globalchange  > 气候变化与战略
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112434
论文题名:
Incentive policies for prefabrication implementation of real estate enterprises: An evolutionary game theory-based analysis
作者: Wang J.; Qin Y.; Zhou J.
刊名: Energy Policy
ISSN: 03014215
出版年: 2021
卷: 156
语种: 英语
中文关键词: Evolutionary game ; Incentive policy ; Policy efficiency ; Prefabrication ; Sustainable development
英文关键词: Construction industry ; Efficiency ; Environmental management ; Game theory ; Planning ; Construction method ; Environmental performance ; Evolutionary game models ; Evolutionary game theory ; Evolutionary games ; Evolutionary stable strategies ; Incentives policy ; Policy efficiency ; Prefabrication ; Real estate enterprise ; Sustainable development ; construction industry ; construction method ; game theory ; incentive ; state role ; sustainable development ; China
英文摘要: Prefabrication construction method has been considered an effective way for enhancing the environmental performance and sustainable development of the construction industry. Many countries have imposed policies to stimulate the implementation of prefabrication. However, the efficiency of the incentive policies in China did not turn out as expected because of the existing benefit game between real estate enterprises and the government under the influence of consumers' purchasing intention. An evolutionary game model was established on the basis of 16 variables influencing the strategy selection of game players for determining the effective incentive policies. The interaction effect of the two players’ behaviours was discussed. Four probable scenarios of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) exist in the game. However, the probabilities of “Incentive” from the government and “Implement” from real estate enterprises depend on the values of the 16 variables. The simulation of the evolutionary system was conducted to analyze the critical variables influencing the game. The increase of reputational incentives, financial incentives, the acceptance level of consumers and penalty and the reduction of additional costs can speed up the achievement of ESS between the government and real estate enterprises. Incentive policies should focus not only on real estate enterprises but also on consumers, manufacturers of prefabricated components and contractors. © 2021 Elsevier Ltd
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被引频次[WOS]:54   [查看WOS记录]     [查看WOS中相关记录]
资源类型: 期刊论文
标识符: http://119.78.100.158/handle/2HF3EXSE/168065
Appears in Collections:气候变化与战略

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作者单位: School of Economics and Management, China University of Petroleum, Qingdao, 266580, China; Institute for Energy Economics and Policy, China University of Petroleum, Qingdao, 266580, China; School of Management Engineering, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan, 250100, China

Recommended Citation:
Wang J.,Qin Y.,Zhou J.. Incentive policies for prefabrication implementation of real estate enterprises: An evolutionary game theory-based analysis[J]. Energy Policy,2021-01-01,156
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