago. Consequently, the Visegrad Group should try to establish grounds for a cooperative way of operating by focusing on projects that provide added value in the military sense rather than the political one, even if they are less visible and do not spill over to other areas of security and defence cooperation. The V4 should also allow flexibility in the projects it undertakes (bilateral and trilateral initiatives should be exploited to provide lessons learned for broader initiatives) and look for NATO-led initiatives, such as the Readiness Action Plan, to facilitate common work, for instance, within exercises involving Allied command structure. Finally, the V4 should make full use of political and expert structures established in 2014, such as the semi-standing Senior Body at the level of State Secretaries/Defence Policy Directors and the subordinated V4 Planning Group, which could take on the role of "carrier" of the V4's collaborative mindset.¹⁴

As for lessons learned that pertain to the issue of the effectiveness of national-level governance in the security policy domain, Poland's and Norway's approaches to security sector reform (SSR) in Afghanistan provide even further insight. On this, there are two main observations: Norway has shown the ability to conduct a regular evaluation of the performance of its capabilities deployed in Afghanistan for the purpose of SSR projects, formulate recommendations regarding

¹² P. Rieker, M. Terlikowski, "The Limits and Achievements of Regional Governance in Security: NORDEFECO and the V4," *PISM Policy Paper*, no. 25 (127), pp. 5–6, <http://goodgov.pism.pl/publikacje/PISM-Strategic-Files-25-127>.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

¹⁴ M. Terlikowski (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20.

improvements and implement them, and, second, it has an unusually large and visible civilian part of its overall effort in Afghanistan. Norway has come a long way in Afghanistan, starting with its typically strong separation of military and civilian efforts (referred to often as the “Norwegian model”) and ending with a joint civil-military approach, required due to the extremely low level of security in the country. Further, within the Norwegian profile of engagement in Afghanistan at least as much attention was devoted to civilian assets and activities as military ones. Norway proved to be able to mobilise and deploy civilian experts hand-in-hand with military personnel. This was proved in particular by the scale of effort in development projects and training of Afghan National Police (ANP), with an instrumental role played by the NORAF instrument (Norwegian Police Support to Afghan Authorities Project).¹⁵

The experience of Norway stands in contrast to the Polish engagement profile in Afghanistan, which was built and heavily relied upon the Polish military contingent within the ISAF operation. ANSF training was performed by the military and included training for the ANP by Polish military police officers (with the use of the Police Training Centre).¹⁶ What is more, development projects, by definition civilian-oriented and including infrastructure works such as the construction of roads or drilling wells, were also implemented mostly by Polish military officers as part of the U.S.-led Province Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Ghazni. In comparison to Norway, Poland had problems with finding proper legal and administrative tools to deploy civilian experts in support of SSR endeavours; as a result, civilians—mostly police officers—did not feature prominently within the Polish presence in Afghanistan. In this context, Poland can learn from Norway a number of lessons regarding civil-military coordination and instituting a culture of cooperation, which allows for greater synergies despite obvious differences in interests and methods of operation. Of course, Norway can build on its long-standing practice of engagement in development aid and the capacity of its NGOs and state institutions, which provide lessons in learning by doing. The Norwegian example can be particularly important for Poland, which is likely to be asked to use its significant military capacity to contribute to future NATO or EU stabilisation operations.

3.2.2. *The EU as a Non-Actor in Security Governance?*

The case studies of Poland’s and Norway’s security governance at the European, regional and national levels allow also a critical observation to be made regarding the rank and role of the European Union as an actor within this particular domain of governance. When looking at Polish and Norwegian engagement in security sector reform in Afghanistan, both states’ approaches to NORDEFECO and the V4 as regional defence cooperation vehicles, or the evolution of their defence policy following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it is hard to identify the effects of European policies, notwithstanding the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) itself.

Within Polish and Norwegian engagement in security sector reform in Afghanistan, the U.S.- and NATO-led frameworks were a clear priority for both countries. The military goals of the Polish and Norwegian contingents fell strictly within the broader, U.S.-defined strategy. The EU has never been considered a key player in Afghanistan, even if it provided huge official development assistance and deployed a tailored CSDP police operation there (EUPOL Afghanistan), to which both Poland and Norway contributed. The same is true about regional defence and military cooperation. NORDEFECO and the V4 have surprisingly few links to CSDP even though both can

¹⁵ For more, see: W. Lorenz, M.A. Piotrowski, “Norwegian and Polish Security Sector Reform Experiences from Afghanistan,” *PISM Strategic File*, no. 1 (64), January 2015, pp. 5–7, www.pism.pl/Publications/PISM-Strategic-Files/PISM-Strategic-File-no-1-64.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 6–7.

be considered “islands of cooperation,” as once such regional vehicles were dubbed.¹⁷ Truly, both benefited from participation in the EU Battlegroups system: NORDEFECO to some extent organised parts of its capability cooperation around the Nordic Battlegroup while the 2016 V4 Battlegroup, in turn, has been so far the only tangible deliverable of the Visegrad Group and there is a good chance that it will be the basis of future V4 capability cooperation. Yet, both vehicles of regional military cooperation have a very limited European perspective in the sense that they do not relate to the capability gaps both identified by the EU and meant to be addressed in a coordinated manner through the “pooling and sharing” initiative or other European Defence Agency-facilitated projects. Finally, the reaction—within the scope of defence policy—of Poland and Norway to Russia-Ukraine conflict and subsequent more aggressive Russian defence posture towards the West further demonstrates the weakness of the European factor in both countries’ security governance systems. The Polish and Norwegian response defence-wise to the drastic deterioration of the security environment in Europe has been entirely focused on the international dimension on NATO and re-building both the U.S. military presence in Europe and re-attracting American strategic attention regarding European security matters. Of course, the EU-imposed sanctions on Russia are considered by Poland and Norway the top tool to deter Russia from escalating the conflict in Ukraine and to compel the Russian-controlled separatists in Donbas to abide by the Minsk agreement. But they are seen as not enough to deter Russia from future violations of the post-Cold War order in Europe. A revamped NATO force posture and U.S. presence are seen by Poland and Norway as the only effective deterrents. Of course, it is hard to expect that Norway, a non-EU member, would be affected by Union policy on such a sensitive area as security governance. While this is partly true, at the same time, Norway has a special relationship within the EU’s CSDP through an Administrative Agreement with the European Defence Agency (EDA), which makes Norway part of the EU-wide capability-oriented cooperation programmes run, supervised or managed by the agency, and the Framework Participation Agreement (FPA), which makes it possible for Norway to contribute troops and civilian specialists to CSDP operations. Finally, Norway, as part of the European Economic Area, is bound by new European Commission legislation regarding procedures for the acquisition of military materiel and its transfer within the Community (Directives 2009/81/EC and 2009/43/EC). Yet, these vehicles do not bring visibility to the EU as one of the drivers of Norwegian security governance.

Despite the formal difference in EU membership, the practical situation is not much different in Poland’s case. Although the country has participated in the majority of CSDP military operations, including the recent African mission to the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), and contributed forces to three subsequent EU Battlegroups (in 2010, 2013 and 2016), the practical importance of CSDP to Polish security governance is secondary to NATO and the country’s relationship with the U.S. The EU plays an auxiliary role, as a “second insurance policy,” and this hierarchy was only reinforced by the Russia-Ukraine conflict.¹⁸

These observations pertain to the problem of the CSDP’s growing irrelevance and, subsequently, the weakness of the EU as a security governance actor. The research conducted within the GoodGov project indirectly points to one of the core reasons for this weakness—a flawed relationship between the EU and NATO. They communicate with each other in an awkward manner, even though 90% of their membership is the same. The stalemate has impeded cooperation in theatres where both the EU and NATO have had their own operations, including Afghanistan and Kosovo, and it has made it hard to coordinate capability development, exchange

¹⁷ The term was popularised by Thomas Valasek in his paper, “Surviving Austerity: The Case for a New Approach to EU Military Collaboration,” CER, May 2011.

¹⁸ For more, see: “Annual Address of the minister of foreign affairs in the Polish parliament (Sejm),” 29 January 2016, www.msz.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/goals_of_foreign_policy/annual_address_2011.

intelligence, discuss the development of threats, including the conflict in Ukraine.¹⁹ But what is even more important is the reason for the paralysis, which is the fact, that European states do not share—or even have not established—a concept for how security in Europe should be governed at the institutional level. The problem of the division of labour and formal relations between NATO and the EU is only one sign of a deeper issue. Another is the OSCE, which has been unable to provide visible results in its security dimension at least since the Istanbul Summit in 1999. Even NATO itself has departed almost completely from its core mission of territorial defence, only after the crisis in Ukraine did it start a modest adaptation to counter Russia's aggressive military posture. It is also not the EU institutions themselves, but European states that share neither threat perceptions nor operate within similar concepts of security. Unless this changes, security governance at the European level will remain flawed and one of its most crucial deteriorating effects will be to limit the role of the EU as a strategic actor and CSDP.

3.3. Energy: A Winding Path towards Improvement

WP3 was devoted to the analysis of several energy-related topics within the broader EU governance framework. This was due to the ongoing Europeanisation of energy-related issues and the constant strengthening of EU energy policy, which for Poland constitutes a basic reference while for Norway has to be taken into account due to the very close EU–Norway energy relationship and interdependence.

3.3.1. *Potential Complementarity*

Norway is a significant global exporter of crude oil and natural gas while Poland relies to an important extent on gas and oil imports, but the interests and priorities of the two countries are not wholly congruent. However, there is significant scope for these two countries to exchange knowledge in order to better coordinate their energy policies and improve their understanding of global energy market developments. For both Poland and Norway, EU decisions and actions in the field of energy are utterly important. However, each views the situation through different lenses—one of a net gas importer and that of a net gas exporter, accordingly.

Poland is acutely aware of its domestic energy vulnerabilities (its largest oil and gas import source is Russia) and has focused on improving European solidarity and diversification of not just routes of supply but especially suppliers. Warsaw, in particular, has been pointing to perceived deficiencies in infrastructure projects as well as the egoistic behaviour of some of the EU Member States. It has also highlighted the vulnerability of the energy systems of Central and Eastern Europe and has called for the creation of the Energy Union. In addition to this, the most recent Polish government's plans include the development of the so-called Baltic Pipe between Poland and Denmark that would allow Norwegian gas to be imported into the country. Also, Poland, as a hypothetical supplier of energy from shale gas (even if recently the plans for unconventional gas extraction have been halted), could adapt some of Norway's institutional solutions to design a system to manage the exploitation of its domestic resources.

As far as Norway is concerned, over the last four decades it has emerged from a “normal” Western importer of hydrocarbons to a key regional and global energy player. Nevertheless, Norway also faces several external and internal vulnerabilities in the field of energy, but Norwegian energy governance seems to be much better coordinated than Poland's. Also, its vulnerabilities mostly are structural in nature, stemming from Norway's role as an important regional and global

¹⁹ N. Græger, J. Todd, “Still a ‘Strategic’ EU–NATO Partnership? Bridging Governance Challenges through Practical Cooperation,” *PISM Policy Paper*, no. 21 (123), June 2015, pp. 5–6, www.pism.pl/Publications/PISM-Policy-Paper-no-123.

energy actor. However, its interests as a producer and exporter are not always compatible with the interests of the EU, which uses its market power to improve import conditions. In addition, Norway, which tries to distinguish between business and politics, does not see the Energy Union as an instrument that can introduce a vital change in its relations with the EU. However, one should also expect that the country's importance as an energy supplier to the Union's internal market will increase. In a situation in which most of the EU countries will strive to reduce their energy dependence on Russia while gradually moving towards low-carbon economies (by using more gas), Norway will have a greater say in shaping EU energy security policy.

Undoubtedly, the impact of the Ukraine crisis makes Norway a privileged partner of the EU because it is Europe's biggest gas supplier after Russia. Nevertheless, in terms of practical solutions, while cooperation between the EU and Norway, as well as Poland and Norway, seems to be well settled and likely to increase, much is still to be done at the level of energy governance.

3.3.2. Governance Vulnerabilities and the Energy Union

The EU energy governance system is vulnerable, and recent external (e.g., Ukraine crisis) as well as internal (e.g., post-Paris climate and energy debate) developments have highlighted gaps inside the bloc that weaken European energy policy efficiency. Within the period analysed as part of the project, in 2013-2016, two major governance-related weaknesses were especially visible and deserve particular attention.

First is the discrepancy between the approaches of the Member States at the national level and the EU in terms of energy policy formulation. Despite vast differences in the energy mixes and climate awareness of the Member States, EU energy policy is based on the idea of solidarity (Art. 194 TFEU) and climate strategies have been largely shaped as "one type fits all." The Member States are obviously granted relative freedom of choice in the energy resources they use as well as the methods to achieve the desired goals. As a consequence, clashes of interests between EU institutions and the Member States, as well as between states themselves, are not uncommon, as demonstrated during the discussions on the EU climate goals or in the context of plans for the construction of Nord Stream 2.

Second is the very weak external dimension of EU energy policy.²⁰ The strongest tools that the bloc has at its disposal when dealing with external players, and especially gas suppliers, can be found in its competition law. Their effectiveness, however, remains disputable and depends on the willingness of counterparts to adapt to the EU's rules. While Norwegian gas companies, after a period of contestation, managed to adjust to the Union's rules, Russia's Gazprom strongly opposes the European regulatory regime.²¹ For Russia, energy resources, especially gas, are viewed as political tools to project power beyond the country's borders.²² The EU's response capacity to this type of behaviour is rather weak and its tools to deal with it effectively are few.

Having pointed out the vulnerabilities, the question remains whether European governance can be improved and if so, how. Although experimentalist theory cannot be deployed unconditionally to describe energy governance in the EU, where the regulatory trace is far more paramount, it can, however, constitute a useful tool to explain the governance process, described

²⁰ J.M. Godzimirski, L. Puka, M. Stormowska, *Has the EU Learnt from the Ukraine Crisis? Changes to Security, Energy and Migration Governance*, PISM Report, February 2015, http://goodgov.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19206.

²¹ A. Gawlikowska-Fyk, Z. Nowak, L. Puka, *The EU Gas Game: Time to Redefine the Rules? Case Studies of Russia and Norway and Lessons for the EU, Norway and Poland*, PISM Report, August 2015, http://goodgov.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20243.

²² J.M. Godzimirski, L. Puka, M. Stormowska, *op. cit.*

thus as the “experimentalist governance cycle.”²³It includes the process of policymaking, interaction between stakeholders and other policy domains, and the formulation of goals. What it fails to explain, or to offer a remedy for, are the limitations of the tools or the vulnerabilities related to competence sharing, and conflicts between stakeholders, although the latter can be, at least partly, addressed by a successful redefinition of common goals and means.

Nevertheless, the mechanisms that were used in 2015 by then-Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the administration of Poland to create an Energy Union reflect experimentalist governance ideas. This initiative triggered a political boost to EU energy cooperation and helped move the security of gas supplies to public attention. Later, also in accordance with the experimentalist governance cycle, the Energy Union was embraced on the EU level, becoming a flagship project of Juncker’s European Commission and triggering the process of a thorough review of EU energy regulations. Although much of the work is to come, so far, Energy Union proposals can have a positive influence on the identified governance weaknesses and vulnerabilities. They have undoubtedly sanctioned EU competence in the energy field, giving a new dynamic to the work of the EU institutions. Although they have not resulted in changes to competence-sharing as inscribed in the treaties, the Energy Union idea gave in practice more powers in the energy field to the (reshaped) European Commission and strengthened the Commissions’ political role. The proposals for the Energy Union, instead of working out a single goal that would probably not satisfy all the stakeholders, have been developed into a catalogue of five most important policy goals (decarbonising the economy; energy efficiency and decreasing demand; integration of the internal energy market; security, solidarity and trust; and, research, innovation and competitiveness).

However, despite the robust funding indicated in the “State of the Energy Union,” financing of the energy transition remains an Achilles’ heel of EU energy policy, and consequently, the Energy Union project. Until the approval of the EU’s next budget, its regulatory power will remain the strongest tool in the European Commission’s kit. It should use this tool in dealings with both external and internal actors. Although the EU cannot become self-sufficient in its relations with external suppliers, such as gas relations with Russia, it should try to limit the damage caused by the application of the “Russian Grand Gas Strategy,” and in the long term, transform the interdependence to its own, greater benefit. When planning how to deliver secure energy to all European citizens, the EU should be guided by the assumption that one should hope for the best but prepare for the worst, and the best available strategy here is the development of an internal energy market, improvement of infrastructure as well as the adoption of proper crisis-management mechanisms.

3.3.3. *Importer’s and Supplier’s Governance*

Poland: A Steep Road towards Better Governance

Due to Poland’s large domestic reserves of hard coal and lignite, as well as coal-based electricity system, the country is sceptical of changes in reaction to climate change. It assumes that the competitiveness of its economy is best secured by the use of domestically available energy resources. Moreover, the national approach to energy governance is strongly influenced by the country’s history and social conditions, with a strong coal lobby influencing the country’s energy agenda. Despite significant energy import dependence, especially in oil and gas, energy governance has not been very efficient: policy planning has been plagued by low efficiency and the prevalence of a preference for the *status quo*, and there has been poor cross-sectoral

²³ For more about the conditions and limitations of the deployment of experimentalist governance, see: L. Puka, R. Parkes (eds.), “Linking National and European Governance: Lessons for Poland and Norway,” *PISM Strategic File*, no. 17 (53), August 2014, <http://GoodGov.pism.pl/publications/PISM-Strategic-Files-17-53>.

coordination and insufficient investment in the modernisation of energy infrastructure and market development.²⁴ In addition to these problems, the system was not adapted well enough to cooperation with business, as illustrated by the unsuccessful hunt for shale gas.²⁵

In order to improve national energy governance, Poland needs to step up its efforts to build a more balanced energy mix in line with EU requirements and expectations. At the same time, the nation's energy policy has to be put into reasonable form by limiting its objectives and through a presentation of a clear and understandable hierarchy of short-, mid- and long-term goals. The state should coordinate its activities more efficiently, i.e., through the newly formed Ministry of Energy. Here, Norway can serve as a model and case study for retaining strong government participation, control and supervision within the market regulations of the European Union, and for facilitating entrepreneurship in a non-interventionist manner. Poland could learn from the Norwegian model about the elements of private-public cooperation in a transparent institutional framework, strengthening government competence, engagement, and control, and, not least, that the state should have a vision and policy for economic and social development related to the extractive sector. Even when it remains an industrial player itself through fully state-owned companies, the country must always stay ahead in negotiations, participate in the processes of adaptation and implementation of international agreements, face up to markets and technological changes, act directly and indirectly, as well as in interactions with the concerned industries.²⁶

Norway: Governance Improvements in the Pipeline

Norway's energy policy is much better coordinated than Poland's and the vulnerabilities are mostly structural in character, stemming from Norway's role as an important regional and global energy actor. Moreover, its experience with organisation of a state-centric system of "hydrocarbon governance" has served as a model for other countries that have developed their extractive sector. Still, internally, in terms of energy governance, Norway only tries to develop infrastructure to help reduce local risks by making the country's energy system more flexible and better interconnected. The major external vulnerability is the fact that 95% of gas and more than 80% of oil is exported and Norway is therefore exposed to external energy trends such as price volatility and external regulation of energy markets and is limited in access to EU energy decision-making and policymaking bodies.

Despite the downturn in the oil and gas sector, Norway should strengthen its energy cooperation with the EU—the country's most important current and future market for its energy commodities. The Union will need sustainable energy supplies and Norway is in a very good position to deliver them. The country could contribute significantly—and through close cooperation with the diverse EU players—to the development of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology and other advanced technological solutions. In reality, they could become one of Norway's national fields of expertise in the "post-oil" era. At the same time, the country should support the development of the EU's internal energy market and regulatory actions that ensure competitiveness and fair competition.

So far, the importer-exporter complementary energy interests have not led Poland and Norway to the development of close energy links. Hence, the level of energy trade is rather low. This is, however, about to change as the new Polish government has expressed interest in it and

²⁴ J.M. Godzimirski, K. Kasianiuk (eds.), *Polish and Norwegian Governance: Closing the Gaps*, PISM Report, July 2014, http://GoodGov.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=17889.

²⁵ L. Puka, O.G. Austvik, A. Gawlikowska-Fyk, "Norwegian Energy Policy in the Changing EU Environment: What Poland Can Learn for Developing Its Shale Gas Industry," *PISM Strategic File*, no. 4 (67), March 2015, <https://www.pism.pl/Publikacje/PISM-Strategic-Files/PISM-Strategic-File-no-4-67>.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

has taken steps that may result in the import of gas from the Norwegian continental shelf to Poland through the proposed pipeline. This will undoubtedly require not only contractual arrangements but also political support from Norway and the EU. For the latter, this pipeline might constitute the embodiment of its Energy Union assumptions.

3.4. Migration: Does It Pose a Threat to the EU?

WP4 focused on migration governance and has sought answers to several related questions that were addressed in a detailed manner in the studies conducted by the project team. The results were included in several publications. The main conclusions to be drawn from the studies—and from the most recent developments pertaining to migration—are presented here.

3.4.1. EU Migration Policy

The research revealed that the issues of European Union migration policy and intra-EU mobility are increasingly interconnected and conflated and that both are under pressure.

The main source of concern is the EU's and some Members States' clear inability to effectively manage the Union's—Schengen Zone's—external borders. The bloc seems to have been taken completely aback by the scope of the irregular migration of the last few years and has had to adopt ad hoc solutions that, instead of improving the situation at its borders, have contributed to more chaos and pressure on the migration governance system at both the EU and national levels. The Union has lacked effective instruments and the political will and imagination to address the growing challenge while national authorities in the various Member States have sent mixed signals to the outside. Hungary, for example, was criticised for having an inhumane policy towards the migrants while German authorities issued an “open invitation” to all refugees from Syria and set aside the whole formal framework regulating asylum in Europe. The immediate result was more rather than less pressure on the EU's external and internal borders and more controversy within the bloc about how to share the burden of migration-related costs of many kinds.

By the end of 2015, it was not a question of whether there was the political will to accept refugees and other migrants but rather the EU and national capacity to address the issue became the dominant topic of discussion in the countries where the majority of the migrants ended up. Both German and Swedish authorities realised that the open-door policy was not a viable option and asked for solidarity from other members of the Union to address the inflow, perceiving it as a common European moral and practical problem. The response from the other Member States was not overwhelmingly positive and added to that, the authorities in those countries faced huge problems with meeting their own goals when work on the resettlement of an agreed number of refugees (quotas) stalled and only several hundred out of 160,000 cases were officially processed.

The crisis has revealed many weaknesses in the EU and in national migration policies and governance, has undermined the Union's international reputation and has contributed to increased levels of conflict within the bloc and in its relations with neighbouring countries, also weakening intra-EU cohesion. One of the reasons is that migration policy has traditionally had three somewhat inconsistent aims:

- management of immigration of people with special qualifications that the EU may need in order to cope with its labour-related and demographic challenges;
- family reunification;
- protection of people in need.

The third point is especially important because the EU sees itself and is perceived by others as an organisation founded on very strong liberal and democratic fundamentals, including promotion of universal human rights. This made it politically impossible for the EU to reject people seeking protection, even when they came in such great numbers. What started as a moral obligation when the first wave of migrants reached Europe in 2014, became a political issue in 2015, and has since become a practical issue and a real test of intra-EU solidarity and its capacity to deal with a humanitarian crisis of such proportion.

3.4.2. Securitisation of Migration

The growing migration crisis to the south of the EU was one of the reasons for the greater interest of the European public in migration-related issues, but by no means the only one. Already in 2014, during the elections to the EU Parliament, a number of anti-migration and Eurosceptic parties saw increasing support for their populist, anti-European Union and often xenophobic programmes. This forced mainstream parties to adopt more critical approaches to migration in general, including intra-EU mobility. The whole field of migration has come to the centre of attention and has become a very contentious issue, both nationally and across the EU.

The refugee crisis may thus have direct consequences on national policies and practices related to mobility. The large numbers of migrants coming to Europe means many will have to be integrated into the national and EU labour market in order for them not to become a burden to national welfare schemes and that, in turn, may change the situation for other groups, such as mobile EU citizens. This contributes to a rising level of tension in national and Union labour markets, fuelling populism and xenophobia, which were already on the rise in Europe.

As the migration crisis affects mobility, other internal EU migrants, including Polish citizens, may be affected. For instance, in Norway, where more than 100,000 Poles have settled, there have been some calls recently for setting aside the whole EU mobility framework and focusing instead on the integration of the more than 30,000 refugees who came to Norway in 2015.²⁷ Even prior to the current crisis, some concern had been expressed that intra-EU labour migration may pose a challenge to the existing model of Norway's welfare state and to the integration of external migrants and low-skilled labour on the country's labour markets. In her article, Elin Ørjasæter made direct reference to Polish labour migrants in Norway and warned that EEA immigrants take jobs from Norwegians as "a strong and hard-working Pole helps to push weaker Norwegians out of the labour market ... (or) he outperforms the hard-working Africans who had arrived as asylum-seekers, so that (they) never get a job."²⁸

Various forms of migration, no matter how they are regulated within the EU, are often presented in public and political debates as posing a threat to societal harmony, i.e., to what is often referred to as "our way of life."²⁹ The fact that most of the migrants reaching Europe during the current crisis come from the Middle East and are predominantly relatively young Muslim men is an important element contributing to the push for securitisation. This may have something to do with perceptions of problems with existing Muslim communities in Europe and the issue of

²⁷ See, for instance: J.E. Dølvik, "Tilbudssjokket," *Klassekampen*, 24 October 2015, www.klassekampen.no/article/20151024/PLUSS/151029859.

²⁸ E. Ørjasæter, "Norden blir som Italia. Der er 25 prosent av barnefamilene fattige," *Aftenposten*, 26 November 2014, www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/Elin-Orjasater-Norden-blir-som-Italia-Der-er-25-prosent-av-barnefamilene-fattige-7801483.html.

²⁹ For more on that topic, see: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998, pp. 119–121; O. Wæver et al. (eds.), *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Pinter, London, 1993; W. van der Brug et al. (eds.), *The Politicisation of Migration*, Routledge, Abingdon–New York, 2015.

“cultural incompatibility” as a factor hampering the future integration of newcomers who are associated in the European debate—directly or indirectly—with Islamic fundamentalism.

The migration crisis has, in other words, revealed the weak spots in European and national migration governance and is often framed in the public debate as posing an existential threat to the whole European integration project. It has already undermined EU internal cohesion and exposed the bloc’s inability to jointly deal with the humanitarian crises in its near neighbourhood and one that was been the impetus for people to seek better opportunities in Europe. As such, the crisis has consequences not only for EU migration policy and its border management policy but also for its foreign and security policy as well as internal cohesion and even for the future of the European integration project.

3.4.3. Poland, Norway and the East

The Polish and Norwegian experiences related to their Russian neighbour in terms of small border traffic and migration, as well as the growth of East European diasporas in both countries, along with some focus on a particular gender-related dimension in Norway, constituted the second main migration-related topic of the GoodGov project. Questions about border management and Russia as a neighbour have gained greater importance since the project began. One of its studies³⁰ deals directly with these two questions, looking at how both Norway and Poland have managed their trans-border relations with Russia and how they have become home to growing Eastern European diasporas. As they share borders with Russia, the current situation with the country presents the authorities in Oslo and Warsaw with new challenges, including in the area of migration and border management.

Although there were some voices calling for Polish authorities to close the border to Kaliningrad as a precautionary measure to prevent Russia from launching hybrid operations against Poland, the border was not closed and the small border traffic regime is still in place. In Norway, the idea of closing the border with Russia was also considered, but in a completely different context. In autumn 2015, more than 5,500 refugees and irregular migrants crossed unhindered from Russia into Norway over the border in order to apply for asylum in Norway. The Norwegian migration governance structures and many other actors were completely taken aback by what was an unexpected development, and some decision-makers at the time aired the idea of closing the border. Norway’s reaction to this migration challenge in the High North was relatively slow to start but effective, as the introduction of hastily proposed rules and procedures put an end to the inflow of migrants from Russia by December 2015. Although this experience might seem specific, it is important to understand that a similar situation may emerge along Russia’s and possibly other post-Soviet countries’ borders with EU or Schengen countries, such as Finland, which has the longest land border with Russia, making it Europe’s most exposed country, and is already facing similar problems to Norway.

Before autumn 2015, when the migrants began using the Russia-Norway border route to access the EU, the bloc’s eastern borders had been of far less concern than its southern borders. Only 1.2% of all illegal border crossings reported by the Member States at the Union’s external borders came along the 6,000 km stretch in the east in 2013, a situation that even improved to 0.5% in 2014.

The very presence and growth of both legal and illegal foreign diasporas have together become a far more sensitive issue in the wake of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, where the Russian-speakers card was played heavily. A related GoodGov study has established that neither in Poland

³⁰ K. Dudzińska, J.M. Godzimirski, R. Parkes, “Border and Migration Management in the East: The Cases of Norway and Poland,” *PISM Policy Paper*, no. 31 (133), September 2015, www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20566.

nor in Norway is the Russian diaspora a great issue in numerical terms. However, the very presence of Russian citizens—or former Russian citizens or those with dual citizenship—may pose some practical and political challenges in a situation in which Polish–Russian and Norwegian–Russian relations are strained because of the Ukraine crisis and the Russian propaganda machinery, which takes all possible opportunities to blame the West for those problems.

By 2015, there were 16,803 people of Russian ethnicity living in Norway, including 11,515 Russian citizens—65% of them female and 35% male. The high share of female Russians living in Norway is at least partly the result of the deep political, economic and social crisis in Russia during the 1990s, when a relatively high number of Russian women decided to marry Norwegian men and left their home country. Although there have been many reports about Russian women being abused by their Norwegian husbands, it is not their situation, but rather the situation of the children of these Russian women living in Norway that has become the main bone of contention in the migration context. In 2014, Russia’s “ombudsman” for these children, Pavel Astakhov, accused Norway of 55 instances of institutional abuse and, in some cases, involving both Russian women and children. Norway’s child protection agency, Barnevernet, has received a lot of attention from Russian media, influencing the perception of Norway in the country and souring bilateral relations.³¹ Similar accusations were also levelled against Poland, where the number of Russian women and children is rather small and definitely smaller in relative terms than in Norway.

Those developments clearly illustrate that having any sort of diaspora can pose some challenges, but it also creates some opportunities.³² As several of the GoodGov studies have shown, in the case of the Polish diaspora in Norway, opportunities seem to prevail. Poles in Norway have filled some important niches and gaps on the Norwegian labour market and have integrated relatively well into Norwegian society. The fact that both Poland and Norway manage their migration policies within the broader EU/EEA framework and are members of the same alliance, and the massive inflow of Polish labour migrants to Norway took place in a period of relatively positive economic development in Norway, have prevented this from becoming a divisive issue in the Norwegian political debate and in its bilateral relations with Poland. However, recent signs of what is viewed as the beginning of a long-term negative trend in the Norwegian economy, combined with the need to integrate a huge number of external migrants who came to Norway in 2015 and those expected to arrive in the coming years, may change this perception. In addition, the fact that some countries in the EU such as the UK have been calling for a revision of the whole framework regulating intra-EU mobility may push this issue higher on the political agenda in Norway and result in some tension.

For Poland, the question of foreign diasporas is far less acute, as only 0.3% of the country’s inhabitants are foreign-born. However, the perspective of welcoming migrants from the crisis-ridden Middle East has already become a rather divisive issue and has resulted in some tension between the current Polish authorities and their EU partners. The issue of the Russian diaspora is not highly visible in the Polish debate, but the question of another Eastern European diaspora—Ukrainians—is indeed very much on the agenda. In Poland, Ukrainians are viewed to a certain degree in the same way as Poles in Norway, as newcomers challenging the local labour force but who fill in some gaps and niches and integrate well into Polish society. Poland is facing a demographic challenge in its labour market and is forced to embark on a more active policy of attracting immigrants to Poland, with Ukrainians singled out as the most promising group. Opening up Poland’s labour market to Ukrainians has been presented as one of the country’s most

³¹ NRK, “Russisk kritikk mot norsk barnevern,” 15 November 2014, www.nrk.no/urix/russisk-kritikk-mot-norsk-barnevern-1.12045438.

³² See, for instance: J.M. Godzimirski, “Diasporaer og norsk utenrikspolitikk,” *Internasjonal politikk*, vol. 69, no. 4, 2011, pp. 579–615, www.idunn.no/file/pdf/51619247/art01.pdf.

important contributions to addressing the migration-related and social challenges growing along the EU's borders.

The GoodGov research has also revealed that the European migration landscape has changed dramatically and that neither national nor European governance structures were prepared to meet the challenge. Europe entered 2016 fearing that a new wave of migrants may be about to reach its borders. This happens at a time when many countries still strive to cope with the effects of the "migration boom" of 2015, and scepticism towards migrants and methods undertaken by the EU and national governments to deal with it is growing all across Europe and beyond. The migration crisis is presented as an existential threat to the very basic principles on which the European integration project rests. How national governments and the EU cope with this challenge may be crucial to the future of the project, which has secured peace in Europe for at least three generations now. How they manage it may have direct and indirect implications far beyond the issue of migration and may affect EU and national security and foreign policies, relations among their partners, Europe's relations with the outside world, and the future of Union integration.

3.5. Workshop Findings

Three simulations were held during workshops arranged by researchers with the GoodGov project. Each one was designed specifically for the project, with one exercise per policy area studied (security, energy and migration governance). All of them took place in the first half of 2015 in Poland and were meant to address the needs of the participants, taking into account that particular moment in history, as well as the reality in the countries of origin. This gave the analysts an opportunity to treat and design the simulations as natural experiments.

They were aimed at achieving three goals. First was the idea to design workshops in a way that the very goal and research findings of the GoodGov project obtained to date would be clear to all of the participants. This was supposed to help with mapping governance-related challenges at the national and European levels and to help improve the efficiency of governance. Second, moderators of all activities (project researchers) wanted to make sure that the communication between workshop participants and project experts was effective. Finally, it was important to acquire deeper insight into the phenomena and processes studied in the project and to help with the evaluation of some of the conclusions drawn up throughout the project.³³ Thus, the workshops would ideally constitute a two-way learning process.³⁴

Bearing in mind these aims, not only did the project researchers intend to involve participants of the workshops in discussions based on their prior knowledge and expertise, they also were willing to confront them with the conclusions from the research collected to date. In this way, the participants could be involved in a "learning-by-doing" exercise that would require some individual effort as well as group work to foster and affect their views.³⁵ Simulations seemed to be the most appropriate solution to achieve this goal as they provide an immediate opportunity to link prior knowledge with specific and profiled action and evaluation.

The simulations' design revolved around one of the crucial underpinnings of the GoodGov project and which was confirmed by its research results—the quality of a country's governance system is a major factor when it comes to its adaptability to the unstable international, cross-

³³ R. Garris, R. Ahlers, J.E. Driskell, "Games, Motivation, and Learning: A Research and Practice Model," *Simulation & Gaming*, vol. 33, no. 4, 2002, pp. 441–467; W.C. Kriz, "Creating Effective Learning Environments and Learning Organizations through Gaming Simulation Design," *Simulation & Gaming*, vol. 34, no. 4, 2003, pp. 495–511.

³⁴ Jac. L.A. Geurts, C. Joldersma, "Methodology for Participatory Policy Analysis," *European Journal of Operational Research*, vol. 128, no. 2, 2001, pp. 300–310.

³⁵ W.C. Kriz, "A Systemic-Constructivist Approach to the Facilitation and Debriefing of Simulations and Games," *Simulation & Gaming*, vol. 41, no. 5, 2010, pp. 663–680.

national and transnational environment. Hence, the country should balance between predictability and a capacity to react to unforeseen circumstances. The research on Poland seems to constitute a relevant example of the validity of this statement. Poland might better cope with threats and manage opportunities if public institutions, including executive departments and agencies, cooperate more effectively and the state's goals are more clearly communicated to all public actors involved in decision-making processes. Thus, it was essential to foster the quality of coordination between actors in different governance dimensions. This very notion was directly implemented as a major part of the simulations.

The rules and mechanisms of the exercises were also in line with the conclusions of the analysts involved in the project. In particular, it was important to show that the transfer of governance knowledge benefits from cooperation on practical, and sometimes technical issues, by people treating each other as equals and professionals. It was agreed that the workshops should take place in an informal setting and, presumably, with the general conviction that the diverse experiences of its participants were equally important and potentially beneficial to all.

Although each simulation focused on a single policy area studied in the project, the workshop moderators did not want to trigger discussions on very specific problems that would be covered by experts who could present their views on the sources of country governance vulnerabilities. As noted earlier, they wanted to avoid a “teaching scheme” and provide instead a mutual learning environment. That is why the moderators considered as potentially more fruitful the utilisation of the diversity of participants and the key notion of uncertainty. The simulations were aimed at helping discuss general governance issues, especially gaps and vulnerabilities.

Thus, all three of the exercises aimed at sharing participants' experiences and understanding more clearly Polish governance problems, at the intersection of the following issues:

- How to best develop and coordinate policy between different actors and stakeholders, both horizontally (between different departments and agencies of the executive within a state) and vertically (e.g., Polish, Polish-Norwegian, EU, transatlantic)?
- How to pursue policy when strategic goals can be perceived as unclear, and/or the goals are conflicting, and/or there is a lack of appropriate implementation tools, and/or if the conditions in the environment are highly uncertain and increasingly turbulent?

More precisely, the goal of the **security simulation**, entitled “How to create a multi-dimensional vision of involvement in crisis-management operations?,” was to formulate a concept of Polish involvement in the EU military mission to Ukraine, which could include non-military and non-governmental actors and stakeholders. This was inspired by real events, and followed by a review and comparison between the EU, NATO, Polish and Norwegian missions.³⁶

The goal of the **energy simulation** (“How to create state policy in the field of energy?”) was to optimise the formulation of policy instruments aimed at lowering Polish CO₂ emissions. The goal was in line with the notion studied within WP3, namely the interplay of dependence on fossil fuels, the import of fossil fuels, and the ability and willingness to engage in climate policy.

The goal of the **migration simulation** (“How to cooperate with the Polish diaspora in the conditions of free movement of people?”) was twofold. The first regarded sensitive issues for Poland and Norway, such as dealing with problems related to migrant families. The second was aimed at learning more about how the countries could effectively manage migration governance in order to be better prepared for possible migration-related setbacks in bilateral relations as well as challenges faced due to East–West and South–North tensions.

³⁶ For more, see: N. Græger, J. Todd, *op. cit.*

In summary, all of the goals of the simulations were subordinated to the governance issues studied within the project and were supposed to constitute the subject of subsequent discussions and presentations. They proved that many of the findings and conclusions of the project were valid in real-life situations. According to the participants, the experiences in the simulations sometimes only strengthened their individual observations of the governance-related issues.

They also helped as a two-way learning process. The participants had a chance to learn about practical problems with governance and the project researchers had an opportunity to confront their own findings and opinions with the opinions of the participants of the workshops, who held varying knowledge, experience and represented diverse organisations.

4. Challenges Ahead

4.1. Poland

At the beginning of 2016, the main question preoccupying Poland's political elite was not the relationship with Russia, which was expected to deteriorate after the elections changed the Polish government, but a completely different set of challenges. The current debate instead focuses on domestic politics and governance (e.g., institutional and even constitutional reforms) as well as on the country's relations with the EU. Russia was not mentioned at all in the statement about the new government's plans when it was presented on 18 November 2015 by new Prime Minister Beata Szydło.

In the field of **security**, the top priority of the new government is to increase the presence of Poland's NATO allies, preferably U.S. troops, on its territory and across the region to strengthen regional security and political cooperation with countries located in the area of what is called the "Międzymorze" ("Intersea" or *intermarium*). It hopes it will lead to the empowerment of Poland and the whole region while increasing the real capabilities of the Polish armed forces by equipping them with state-of-the-art weaponry, increasing their numbers and reorganising their structures.

Questions pertaining to **security** were discussed thoroughly in the new prime minister's exposé.³⁷ The term "security" is mentioned in this 7,595 word-long document 11 times, but not always in the context of international or national security. The government promised "to strive to ensure the security and safety of citizens of our country," described "the safety of Polish women and Polish men" as being of "utmost and paramount importance." Towards the end of her speech, Prime Minister Szydło elaborated further on security-related questions, stating that the new government would be guided by three priorities: "safety and security in its classical meaning, when armed conflict, though now frozen, is pending at the borders of our country;" economic security, especially in the energy sector, but also in the IT industry; and third, by ensuring the state its proper status and position in the international arena.

When touching upon the question of **energy**, the prime minister promised better coordination of the country's energy policy through the establishment of a Ministry of Energy and framed the question of energy in security terms. She underlined that for the new government, energy security meant the preservation of Polish coal—including lignite—as a source of energy and paid special attention to the question of security of supply of oil and gas, which is to be improved by the opening up of the first Polish LNG terminal in Świnoujście and the possible construction of a second LNG terminal in the Tricity area (Gdańsk, Gdynia and Sopot).

When it comes to **migration**, the issue was mentioned only three times in the policy statement. The new political agenda seems to be dominated by concern for the effects of emigration on the country. The new government is interested in halting the outflow of Poles through a policy that would make especially younger citizens "willing and able to find their life chances in our country" and to choose not to emigrate to other European countries for economic reasons. The new government also wants to maintain "contact with Polish communities abroad," not least in order to make "better use of the intellectual and economic potential" represented by this community. It also promises to "protect Poles living abroad, strive to ensure they are treated properly and, in the case of an emergency, are safely evacuated to the country." The new prime minister also presented an official view of the migration crisis in Europe by referring to the

³⁷ This brief analysis is based on the official English translation of the policy statement available at the government website at: www.premier.gov.pl/en/policy-statement-by-prime-minister-beata-szydlo-stenographic-record.html.

ongoing debate on European solidarity in this context. The crisis was, in her opinion, caused by some states that were attempting to export problems that had been brought upon themselves to other countries, including Poland.

A large part of the PM's exposé, though, was devoted to the new government's aim at a deep reorganisation of the Polish state, intended to boost more sustainable development, improve the quality of both **governance** and life in Poland, and to help the country manoeuvre around the middle income trap. Szydło also announced a number of governance-related reforms in many sectors. This was to be achieved by reorganising some existing ministries, such as the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Regional Development, and the Ministry of the Treasury, and establishing new ministries, such as the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Infrastructure, the Ministry of Digitalisation, and the Ministry of Maritime Economy.

The main driving idea behind the policy of the new Polish government is to give a new type of boost to the economic development of the country. This can, in the opinion of the new government, be achieved only if Poles are given better economic and social opportunities (for example, through social welfare transfers to families with children). The direction of the announced changes, however, has spurred concern not only by the opposition in Poland but also among external European observers.

Therefore, for the government to be able to implement its policies, it needs not only an ambitious programme but also the ability to adopt a firm and balanced approach that should not alienate either its voters or its international partners. The new government, meanwhile, stated that it appreciates "all the benefits related to membership in the European Union" and has promised to strive "to increase the effectiveness of EU efforts." It is therefore utterly important that the government's actions contribute to lowering, rather than increasing the tension, both internally and in the EU as a whole. The new Polish government should also use available channels and forums to dispel fears its European partners may have concerning its long-term intentions and to make them better understand what it is up to.

One of the ways of addressing the EU concerns and promoting the Polish approach is the use of the experimentalist framework in Union matters, which would allow for the exchange of views and revision and correction of approaches through a four-step process. Adopting this cooperative approach would best serve both Poland's and the EU's interests. Such an approach, which requires much time and effort and is obviously much less spectacular, may be viewed as more challenging, but at the end of the day, both Poland and the EU will benefit from it if the level of tension in relations between them decreases and they are able to find common ground. If so, it would indeed improve their chances of successfully addressing the most burning questions and common problems. As a full-fledged EU member, Poland has the privilege of being present at all important decision-making tables and using the experimentalist framework to promote its views and interests. For Norway, though, the situation is far more challenging. The country's quasi-membership in the EU gives it only indirect access to decision-making processes and bodies and limit its ability to use the experimentalist framework for its policy purposes. This should not, however, prevent Poland and Norway from coordinating their European policies wherever they both find it to be beneficial, nor from developing closer bilateral relations wherever suitable.

4.2. Norway

At the beginning of 2016, **Norway** faces what could be labelled a “policy quandary” and all three elements studied by the GoodGov project (security, energy and migration) seem to be intertwined. The question of the mass **migration** is being increasingly viewed in **security** terms and labelled a threat to “way of life” in the country and a challenge to its governance structures, which were not prepared to deal with such a massive inflow. What also complicated the Norwegian debate on migration—and contributed to viewing the current crisis in security terms—was the fact that towards the end of 2015 the majority of asylum-seekers were coming from Russian territory (in October and November, more than 1,000 per week). This made some Norwegian observers claim that this was an element of Russia’s hybrid-warfare tactics³⁸ or at least a punitive measure against Norway for backing sanctions against it.³⁹

In addition, tackling the migration-related challenges comes with a relatively high price tag, and not only in Norway. One of the leading Norwegian military experts, Hågen Karlsen⁴⁰ presented an estimate that over the coming decades the cost could reach as much as NOK 400 billion. Other sources estimated the additional cost of dealing with the latest migration wave to be NOK 9.5 billion in 2016,⁴¹ which for comparison’s sake is 20% of the country’s total planned spending on defence-related matters (NOK 49.1 billion⁴²). Resources that were earmarked for other purposes, for instance, development aid, had to be re-directed to meet this new and unexpected migration challenge. The mass inflow of migrants is viewed not only as a societal but also an economic challenge. On top of this, Norway has had to cope with falling oil prices, creating an **energy**-related crisis negatively affecting its economy and society. In a situation when almost 50% of export revenue has until recently been generated by sales of petroleum products and the state budget for 2016 was estimated to have 18.8% of its revenues generated by the petroleum sector, an average oil price of NOK 440 per barrel (about \$50) means that the drastic fall in oil prices, combined with falling production since the peak in 2001, has placed economic constraints on the policy choices facing the country’s decision-makers. In 2015, the country’s petroleum revenues reached NOK 342 billion, but in 2016, they are expected to amount to only NOK 233.1 billion, provided the average price remains at about \$50 a barrel for the whole year.

The falling price of oil and the concurrent need to provide additional funding to deal with the migration crisis, now and in the future, may also undermine plans for additional investments in the country’s defence sector as proposed by the recently published recommendation prepared by the Norwegian Chief of Defence.⁴³ Prof. J. Haaland Matlary, expert of international relations and national security, framed the problem in a rather dramatic manner, asking whether it is right to treat migration-related expenses as more important than defence-related expenditures and whether the low oil price means Norway must scale down its defences.⁴⁴

Norway’s defence minister, in her annual speech, said the country’s military has to face new economic realities and adapt to the changing economic circumstances. In the relatively short

³⁸ G. Hågen Karlsen, “Strategispill på Storskog,” *Dagens Næringsliv*, 9 November 2015, www.dn.no/meninger/debatt/2015/11/09/2149/Flyktningkrisen/strategispill-p-storskog.

³⁹ P.A. Aale, “Putin straffer Norge,” *Aftenposten*, 23 October 2015, www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/Putin-straffer-Norge-med-asylsokere-8214587.html.

⁴⁰ G. Hågen Karlsen, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ K. Skard, T. Gjerstad, “Asylstrømmen koster 9,5 milliarder i 2016,” *Dagens Næringsliv*, 28 October 2015, www.dn.no/nyheter/politikk/Samfunn/2015/10/28/1448/Statsbudsjettet/asylstrømmen-koster-95-milliarder-i-2016.

⁴² “Forsvarsbudsjettet 2016,” www.statsbudsjettet.no/Statsbudsjettet-2016/Statsbudsjettet-fra-A-til-A/Forsvars-budsjettet-2016/#artikkel.

⁴³ “Forsvarssjefens militære fagråd – Et forsvar i endring,” <https://forsvaret.no/fmr>.

⁴⁴ H. Matlary, “Trusselen mot Forsvaret,” 19 January 2016, www.dn.no/meninger/debatt/2016/01/19/2143/Kronikk/trusselen-mot-forsvaret.

speech, economic factors were mentioned 37 times and she underlined that developments in defence should be seen in a broader context. As she chose to put it, “[we] want to have a strong defence, but we also need responsible economic policy.”⁴⁵ Although in her interview with CNN Defence Minister Søreide warned of the threat from Russia, saying that after the annexation of Crimea relations with Russia would never be the same,⁴⁶ there is a widely held conviction among Norwegian experts and its intelligence community⁴⁷ that Russian aggression against a NATO country, including Norway, is not very probable in the months or years to come.⁴⁸ However, this optimistic assessment has been recently contested by some Norwegian analysts who point out that the proposals on reform of the Norwegian armed forces presented recently by the chief of defence do not take into consideration recent developments on either the Russian side or in NATO. According to this view, Russia’s capabilities have increased drastically in recent years and it may have a strategic interest in securing control over at least part of Norwegian territory in case of a conflict with the West while NATO’s will and ability to project its power and help Norway in the case of a crisis in relations with Russia have diminished, and thus, Norway should reform its military forces with those factors in mind.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the falling oil price and the deepening of the economic crisis in Russia may lead it to cut its defence spending. From the Norwegian perspective, as well as that of Russia’s other NATO or EU neighbours, such a development would be viewed as something positive, not least because the need to test the quality of the Allied security guarantee would be less imminent. This is especially important for NATO’s frontline countries—those with a shared border with Russia, including Norway, Poland and the three Baltic republics, which due to geographical and strategic reasons, are the most vulnerable.

⁴⁵ I.E. Søreide, “Nyttårsforedraget, Oslo Militære Samfund, 11 January 2016, www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/eny-langtidsplan-for-forsvarssektoren--vart-utgangspunkt-og-vare-valg/id2470039.

⁴⁶ See: M. Krever, “Norway: ‘We are faced with a different Russia’,” 26 February 2015, <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/25/world/amanpour-norway-ine-eriksen-soreide>.

⁴⁷ Norwegian Intelligence Service, “Annual Assessment 2015,” http://forsvaret.no/fakta/_ForsvaretDocuments/Focus2015-ENG_hele_lav_19.05.pdf. There, it states the following: “Despite significant military and security policy shifts in 2014, NIS maintains that Russia does not, in the current situation, pose a military threat to Norway. Threats arise from a combination of capability and intention, and although Russia’s capability is increasing it is currently difficult to envision any rational basis for Russian military action against Norway in the short to medium term.”

⁴⁸ See, for instance: L. Rowe, “Norsk russlandsdebatt er påfallende lite forankret i virkeligheten,” *Aftenposten*, 16 December 2015, www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/Norsk-russlandsdebatt-er-pafallende-lite-forankret-i-virkeligheten--Lars-Rowe-8286960.html.

⁴⁹ For more on those issues, see: S. Ulriksen, “En kommentar til Forsvarsjefens fagmilitære råd (1): NATO’s evne og vilje,” *NUPI Policy Brief*, 28, 2015, <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2367853>; and S. Ulriksen, “En kommentar til Forsvarsjefens fagmilitære råd (2): Strategi og struktur,” *NUPI Policy Brief*, 29, 2015, <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2374084>.

5. Afterword

This report presents the main empirical and governance-related findings of the GoodGov project. It had two main objectives: one, to examine various governance-related questions in the national, bilateral and European context, and two, to contribute to improving the quality of governance and the level of bilateral cooperation between Poland and Norway by providing better research-based insight into how governance-related vulnerabilities and challenges can be addressed within the existing European framework. The project aimed at helping Polish, Norwegian and European decision-makers identify problems in their cooperation and sought to provide practical research-based information on how to deal with various governance-related challenges.

In addition, the project was intended to improve the level of research cooperation between the leading Polish and Norwegian expert milieus, and this experience may, therefore, be relevant when other similar projects are to be designed and launched in the next round of EEA-based research projects. This may make the results of the project highly relevant, not only to those interested in learning more about the three reviewed areas of governance, namely security, energy and migration, in Poland, Norway, and the EU, but also to those who will design the framework for future research cooperation between Poland and Norway. In this sense, the completion of this project can offer some important insight into the field of transnational and international research on governance and related issues.

6. Appendices

6.1. GoodGov Researchers

PISM—The Polish Institute of International Affairs

Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz (energy)
Kinga Dudzińska-Raś (migration)
Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk (energy)
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska (governance)
Alex Lazarowicz (migration)
Wojciech Lorenz (security)
Zuzanna Nowak (energy, summary)
Roderick Parkes (governance, migration)
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski (security)
Lidia Puka (governance, energy, summary)
Marta Stormowska (governance, migration)
Marcin Terlikowski (security, summary)

NUPI—The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Ole Gunnar Austvik (energy)
Jakub M. Godzimirski (security, energy, migration, summary)
Nina Græger (security)
Pernille Rieker (security)
Ole Jacob Sending (governance)
Ulf Sverdrup (security)
John Todd (WP2)

ISP PAN—Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences

Dominik Smyrgała (governance)
Grzegorz Gałczyński (governance)
Krzysztof Kasianiuk (governance, security, summary)
Tomasz Paszewski (governance, security)

6.2. GoodGov Publications

Year	WP	Authors, title	Key topics
2014	1	Lidia Puka, Roderick Parkes (eds.), Jakub Godzimirski, Agata Gostyńska, Pernille Rieker, Marta Stormowska, "Linking National and European Governance: Lessons for Poland and Norway," <i>PISM Strategic File</i> , no. 17 (53)	Governance, EU, Norway, Poland
2014	1	Jakub M. Godzimirski, Krzysztof Kasianiuk, Kinga Dudzińska, Grzegorz Gałczyński, Tomasz Paszewski, Dominik Smyręga, <i>Polish and Norwegian Governance: Closing the Gaps</i> , PISM Report	Governance, rankings, security, energy, migration, Norway, Poland
2014	1	Dominik Smyręga, <i>Energy Policy in Poland. State of Governance</i> , GoodGov Project Working Paper	Energy, governance, Poland
2014	1	Ole Jacob Sending, "Governance in Norway and Poland: Can Unequal Partners Learn Anything from Each Other?," <i>PISM Strategic File</i> , no. 12 (48)	Governance, knowledge transfer, governance modes
2015	1	Jakub M. Godzimirski, Lidia Puka, Marta Stormowska, <i>Has the EU Learnt from the Ukraine Crisis? Changes to Security, Energy and Migration Governance</i> , PISM Report	EU, governance, Poland, Norway, Ukraine crisis, Russia governance, security, energy, migration
2014	2	Jakub M. Godzimirski, "Ukraina ved enda en korsvei," <i>Hvor hender det?</i> , 5/2014	Security, Ukraine crisis, Russia
2015	2	Wojciech Lorenz, Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski, "Norwegian and Polish Security Sector Reform Experiences from Afghanistan?," <i>PISM Strategic File</i> , no. 1 (64)	Security, Poland, Norway, NATO, Afghanistan
2015	2	Nina Græger, John Todd, "Still a "Strategic" EU-NATO Partnership? Bridging Governance Challenges through Practical Cooperation," <i>PISM Policy Paper</i> , no. 21 (123)	Security, EU, NATO, Poland, Norway
2015	2	Pernille Rieker, Marcin Terlikowski, "The Limits and Achievements of Regional Governance in Security: NORDEFECO and the V4 PISM," <i>PISM Policy Paper</i> , no. 25 (127)	Security, regional cooperation
2015	2	Marcin Terlikowski, Jakub M. Godzimirski, Krzysztof Kasianiuk, Wojciech Lorenz, Tomasz Paszewski, Marcin A. Piotrowski, Pernille Rieker, Ulf Sverdrup, <i>The Security Policy of Poland and Norway in the National, Regional and European Dimensions</i> , PISM Report	Security, Poland, Norway, Russia, NATO
2014	3	Lidia Puka, "The Paradox of a Stable Supplier: Norway in the European Union's Gas Strategy," <i>PISM Bulletin</i> , no. 122 (717)	Energy, Norway, gas, EU
2015	3	Zuzanna Nowak, Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Jakub Godzimirski, "The Power to Influence Europe? Russia's Grand Gas Strategy," <i>PISM Strategic File</i> , no. 6 (69)	Energy, Russia, Norway, gas, Poland, EU
2015	3	Zuzanna Nowak, Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Jakub Godzimirski, "Macht aus der Pipeline. Russlands energiepolitik und die EU," <i>Osteuropa</i> , Nr 3, pp. 151–161	Energy, Russia, Norway, gas, Poland, EU
2015	3	Lidia Puka, Ole Gunnar Austvik, Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, "Norwegian Energy Policy in the Changing EU Environment: What Poland Can Learn for Developing Its Shale Gas Industry," <i>PISM Strategic File</i> , no. 4 (67)	Energy, Poland, Norway, shale gas, governance
2015	3	Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Zuzanna Nowak, Lidia Puka, <i>The EU Gas Game: Time to Redefine the Rules? Case Studies of Russia and Norway and Lessons for the EU Norway and Poland</i> , PISM Report	Energy, Poland, Norway, EU, Russia, gas
2015	4	Alex Lazarowicz, "Governance of the Free Movement of EU Citizens: Weathering the Storm of Politicisation," <i>PISM Policy Paper</i> , no. 3 (105)	Migration, EU, mobility, free movement
2015	4	Marta Stormowska, "Mobile EU Citizens or Migrants? Assessing the Polish Diaspora in Norway," <i>PISM Policy Paper</i> , no. 10 (112)	Migration, Poland, Norway
2015	4	Kinga Dudzińska, Jakub Godzimirski, Roderick Parkes, "Border and Migration Management in the East: The Cases of Norway and Poland," <i>PISM Policy Paper</i> , no. 31 (133)	Migration, border control, gender, small border traffic, Norway, Poland, Russia, Ukraine
2015	4	Jakub M. Godzimirski, Marta Stormowska, Kinga Dudzińska, <i>New European Diasporas and Migration Governance: Poles in Norway</i> , PISM Report	Migration, Poland, Norway, sending country, receiving country
2015	4	Jakub M. Godzimirski, "Flyktingkrise i Europa – hva står på spill?," <i>Hvor hender det?</i> , 20/2015	Migration, EU, governance, crisis
2016	5	Tomasz Paszewski, "Can Poland defend itself?," <i>Survival</i> , vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 117–134	Security, Poland, Russia, NATO

6.3. GoodGov Events

Date	Place	Type	Title
09.10.2013	Warsaw	Conference	Governing Together: Towards a Polish-Norwegian Approach to Transnational Challenges
19.05.2014	Warsaw	Expert Seminar	Polish-Norwegian Expert Roundtable on Energy Governance
11.06.2014	Warsaw	Expert Seminar	Polish-Norwegian Expert Roundtable on Security and Defence Governance
17.06.2014	Warsaw	Expert Seminar	Polish-Norwegian Expert Roundtable on Migration Governance
06.11.2014	Oslo	Conference	The Ukrainian crisis as a challenge for national and European security, energy and migration governance? Insights from Norway and Poland
16.03.2015	Warsaw	Workshop	How to create state policy in the field of energy? / Jak tworzyć politykę państwa w dziedzinie surowców energetycznych?
27.04.2015	Warsaw	Workshop	How to cooperate with the Polish diaspora on the free movement of people? / Jak współpracować z polską diasporą w warunkach swobodnego przepływu osób?
08.06.2015	Warsaw	Workshop	How to create a multi-dimensional vision of involvement in crisis-management operations? / Jak tworzyć wielowymiarową wizję zaangażowania w operacje zarządzania kryzysowego?



PISM

POLSKI INSTYTUT SPRAW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The **Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)** is one of the most influential government-affiliated research institutes worldwide. It promotes the flow of ideas that inform and enhance the foreign policy of Poland. PISM provides independent analysis and advice to all branches of government, contributes to wider debates on international relations and houses one of the best specialist libraries in Central Europe.



The **Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (ISP PAN)** was founded in September 1990 as an entirely new institution within the structure of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Its activities constitute a response to the challenge to study post-communist societies from a comparative perspective. ISP PAN carries out research in sociology, history, geopolitics and political theory, linking both empirical and theoretical study of societies.



Norwegian Institute
of International
Affairs

The **Norwegian Institute of International Relations (NUPI)** has more than 50 years of experience and is Norway's leading independent centre for research and information on international political and economic issues. It undertakes long-term basic research as well as short-term applied research and advisory services. NUPI has been ranked among the top international think tanks in several recent rankings.

Project GoodGov—“National and European Governance: Polish and Norwegian Cooperation Towards More Efficient Security, Energy and Migration Policies”—is a Polish–Norwegian research project conducted by PISM in cooperation with NUPI and ISP PAN.

This report presents the main empirical and governance-related findings of the GoodGov project. It also maps the project's achievements, examines its policy relevance and identifies various knowledge gaps revealed during the study that should be addressed by new research.

The research leading to these results has received funding from the Polish–Norwegian Research Programme operated by the National Centre for Research and Development under the Norwegian Financial Mechanism 2009–2014 in the framework of Project Contract No Pol-Nor/202499/39/2013.



POLSKI INSTYTUT SPRAW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
UL. WARECKA 1A, 00-950 WARSZAWA
TEL. (+48) 22 556 80 00, FAX (+48) 22 556 80 99
PISM@PISM.PL, WWW.PISM.PL

978-83-64895-75-3 pb
978-83-64895-76-0 pdf