DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111919
论文题名: Pricing strategy and coordination of automobile manufacturers based on government intervention and carbon emission reduction
作者: Ma J. ; Hou Y. ; Wang Z. ; Yang W.
刊名: Energy Policy
ISSN: 03014215
出版年: 2021
卷: 148 语种: 英语
中文关键词: Carbon emission
; Dynamic complexity research
; Electric vehicle
; Fuel vehicle
; Pricing strategy
英文关键词: Carbon
; Costs
; Electric automobiles
; Emission control
; Energy utilization
; Fuels
; Optimal systems
; Outsourcing
; Public policy
; Taxation
; Automobile manufacturers
; Bounded rationality
; Carbon emission reductions
; Government intervention
; Optimal solutions
; Preferential policies
; System's stabilities
; Vehicle manufacturers
; Automobile manufacture
; automobile
; carbon emission
; electric vehicle
; emission control
; manufacturing
; pollution tax
; price dynamics
英文摘要: The game model of the duopoly automobile manufacturers established in this paper takes the carbon emission reduction policy constraint as the research background, and discusses how the electric vehicle and the fuel vehicle compete in the performance of the product in the delay pricing decision under the strategic consumer, which is seldom considered in other related studies. The government gives electric vehicle consumers preferential policies on consumption subsidies and exemption from consumption tax. Additionally, he levies consumption tax and sales carbon tax from fuel vehicle consumers and manufacturers, respectively. The government also supports the development of electric vehicles by establishing charging piles. This paper cast light on how different market structures and different adjusting speed of price work on the vehicle manufacturers' operation and the system's stability. At first, we consider a single period game to derive the optimal solutions, finding that government intervention policies can maximize the social welfare. Additionally, the impacts of tax and subsidy on social welfare are different when fuel vehicle manufacturer is leader. Then, we consider a repeated game where players make decision based on bounded rationality. We compare the optimal solutions and give a numerical simulation for the dynamic process. For fuel vehicle manufacturer, too much energy consumption triggers high emission tax and also lowers consumers' surplus. We also find that fuel vehicle manufacturer acting as the leader enables the system to be more stable than the scenario in the current vehicle industry condition, where the electric vehicle manufacturer acts as the leader. © 2020 Elsevier Ltd Citation statistics:
资源类型: 期刊论文
标识符: http://119.78.100.158/handle/2HF3EXSE/167909
Appears in Collections: 气候变化与战略
There are no files associated with this item.
作者单位: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072, China
Recommended Citation:
Ma J.,Hou Y.,Wang Z.,et al. Pricing strategy and coordination of automobile manufacturers based on government intervention and carbon emission reduction[J]. Energy Policy,2021-01-01,148