globalchange  > 科学计划与规划
DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2016.1259100
Scopus记录号: 2-s2.0-85006118708
论文题名:
Ambitious climate policy through centralization? Evidence from the European Union
作者: Bausch C; , Görlach B; , Mehling M
刊名: Climate Policy
ISSN: 1469-3062
EISSN: 1752-7457
出版年: 2017
卷: 17
起始页码: S32
结束页码: S50
语种: 英语
英文关键词: Centralization ; climate policy ; decentralization ; EU ETS ; European Union ; member states ; national policies ; renewable energy
Scopus关键词: alternative energy ; centralization ; climate change ; decentralization ; emissions trading ; environmental policy ; European Union ; renewable resource ; Europe
Scopus学科分类: nvironmental Science: General Environmental Science ; Earth and Planetary Sciences: Atmospheric Science
英文摘要: Finding the right balance between centralization and decentralization is a struggle as old as the European integration project itself. Centralization, defined as a shift of competences to a higher and more aggregated governance level, offers a number of advantages, including greater policy consistency and fewer market barriers and competitive distortions. However, it also comes at the price of reduced flexibility to accommodate national circumstances, which in turn can undermine domestic political support. As the evolution of climate policy in the EU illustrates, the degree of centralization does not necessarily correlate with the level of policy ambition with respect to climate protection. Tracing the role of centralization debates in the context of emissions trading and of policies to promote renewable energy, this article shows shifting preferences about centralization over time, and attempts to explain the causes of these changes and their implications for climate policy. It also addresses a recent trend towards greater regional cooperation, which is reflected in the emerging notion of a European Energy Union. But it also concludes that generalizations about the impact of centralization–or a lack thereof–fall short of the nuances in each individual case. Policy relevance Following its recent enlargement, and faced with changing economic and political circumstances at the national level, the EU must once again confront difficult questions about the adequate balance between centralized and decentralized approaches as it seeks to operationalize the climate and energy targets for 2030. The need for greater ambition in climate protection, unilateral measures taken by Member States to induce greater greenhouse gas mitigation in the power and industry sectors covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, divergent strategies to stabilize electricity markets as these integrate growing shares of variable renewable energy sources, or the ongoing discussion about a European Energy Union all underscore the need for improved understanding of the implications of centralization. This article draws on past experiences with central climate and energy policies to explain factors affecting the decision for or against centralization, as well as the effects of such decisions. © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
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资源类型: 期刊论文
标识符: http://119.78.100.158/handle/2HF3EXSE/80281
Appears in Collections:科学计划与规划

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作者单位: Ecologic Institute, Pfalzburger Str. 43/44, Berlin, Germany; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA, United States

Recommended Citation:
Bausch C,, Görlach B,, Mehling M. Ambitious climate policy through centralization? Evidence from the European Union[J]. Climate Policy,2017-01-01,17
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