Management
; Operations Research & Management Science
WOS研究方向:
Business & Economics
; Operations Research & Management Science
英文摘要:
We explore the role of a transmission system operator (TSO) that builds a transmission line to accommodate renewable energy in order to lower emissions as required by government policy. In contrast to central planning, a TSO in a deregulated electricity industry can only indirectly influence outcomes through its choice of the transmission line capacity. Via a bi-level model, we show that this results in less transmission capacity and with limited emissions control in a perfectly competitive industry vis-a-vis a benchmark centrally planned system. A carbon charge on industry that fully accounts for the cost of pollution damage leads to a perfect alignment of incentives and maximised social welfare only under perfect competition. By contrast, a carbon charge may actually lower social welfare under a Cournot oligopoly as the resulting reduction in consumption facilitates the further exercise of market power. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1.UCL, Dept Stat Sci, London, England 2.Stockholm Univ, Dept Comp & Syst Sci, Stockholm, Sweden 3.HEC Montreal, Dept Decis Sci, Montreal, PQ, Canada 4.Natl Grad Inst Policy Studies GRIPS, Tokyo, Japan 5.RIETI, Tokyo, Japan 6.Univ Calif Santa Cruz, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Baskin Sch Engn, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA
Recommended Citation:
Siddiqui, Afzal S.,Tanaka, Makoto,Chen, Yihsu. Sustainable transmission planning in imperfectly competitive electricity industries: Balancing economic and environmental outcomes[J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,2019-01-01,275(1):208-223