DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112308
论文题名: Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power
作者: Heim S. ; Götz G.
刊名: Energy Policy
ISSN: 03014215
出版年: 2021
卷: 155 语种: 英语
中文关键词: Auctions
; Balancing power
; Collusion
; Energy markets
; Market power
; Reserve power
英文关键词: Auction design
; Auction markets
; Balancing power
; Collusion
; Energy markets
; Market Power
; Pay-as-bid auction
; Power
; Price increase
; Reserve power
; Power markets
; auction
; competition (economics)
; energy market
; price dynamics
; Germany
英文摘要: We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power that did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and bidding strategies using micro-level bidding data, we find a concentrated market with highly pivotal suppliers in an environment with completely inelastic demand and high entry barriers. We provide descriptive evidence that the price increase was triggered by an abuse of the “guess the clearing price” principle of discriminatory auctions via repeated pretended “bad guessing” of the marginal bid by the most dominant supplier. As intentional “bad guessing” of marginal bids is hard to prove, this suggests that the auction design is crucial for the competition authority's monitoring power – an issue that is often neglected in the discussion on the properties of auction designs. In fact, given regulatory threats, the deemed main advantage of pay-as-bid auctions over uniform price auctions and the popular belief that they reduce dominant suppliers' withholding incentives and diminish their ability to tacitly collude may be questioned in non-static settings. This suggests that pay-as-bid auctions may not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive behavior, but can even increase them when market power is high and demand inelastic, which is the case in virtually all energy markets. © 2021 Elsevier Ltd Citation statistics:
资源类型: 期刊论文
标识符: http://119.78.100.158/handle/2HF3EXSE/167816
Appears in Collections: 气候变化与战略
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作者单位: MINES ParisTech (CERNA), PSL, France; University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas (CRED), France; ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research Mannheim, Germany; University of Gießen, Germany
Recommended Citation:
Heim S.,Götz G.. Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power[J]. Energy Policy,2021-01-01,155